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ABSTRACT 
‘Impossible Tales’: Language and Monstrosity in the Literary Fantastic 
Irene Bulla 
 
This dissertation analyzes the ways in which monstrosity is articulated in fantastic literature, a 
genre or mode that is inherently devoted to the challenge of representing the unrepresentable. 
Through the readings of a number of nineteenth-century texts and the analysis of the fiction of 
two twentieth-century writers (H. P. Lovecraft and Tommaso Landolfi), I show how the 
intersection of the monstrous theme with the fantastic literary mode forces us to consider how 
a third term, that of language, intervenes in many guises in the negotiation of the relationship 
between humanity and monstrosity. I argue that fantastic texts engage with monstrosity as a 
linguistic problem, using it to explore the limits of discourse and constructing through it a 
specific language for the indescribable. The monster is framed as a bizarre, uninterpretable 
sign, whose disruptive presence in the text hints towards a critique of overconfident rational 
constructions of ‘reality’ and the self.  
The dissertation is divided into three main sections. The first reconstructs the critical debate 
surrounding fantastic literature – a decades-long effort of definition modeling the same tension 
staged by the literary fantastic; the second offers a focused reading of three short stories from 
the second half of the nineteenth century (“What Was It?,” 1859, by Fitz-James O’Brien, the 
second version of “Le Horla,” 1887, by Guy de Maupassant, and “The Damned Thing,” 1893, 
by Ambrose Bierce) in light of the organizing principle of apophasis; the last section 
investigates the notion of monstrous language in the fiction of H. P. Lovecraft and Tommaso 
Landolfi. 
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This dissertation analyzes the ways in which monstrosity is articulated in fantastic literature, a 
genre or mode that is inherently devoted to the challenge of representing the unrepresentable. 
Through the readings of a number of nineteenth-century texts and the analysis of the fiction of 
two twentieth-century writers (H. P. Lovecraft and Tommaso Landolfi), I show how the 
intersection of the monstrous theme with the fantastic literary mode forces us to consider how 
a third term, that of language, intervenes in many guises in the negotiation of the relationship 
between humanity and monstrosity. I argue that fantastic texts engage with monstrosity as a 
linguistic problem, using it to explore the limits of discourse and constructing through it a 
specific language for the indescribable, built around the core principle of apophasis. The 
monster is framed as a bizarre, uninterpretable sign, whose disruptive presence in the text hints 
towards a critique of overconfident rational constructions of ‘reality’ and the self.  
The fantastic mode identifies a way of writing that flourished especially in the nineteenth 
century in the United States, Germany, France, England and (with some delay) in Italy. A 
decades-long critical debate has been developing around its definition; in this study, I consider 
a story fantastic if it employs a generally realistic setting to stage the encounter of a character 
with unknown and ineffable forces, usually (but not necessarily) of supernatural origin. The 
specificity of this type of narrative, compared to other genres or modes featuring the 
supernatural such as the epic and the fairy-tale, lies in the fact that the world it reconstructs is 
a faithful image of ‘reality,’ i.e. regulated by scientific laws and the rules of logic and identity; 
it is therefore dependent on a post-Enlightenment, post-scientific-revolution interpretation of 
		 	2	
magical and supernatural thinking as a superseded cultural code. In the economy of a fantastic 
story, the impossible event or manifestation cannot be ascribed to mere physical causes such 
as dream or hallucination: the text refuses to be read this way. This sets up the fantastic 
occurrence as an inexplicable breach or “déchirure”1 in the fabric of reality, prompting 
questions on the relationship between real and unreal, natural and supernatural, possible and 
impossible, subject and object. In fact, according to Tzvetan Todorov, whose seminal 
Introduction à la littérature fantastique (1970) has defined subsequent critical debates on the 
supernatural in literature, the fantastic is a fertile ground for the analysis of issues underlying 
all literary texts precisely because it foregrounds the relationship between real and imaginary: 
in this sense, it represents “the quintessence of literature.”2 Such foregrounding takes the shape 
of represented encounters on the edge of the natural and the possible, resulting in characters 
being stuck in a cognitive and linguistic deadlock.  
The fact that fantastic literature deals in bizarre occurrences and supernatural apparitions 
that disrupt the laws of nature and logic (as established by a rationalistic, secularized culture) 
should not lead us to consider it, as Todorov does, “nothing but the bad conscience of [the] 
positivist era”3 – its irrational counterpoint. In fact, the fantastic presupposes an 
epistemological model based on philosophical naturalism (i.e. nothing in the world exists 
outside the confines of nature and man’s only instrument for the study of nature is the scientific 
                                                
1 Roger Caillois, “De la féerie à la science-fiction,” in Anthologie du fantastique, ed. Roger Caillois 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1966), vol. I, 8. In this study, quotations in Italian always appear in the original 
language, while quotations in other languages are given either in the original or in English, whenever a 
published translation is available. 
2 Tzvetan Todorov, The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1975), 168. 
3 Ibid. 
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method) in order to question its absolute validity; it critiques overconfident constructions of 
reason by applying to them the same skepticism cultivated by scientific thought. In doing so, 
it undermines nineteenth-century Positivistic optimism in the indefinite enlargement of the 
human sphere of knowledge (and the notion of a unitary subjectivity as agent of this operation) 
through the representation of dark areas of nature and the self, which it frames as ultimately 
impervious to human cognition.  
The defining trait of a fantastic story is to be found not only in the epistemological doubt 
experienced by a character when faced with an inexplicable occurrence, but also in the related 
struggle that s/he experiences when attempting to describe it. Hence the seminal questions 
staged by the fantastic: “what is this?” and, or especially, “how do I talk about it?” The fantastic 
experience coincides, more than anything else, with “quella vicenda che consiste nel fatto di 
raccontare”4; it is an “avventura conoscitiva,”5 but also an avventura espressiva. This is why 
its narrators are usually autodiegetic, i.e. they are the main character in the story. Through this 
focalization, a fantastic text generally provides a limited point of view and a fragmentary 
account, creating an economy of withdrawn information that heightens the mystery around the 
events described, as well as the impotency of the narrator to make sense of them through a 
linear narrative. Not by chance has the fantastic been compared to the detective story; however, 
if all pieces of a detective story usually fall into place, in a fantastic text the narrative material 
never fully yields to logical discourse, and the narrator (who is no Sherlock Holmes) is 
constantly at a loss for words and explanations.  
                                                
4 Carla Benedetti, “L’enunciazione fantastica come esperienza dei limiti,” in La narrazione fantastica, 
ed. Remo Ceserani, Lucio Lugnani, Gianluigi Goggi, Carla Benedetti and Emanuella Scarano (Pisa: 
Nistri-Lischi, 1983), 297.  
5 Emanuella Scarano, “I modi dell’autenticazione,” ibid., 381.  
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The fantastic interrogates the extent to which a subject’s conceptual limits are also his or 
her discursive limits; it lures its narrator-characters into situations in which their experiences 
exceed their linguistic means. The present study takes the issue to the extreme by interrogating 
how a genre or mode especially concerned with ways of telling, whose “every page subverts 
linguistic categorizations,”6 describes the indescribable figure par excellence: the monster. 
Horrific synthesis of species and beings, or delirious parody of existing creatures, the monster 
is an enemy of fixed categories; it begs the question of whether it is real or imaginary, because 
it is by definition neither or both. Its ontological multiplicity defies the structural sequencing 
of rational thought, deductive reasoning and syntactical order. If the fantastic is the 
quintessence of literature, is the monster the quintessence of the fantastic? The hypothesis 
advanced in this study is that its puzzling presence materializes (in ways that are all but 
straightforward) the limits of knowledge and discourse and allows for an even more explicit 
treatment of exquisitely fantastic questions in the texts. How does one represent the 
unrepresentable? How does one name the unnameable? How does the text describe this effort 
and what are the stakes of this act of naming? What do monstrous encounters reveal about the 
nature of language and our relationship to it? Can language itself become monstrous? 
In the first chapter, I offer a detailed reconstruction of and commentary on the critical 
debate around the fantastic genre or mode. It is by now a critical commonplace to acknowledge 
that every study on the fantastic, no matter its nature and aims, must begin with a more or less 
ample survey of the critical literature to date. My dissertation is no exception to this rule, and 
for good reason. The fantastic is a very debated province: depending on critic and ‘school’ of 
                                                
6 Todorov, 168. 
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thought, its chronological scope varies from the entire intellectual history of mankind (if it is 
made to coincide with the faculty of imagination) to the past two centuries (if restricted to a 
specifically modern textual tradition); its typological criteria may include a mere dozen texts 
(according to Todorov’s strict hésitation theory) or coincide with the entire body of world 
literature (in the evaluation of Jorge Luis Borges). Therefore, it is unwise to enter into a 
discussion of the fantastic without first defining what, exactly, is meant by this category. The 
chapter begins with a brief discussion on the difference between fantastic as genre and as mode, 
embracing the position adopted, among others, by Remo Ceserani, who associates the term 
both with a localized textual tradition (genre) and with a set of rhetorical and formal strategies, 
thematic networks and textual approaches that become available across several genres (mode). 
I show how the tendency of fantastic literature to engage with modern epistemological and 
philosophical debates determines the ways in which it frames super- or preternatural 
phenomena, as well as its relationship to thematic and structural aspects of realistic literature. 
A fantastic story relies on the conventions of literary realism, and the readerly expectations 
they generate, in order to undermine them from the inside, perverting the referential credibility 
of the text through fragmentary, opaque, and unreliable narratives. 
According to the noted theoretical formulation advanced by Tzvetan Todorov, the 
fantastic is the hesitation experienced by the character and the reader alike when faced with an 
event that falls outside the parameters of conventional reality; this hesitation disappears 
whenever the character (and the reader) explains the event either as a natural or as a 
supernatural phenomenon, thereby making a choice that dispels the fantastic ambiguity. In the 
chapter and throughout the entire study, I move away from the notion of choice (which, as 
demonstrated by Orlando, Amigoni, Lugnani and others, is not entirely productive) and 
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approach the fantastic as a thematization of doubt achieved through the represented reaction of 
the narrating subject (Benedetti), regardless of whether such doubt is dispelled in the end; I 
also choose to forgo any critical consideration on the slippery, extra-textual entity of the reader. 
In the last section of the first chapter, I offer an analysis of the narrative and rhetorical 
strategies displayed by a number of classic texts from the nineteenth century. All of these 
devices (such as a flaunted unreliability of the narrator and a thematization of the act of telling 
through the representation of fictive audiences) confirm that the fantastic mode is structurally 
concerned with the conditions of representation. 
The second chapter introduces the question of monstrosity into the equation. Not unlike 
the fantastic, monstrosity is a slippery notion that begs definition – the irony being the fact that 
its only fixed characteristic seems to be its indefinability. However, if we shift the focus from 
its constitutive features to its (textual) impact, we realize that, in a fantastic text, the encounter 
with monstrosity seems to provoke in the characters a radical “inability to «tell».”7 The 
infinitive is to be intended in its two related meanings: both as “to distinguish” (i.e. to subject 
the creature to a process of taxonomization which it always escapes – therefore pointing to its 
irreducible hybridity) and as “to speak” (i.e. to drag the unruly, ineffable monstrous sign into 
the realm of language). No figure makes more evident how the question of classification is 
essentially linked to an act of naming. 
Monstrosity is usually present in all lists of fantastic themes compiled by the critical 
literature, together with other thematic staples such as the double, life after death, the 
fragmented body, the déjà vu and so on. Because of the distinctiveness of its recurrent themes, 
                                                
7 Jack Halberstam, Skin Shows: Gothic Horror and the Technology of Monsters (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1995), 23. 
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fantastic literature lends itself well to the kind of thematic criticism indicted by critics such as 
Roman Jakobson and Leo Spitzer: the collection of rough data about the appearance of a certain 
theme across a number of literary works, a method that, while building a solid basis for the 
exercise of critical reading, if used by itself lacks the capacity to penetrate and illuminate any 
deep interrelation between an element and its context.8 As suggested by Remo Ceserani (editor, 
together with Mario Domenichelli and Pino Fasano, of a Dizionario dei temi letterari9), 
thematic criticism should privilege “quei temi che si prestino, più facilmente di altri, a svolgere 
una funzione costruttiva nel testo anche dal punto di vista formale, divenendo procedimenti 
testuali, fornendo un tessuto metaforico alle invenzioni narrative, svolgendo un ruolo attivo nel 
gioco di tematizzazione dei procedimenti formali e di testualizzazione dei temi.”10 With these 
warnings in mind, the second chapter raises the following questions: what happens when we 
intersect the monstrous theme with the fantastic genre? Considering that monsters pop up all 
over the literary landscape, in fables, fairy-tales, mythology, epic, and religious narratives, just 
to name a few, what does a monster do in a fantastic text? What can we learn about this literary 
mode from the way it accommodates the cumbersome presence of its monstrous figures? 
                                                
8 On this see Pierluigi Pellini’s account of the recent critical redemption of thematic criticism from its 
fame as “ingenuo positivismo contenutista” (Pierluigi Pellini, “Critica tematica e tematologia: paradossi 
e aporie,” Allegoria, no. 58, 2008: 61; for a recent, comprehensive reflection on contemporary 
developments of thematic criticism, cf. this and other essays in the section “Il tema: la critica tematica 
oggi” on the same issue of Allegoria). 
9 Remo Ceserani, Mario Domenichelli, and Pino Fasani, eds., Dizionario dei temi letterari, 3 vols., 
Milano: Garzanti, 2007. 
10 Remo Ceserani, “Il punto sulla critica tematica,” Allegoria, no. 58 (2008): 30. Quoting Zholkowsky, 
Alessandro Viti reminds us that “nei casi più interessanti i temi, dati semantici, attirano procedure 
formali analoghe” (Alessandro Viti, “Per una tematologia ermeneutica: sul Dizionario dei temi 
letterari,” Allegoria, no. 58, 2008: 99). 
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After tracing the origins of apophasis and defining the role of the monstrous creature in 
medieval theorizations, I discuss the significance of apophatic discourse for the study of 
fantastic literature, with special stress on the question of affirmative language and rational 
knowledge. Within this framework, I carry out an in-depth analysis of three short stories from 
the second half of the nineteenth century, whose most immediate unifying criterion is the 
presence of a material ghost (a tangible but invisible being): “What Was It?” (1859), by Fitz-
James O’Brien; the second version of “Le Horla” (1887) by Guy de Maupassant; and “The 
Damned Thing” (1893) by Ambrose Bierce. 
Through the readings in this chapter, I try to show how, at the rhetorical level, the elusive 
presence of the monster determines a constant performance of unsayability, especially reliant 
on the abundance of paraliptical statements (saying that something will not or cannot be said, 
and then saying it precisely through or despite this disavowal). Since the creature cannot be 
assessed directly though the senses or through mere logical reasoning, language has to content 
itself with fragments, ellipses and descriptions per viam negativam; the monster is always the 
object of a partial, tangential and ultimately incomplete knowledge. I read the appearance of 
these unusual monsters, which sow discord among the senses and suggest that the realm of 
material reality may be wider than humanly assessed, in light of the expansion of human 
faculties determined by late nineteenth-century scientific advancements such as the discovery 
of radio waves, telegraphy, and electromagnetism. If, on the one hand, these achievements 
determine an enlargement of the human domain over areas that were previously considered 
inaccessible, on the other they highlight the permanence of many more such areas, suggesting 
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that “the more we see, the less we are.”11 In conclusion, in these texts the figure of the material 
ghost works as a structuring principle on several levels: it determines the rhetorical-stylistic 
tics of their narrators; it hints at a broader notion of cataphatic (affirmative) language as 
unequipped to penetrate extrasensorial provinces of the real; it undermines any cosmology 
made to measure for the human mind, preventing “the adequation of the real with intellect.”12 
The third chapter goes on to analyze the “teratologically fabulous”13 creations of two 
twentieth-century authors, H. P. Lovecraft (1890-1937) and Tommaso Landolfi (1908-1979). 
Despite their significantly different approaches to the fantastic mode, both bodies of work 
allow for a reflection on the ‘survival’ of the mode after the end of the nineteenth century, 
when, according to Tzvetan Todorov’s notorious periodization, the blurring of boundaries 
between the real and the imaginary weakens the background against which the fantastic sets its 
disruption, and psychoanalysis makes the fantastic “useless”14 by appropriating (and 
‘explaining’) its themes and tropes. In fact, far from resigning to its own death, twentieth-
century fantastic makes the most of its belatedness by engaging explicitly with the literary 
tradition, heightening its reflexivity (already a structural feature of the mode) and thematizing 
its preferred devices and procedures. In teratological terms, this translates into the spawning of 
new, non-traditional monsters, unsettling embodiments of precisely the issues that Todorov 
associated with the end of the genre. For instance, the vast, indifferent cosmos that serves as a 
                                                
11 Matthew A. Taylor, “Ghost-Humanism; or, Specters of Materialism,” J19: The Journal of 
Nineteenth-Century Americanists I, no. 2 (2013): 417.  
12 David Williams, Deformed Discourse: The Function of the Monster in Mediaeval Thought and 
Literature (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1996), 59. 
13 H. P. Lovecraft, “The Dunwich Horror,” in Tales, ed. Peter Straub (New York: The Library of 
America, 2005), 389.  
14 Todorov, 160. 
		 	10	
backdrop for Lovecraft’s stories is populated by monsters that reflect the epistemological 
earthquake caused by Albert Einstein’s and Max Planck’s discoveries in theoretical physics: 
their bodies respond to an “abnormal, non-Euclidean”15 geometry; their dwelling places and 
their immemorial existence bend spacetime in ways that are inconceivable for (and profoundly 
incompatible with) the human mind. In order to describe such unthinkable dimensions, 
language makes itself monstrous through a “lushly overwritten”16 style, loaded with qualifiers 
and synonyms, that seems to mirror the innumerable appendages of the inconceivable creatures 
it struggles to describe. The notion of monstrous language is also thematized through the 
recurrent presence of “pseudobiblia,” fictional treatises of forbidden lore whose mere reading 
can push an individual to (and past) the edge of sanity. The virus of monstrosity hatches within 
those words in the same way as it lays dormant in the genetic makeup of a number of 
unfortunate characters, “searchers after horror”17 who pursue some forbidden truth only to find 
the inhuman within themselves, according to a principle of “progressive and ineluctable 
transformation of the monster-object into the monster-subject.”18 
Tommaso Landolfi’s peculiar brand of monstrosity builds a linguistically-inflected 
model for the unconscious, suggesting that a subject’s stability and rationality is primarily 
dependent on a functioning relationship with the language s/he uses, and that when that 
relationship is affected (i.e. revealed as precarious and based on convention), the character’s 
                                                
15 Lovecraft, “The Call of Cthulhu,” 193. 
16 Joyce Carol Oates, “The King of Weird,” The New York Review of Books 43, no. 17 (1996): np, 
accessed 20 March 2018, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1996/10/31/the-king-of-weird/ 
17 H. P. Lovecraft, “The Picture in the House,” in The Dunwich Horror and Others, ed. S. T. Joshi (Sauk 
City: Arkham House, 1984), 116. 
18 Maurice Lévy, Lovecraft: A Study in the Fantastic, trans. S. T. Joshi (Detroit: Wayne State University 
Press, 1988), 74. 
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mental infrastructure disintegrates completely. Consequently, Landolfi’s fiction does not rely 
on classic vampires and werewolves for the activation of the fantastic space, nor on the 
uncertain epistemological footing provoked by the non-traditional ghosts of nineteenth-century 
fantastic; instead, it transforms words themselves into monsters, locating the typically fantastic 
experience of the unknown in the relationship between the subject and his/her own language. 
In his fiction, words come alive in the shape of tiny, animal-like creatures demanding to be 
heard; everyday objects are made strange and eerie purely by virtue of a twisting of their 
signifiers; obsessive thoughts materialize outside a character’s brain in the form of undefinable 
creatures with unheard-of names, with paradoxical ‘bodies’ straddling the boundary between 
word and thing. These word-monsters offer an iconic representation of Landolfi’s aporetic 
conception of narrative, whereby the impossibility of dominating discourse clashes tragically 
with the impossibility of living outside of it, translating into a notion of the ultimate 
impossibility of literature.  
		 	12	
Chapter I 
The literary fantastic 
 
 
“Raisonnons un peu, s’il vous plaît, car la logique est 
de mise partout, même dans les contes de revenant.” 





1. Reframing the supernatural 
In a typical fantastic story, the author establishes a realistic, verisimilar world in which a 
seemingly supernatural event occurs, such as the return of the dead or a monstrous apparition. 
This event appears to have the same ontological weight (to be just as real) as the familiar, 
everyday objects and events that surround it, but is fundamentally at odds within the secular, 
naturalistic worldview that the characters embrace and represent. Such a worldview, which has 
theoretically banished the supernatural and is impervious to mystery and superstition, is 
therefore shown as relative and unstable, because incapable of accounting for a significant 
portion of the human experience. The characters’ reaction dramatizes the epistemological 
doubt and the linguistic deadlock that is the hallmark of fantastic narratives. One could also 
describe fantastic fiction by demarcating its territory within the larger realm of supernatural 
literature, on account of its treatment of supernatural or inexplicable elements. For instance, in 
epic narratives and fairy-tales, magical occurrences and monstrous creatures do not conflict 
with the diegetic world in which they occur; they are expected to be a part of it. Conversely, a 
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fantastic text sets up a world just like ‘ours’ until the appearance of the supernatural rips 
through the fabric of realistic illusion; the result is that of an element out of place, whose 
incongruity gives the text its vital energy and deeper significance. 
This basic model (with due variations) is especially observable in a cluster of texts 
written between the last decades of the eighteenth century and the entire nineteenth century in 
certain areas of the Western world – mainly France, Germany, England, the United States and 
Italy. On the one hand, these texts crystallize “una precisa tradizione testuale”19 – a historically-
determined, convention-bound genre. On the other, they participate in a literary mode, meaning 
“un insieme di procedimenti retorico-formali, atteggiamenti conoscitivi e aggregazioni 
tematiche, articolazioni dell’immaginario storicamente concrete e utilizzabili da vari codici 
linguistici, generi artistici o letterari.”20 Therefore, the fantastic also represents a textual 
‘approach’ or form on a par with the comic, tragic or pastoral, with a fundamental difference: 
while other modes are usually considered super-historical, the fantastic has a relatively recent 
birthdate. At the same time, it endures as a “temptation” until today in the shape of “a formal 
possibility which can be revived and renewed.”21 
In order to understand the features of this mode, it is especially important to assess it 
against the intellectual-historical conditions that underlie its emergence. In his landmark study 
of the fantastic, French-Bulgarian critic Tzvetan Todorov describes it as the dark side of 
scientism: “the literature of the fantastic is nothing but the bad conscience of [the] positivist 
                                                
19 Remo Ceserani, Il fantastico (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1996), 11. 
20 Ibid., 8. 
21 Fredric Jameson, “Magical Narratives: Romance as Genre,” New Literary History 7, no. 1 (1975): 
142.  
		 	14	
era.”22 However, this view simplifies excessively the ambiguities of the fantastic’s relative 
position in the cultural and literary systems of nineteenth-century Western society. The fantastic 
does not simply give voice to the persistence of pre-rational beliefs against a backdrop of 
scientific rationality which it supposedly protests: it fully participates in a secular, naturalistic 
system in order to put to the test its main gnoseological tenets (and, I would add, to consistently 
reveal them as insufficient).23 It explores the possibility of transcendence within a mainly 
immanent framework, turning any dogmatic application of scientific skepticism onto itself by 
applying the same relentless curiosity towards those aspects of human experience that post-
Enlightenment inquiries generally neglect.24 This probing operation follows two parallel paths, 
addressing both the ontological component of the naturalistic worldview (which negates the 
existence of supernatural entities) and the methodological component (which crowns the 
scientific method as the most suitable instrument for the acquisition of knowledge about the 
world).25 In other words, the fantastic both subverts overly confident definitions of reality and 
nature, and reflects upon the reliability of the way humans apprehend, elaborate and describe 
                                                
22 Todorov, 168. 
23 If, on the one hand, it is naïve (and downright incorrect) to picture a completely rational post-
Enlightenment, it is equally so to conceive fantastic literature as its irrational counterpoint. The mode 
generally shows the same commingling of scientific and para- or pseudo-scientific sensibility, the same 
tension between complete immanence and a longing for the spiritual, that is already embedded in 
Positivistic culture. 
24 “Il fantastico … può essere considerato una reazione all’affermarsi del razionalismo illuminista e di 
una visione scientifica del mondo, ma è anche paradossalmente impensabile senza quello stesso 
atteggiamento di dubbio sistematico con cui l’Illuminismo guarda alla religione” (Leonardo Cecchini, 
“Parlare per le notti”: il fantastico nell’opera di Tommaso Landolfi, Copenhagen: Museum 
Tusculanum Press, 2001, 31-32). 
25 David Papineau, “Naturalism,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta 
(Winter 2016). 
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the world. At the same time, it expresses a fundamental mistrust in the expressive and 
revelatory possibilities of language. 
It should not surprise us, then, that the fantastic generally shows, “nelle sue stesse 
strutture narrative e nei procedimenti formali che usa, un’evidente preferenza per le questioni 
epistemologiche.”26 This is the angle from which most fantastic themes are approached, such 
as death, the double, the monstrous, the nocturnal, the repressed: these are keys to open up and 
explore new, unsettling perspectives into the nature and borders of the known world, as well as 
into monolithic representations of subjectivity. One need only look, for instance, to the theme 
of death and its semantic constellations – a privileged territory of exploration in fantastic texts. 
Over the last decades of the eighteenth century and into the nineteenth, the idea of death and 
the process of dying underwent a discursive makeover, which the literary fantastic translated 
into novel approaches to the question of the relationship between life and death. The 
dissemination of mechanistic conceptions of the human body, the pervasiveness of materialistic 
philosophies and popular inquiries into animal magnetism and hypnosis27 (such as Luigi 
Galvani and Giovanni Aldini’s experiments with electricity on dead tissue28) were part of a 
debate that influenced, and was also shaped by, fantastic reflections on the spirit/matter 
dualism, the question of the life after death and the hubristic misuse of science (the most 
immediate literary reference is of course Mary Shelley’s 1818 novel Frankenstein). 
                                                
26 Remo Ceserani, “Le radici storiche di un modo narrativo,” in La narrazione fantastica, 27. 
27 Ibid., 21. 
28 The experiments took place in the last two decades of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the 
nineteenth between Italy and England. When Luigi Galvani observed the legs of a dead frog twitching 
when touched with two metal tools, he speculated (erroneously) that electricity was intrinsic to muscle 
tissue; his nephew held a public demonstration of the same phenomenon on the body of a recently 
executed man in London in 1803. The phenomenon came to be known as “galvanism.” 
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In particular, the decoupling between (living) matter and the mind or consciousness that 
should control it is a common fantastic theme, connected to the exquisitely modern question of 
the fragmentation of subjectivity. Hence the many stories on broken bodies and unruly body 
parts. In Théophile Gautier’s “The Mummy’s Foot” (1840), when a long-dead Egyptian 
princess appears in 1840s Paris to reclaim her mummified limb, the connection with recent 
theories of animal magnetism is made explicit: “[the foot] commenced to act in a nervous 
manner; contracted itself, and leaped over the papers like a startled frog; one would have 
imagined that it had suddenly been brought into contact with a galvanic battery.”29 In “Storia 
di una gamba” (1867) by Iginio Ugo Tarchetti, a man suffers the amputation of a leg after a 
war injury; he becomes obsessed by its severed limb and feels that his physical “disequilibrio” 
and “incompletazione”30 have sentenced him to a state in between life and death. In Arrigo 
Boito’s “Il pugno chiuso” (1870), a doctor reports on the case of a man with a clenched fist 
that he cannot open by any effort of his will, either because of a curse or due to nervous 
pathology. In all these examples, the body part, with its actual or projected autonomy, is in fact 
the protagonist of the story, as corroborated by the titles.31 
                                                
29 Théophile Gautier, “The Mummy’s Foot,” in Stories (London & Edinburgh: T.C. & E.C. Jack, 1908), 
60.  
30 Iginio Ugo Tarchetti, “Storia di una gamba,” in Tutte le opere, ed. Enrico Ghidetti (Bologna: Cappelli, 
1967), vol. II, 202. “Toccai un tendine e vidi rizzarsi il pollice del piede... Gran Dio! La gettai da me 
con orrore; e subito mi curvai su di lei per istinto, quasi mi appartenesse ancora, quasi avesse potuto 
ancora soffrire” (203); “io appartengo alla morte ed alla vita in un tempo” (190). 
31 The fragmented body motif in fantastic literature has been explored, among others, by Vittorio Roda 
in I fantasmi della ragione: fantastico, scienza e fantascienza nella letteratura Italiana fra Otto e 
Novecento, Napoli: Liguori, 1996, especially in chapter I, and in his article “Problematiche della 
corporalità nel Tarchetti fantastico (ed in altri),” in La tentazione del fantastico: narrativa italiana fra 
1860 e 1920, ed. Friedrich Wolfzettel and Peter Ihring (Frankfurt Am Main: Guerra, 2003), 193-213; 
as well as by Angelo M. Mangini in Letteratura come anamorfosi: teoria e prassi del fantastico 
nell'Italia del primo Novecento, Bologna: Bononia University Press, 2007, especially in the section 
titled “Il corpo diviso.” 
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The possibility of intermediate stages between life and death and of suspended states of 
consciousness informs a number of fantastic texts that openly thematize popular psychic 
practices of the time. In the latter half of the eighteenth century, German physician Franz 
Mesmer elaborated a theory according to which all living beings were united by a subtle 
substance or fluid, whose “tides” could be influenced by the planets in the same way as sea 
tides; this energy could be channeled and directed by a conductor in order to facilitate healing. 
Mesmerism, despite being disproved by scientific authorities at the end of the century, 
continued to thrive in the following decades and became at times conflated with spiritism and 
hypnosis. In E. A. Poe’s “The Facts in the Case of M. Valdemar” (1845), a terminally ill man 
is mesmerized (hypnotized) on his deathbed; the doctor, who is also the first-person narrator, 
seeks to determine “to what extent, or for how long a period, the encroachments of Death might 
be arrested by the process.”32 After the passes (special hand movements performed by the 
doctor-mesmerist), Valdemar plunges in a deep trance-like sleep, from which he is able to 
interact verbally with the people around him. Interrogated on his state and feelings, he declares 
himself first asleep and then finally dead, whereupon he appears to stop breathing but remains 
suspended in a state of half-life. It is concluded that “death (or what is usually termed death) 
had been arrested by the mesmeric process.”33 For the following seven months, the doctor and 
his colleagues continue to call upon the ‘dead’ man, until they finally decide to wake him. 
Upon being revived, M. Valdemar seems to suddenly realize the horror of the artificially-
induced twilight zone he is inhabiting and bursts in a chilling exclamation: “For God’s sake! – 
                                                
32 Edgar Allan Poe, “The Facts in the Case of M. Valdemar,” in The Works of the Late Edgar Allan 
Poe, ed. Rufus Wilmot Griswold (New York: Redfield, 1857), vol. I, 121-122.  
33 Ibid., 129. 
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quick! – quick! – put me to sleep – or, quick! – waken me! – quick! – I say to you that I am 
dead!”34 Finally, soon thereafter, the narrator and his companions witness the impossible: 
“[Valdemar’s] whole frame at once – within the space of a single minute, or even less, shrunk 
– crumbled – absolutely rotted away beneath my hands. Upon the bed, before that whole 
company, there lay a nearly liquid mass of loathsome – of detestable putrescence.”35 
The fantastic also introduced a new vocabulary for a thematic staple of supernatural 
literature: ghosts. Modern spiritualism (the belief that ghosts not only exist, but can 
communicate with the living) took the shape of a discipline around the middle of the nineteenth 
century, but the question had been receiving scholarly attention for decades. In 1766, Immanuel 
Kant penned the essay “Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated through Dreams of Metaphysics” 
in order to challenge the writings of Swedish mystic Emanuel Swedenborg: in Kant’s view, 
spirits have no metaphysical quality, but are indeed the product of far more prosaic physical 
causes, such as an upset stomach. The spirit-seer suffers a delusion of the senses akin to a 
mental projection: “the confused person transposes mere objects of his imagination outside 
himself and takes them to be things that are actually present before him.”36 Schopenhauer 
engaged with this study in his 1851 “Essay on Spirit-Seeing and Related Issues,” in which he 
took the reality of spirit-seeing as a given and treated it not as subjective perception, but as an 
                                                
34 Ibid., 130. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Immanuel Kant, “Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated Through Dreams of Metaphysics,” in Kant on 
Swedenborg: Dreams of a Spirit-Seer and Other Writings, ed. Gregory R. Johnson (West Chester, PA: 
Swedenborg Foundation, 2002), 33.  
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objective phenomenon.37 Around this time “[s]piritualism was reshaped by the very scientific 
discoveries that had sparked its resurgence, ‘naturalizing’ phenomena once attributed only to 
supernatural agency. Within this new paradigm, such phenomena were described as 
‘paranormal’, and, therefore, natural.”38 An effort to reconcile spiritism and science was 
especially visible in the English-speaking world: academic circles were created for the 
investigation of ghost sightings such as the Society for Psychical Research at Trinity College, 
Cambridge (England) in 1882, followed three years later by the American branch. William 
James, professor of psychology and philosophy at Harvard and brother to Henry James, 
occupied a prominent role in the society. Unsurprisingly, many elements of Henry James’s 
ghost story The Turn of the Screw (1898), considered by Todorov “a remarkable example”39 of 
the ambiguity he regarded as the constitutional trait of fantastic literature, were inspired by 
‘real’ accounts of ghost sightings that the writer had been exposed to during societal meetings 
or in written proceedings.40 In fact, the story suggests the possibility (among many others) that 
the ghosts of two previous inhabitants of the manor may have lingered on to haunt the children 
by virtue of the intensity of their wickedness; this is reminiscent of the coeval theory of 
“thought-transference” expounded by some members of the Society for Psychical Research, 
                                                
37 Arthur Schopenhauer, “Essay on Spirit Seeing and Everything Connected Therewith,” in Parerga 
and Paralipomena: Short Philosophical Essays, ed. E. F. J. Payne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2016), vol. I, 225-310. 
38 Nancy Helen Traill, Possible Worlds of the Fantastic: The Rise of the Paranormal in Fiction 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 17-18. 
39 Todorov, 43. 
40 Peter G. Beidler, “Introduction: Biographical and Historical Contexts,” in The Turn of the Screw. 
Complete, Authoritative Text with Biographical, Historical, and Cultural Contexts, Critical History, 
and Essays from Contemporary Critical Perspectives, ed. Peter G. Beidler, (Boston/New York: 
Bedford-St. Martin’s/Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), especially 15-19. 
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according to which a dying person could project a lingering telepathic image of themselves to 
the living.41 
Another privileged territory for both techno-scientific and fantastic explorations from the 
turn of the nineteenth century onwards was that of speculations on mechanical human beings. 
In the wake of contributions such as Julien Offray de la Mettrie’s L’Homme-Machine (1747), 
in which the French physician propounded a fully materialistic vision of Man, there was a surge 
in the production of highly specialized mechanical devices in the shape of animals or human 
beings. Around this time, Jacques de Vaucanson created a Flute-Playing automaton, as well as 
a popular mechanical duck, which by virtue of special mechanical contrivances appeared to be 
able to eat and defecate. In 1769, Wolfgang von Kempelen unveiled the notorious Chess-
Playing Turk, which toured Europe for decades and became immensely popular (it even 
prompted E. A. Poe to write an essay speculating on its workings in 1836). Fantastic tales 
liberally explore the uneasy relationship between humans and their simulacra: usually man-
made, these automata crystallize the dialectic between nature and artifice, creation and 
production, all the while challenging the exceptionality of the human and even reframing the 
question of modern (“romantic”) love.42 This theme is developed, for instance, in E.T.A. 
Hoffmann’s “The Sandman” (1817), where the protagonist’s realization of being in love with 
a life-like wooden doll precipitates his descent into madness; in Prosper Mérimée’s “The Venus 
of Ille” (1834), where a statue is suspected to have killed a young man in a fit of jealousy; and 
                                                
41 Shane McCorristine, Spectres of the Self: Thinking about Ghosts and Ghost-Seeing in England, 1750-
1920 (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), especially section II. 
42 This last point in particular is raised and explored in Simona Micali, “‘The alchemic marriage’: 
passione e tecnologia tra Ottocento e Novecento,” in Studi di letterature comparate in onore di Remo 
Ceserani, ed. Mario Domenichelli et al., vol. II, Letteratura e tecnologia (Manziana, Roma: 
Vecchiarelli, 2003), 53-78.  
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in 1886 novel “The Future Eve” by Auguste Villiers de L’Isle Adam, in which a fictionalized 
Thomas Edison creates a female android as a partner for his friend Lord Ewald, who is 
tormented by the dullness of his human fiancée. 
 
2. Charting the critical field 
2.1. Inclusivism and exclusivism 
Before venturing further into the analysis of the features of fantastic literature, it will be useful 
to sketch the field of current criticism in order to help situate and refine our approach to the 
subject. Critical contributions can be loosely divided into two main schools, mirroring an 
“exclusive” and an “inclusive” tendency.43 The exclusive school considers the fantastic in light 
of its neighboring genres and attempts to define its specificity through historical rooting and 
an intersection of thematic and formal characteristics. This approach was generally embraced 
by a number of French scholars who, in the 1950s and 1960s, effectively founded a 
contemporary theory of the genre (Pierre-Georges Castex,44 Louis Vax,45 and Roger Caillois46). 
Tzvetan Todorov recognized the importance of their critical endeavors, and in fact elaborated 
on them, as he devised his enormously influential theory of fantastic literature (in the already-
                                                
43 A clear and detailed discussion of the schools of fantastic criticism can be found in Stefano Lazzarin, 
“Dérive(s) du fantastique. Considérations intempestives sur la théorie d’un genre,” Comparatistica XIV 
(2005): 113-136. The distinction is also advanced by Remo Ceserani in Il fantastico, especially in the 
introduction (“Delimitazione di una modalità dell’immaginario”). 
44 Pierre-Georges Castex, Le conte fantastique en France, de Nodier à Maupassant, Paris: José Corti, 
1951. 
45 Louis Vax, La séduction de l’étrange: étude sur la littérature fantastique, Paris: PUF, 1964. 
46 Roger Caillois, Au coeur du fantastique, Paris: Gallimard, 1965, and the afore-mentioned “De la 
féerie à la science-fiction.” 
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mentioned Introduction à la littérature fantastique). Other scholars belonging to this group 
include, in the Italian area, Remo Ceserani47 and Lucio Lugnani.48  
By contrast, the “inclusive” current tends to regard the fantastic either as one expression 
of the universal and super-historical human faculty of imagination, or as a term including the 
entirety of non-realistic literature. This corresponds to a lesser interest in discussing the 
specificity of the fantastic vis-à-vis similar genres; in the generally loose taxonomy traced by 
these critical works, the fantastic comprises (or is part of a system including, depending on the 
critic) fantasy, fairy tales, science fiction, horror and more. Critics who operate under similar 
assumptions include Eric S. Rabkin,49 Kathryn Hume,50 and Rosemary Jackson.51 Lazzarin 
summarizes the main difference between “exclusive” and “inclusive” criticism through the 
following chart, with the left column describing the (mostly Anglo-American) branch of 
inclusive criticism and the right column the (mostly French and Italian) exclusive variety: 
 
théorie ample et inclusive vs théorie restreinte et 
exclusive 
 
critère thématique vs critère thématico-formel 
 
définition intuitive et  
fonctionnelle 
vs définition rigoureuse et 
taxinomique 
                                                
47 Ceserani, “Le radici storiche di un modo narrativo” and the afore-mentioned Il fantastico; in English, 
“Fantastic and Literature,” in Encyclopedia of Italian Literary Studies, ed. Gaetana Marrone, Paolo 
Puppa, and Luca Somigli, New York: Routledge, 2007. 
48 Lucio Lugnani, “Per una delimitazione del genere,” in La narrazione fantastica, 37-73; in the same 
collection, “Verità e disordine: il dispositivo dell’oggetto mediatore,” 177-288. 
49 Eric S. Rabkin, The Fantastic in Literature, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. 
50 Kathryn Hume, Fantasy and Mimesis: Responses to Reality in Western Literature, New York: 
Methuen, 1984. 
51 Rosemary Jackson, Fantasy: The Literature of Subversion, London; New York: Methuen, 1981. 
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vs genre ou mode littéraire 
[…]52 
 
In this work, I embrace the exclusive critical approach. As established in the previous section, 
the ways in which the fantastic codifies the supernatural is heavily dependent on a modern 
approach to ‘the natural’ and its boundaries, as well as to the instruments and limits of human 
knowledge. These preoccupations give the fantastic genre/mode both an array of themes and a 
distinctive rhetorical vocabulary. Watering down the meaning of fantastic to encompass all that 
is non-realistic (with the conceptual problems that even the latter term entails), or conflating it 
with literature or imagination in general,53 appears to create more hermeneutical problems than 
it solves. 
In this context, paying attention to genre-specific terminological distinctions is all but an 
idle exercise. For instance, in these pages I never adopt the term “fantasy” as an interchangeable 
alternative to “fantastic.” I regard fantasy literature as invested in setting up an alternative 
dimension where the relationship between the depicted and the ‘real’ world is not at all the 
central concern. A text such as J. R. R. Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings (1954-1955) does not 
explicitly invite a comparison between the natural and physical rules that regulate life on 
Middle Earth and those of the world as we know it. The character of Legolas will not elicit a 
reaction of disbelief on the grounds that elves ‘do not exist.’ Similar criteria apply to fables 
                                                
52 Lazzarin, “Dérive(s) du fantastique,” 131-132.  
53 Cf. the uncompromising position of Jorge Luis Borges, according to whom “toda literatura es 
esencialmente fantástica” because the mere idea of realistic literature is “falsa” (Jorge Luis Borges and 
Osvaldo Ferrari, En diálogo, México: Siglo XXI, 2005, 160). 
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and fairy-tales, or what Todorov refers to as the “marvelous.” On the contrary, I will show how 
fantastic literature interrogates the limits of our knowledge of the world (and our capacity to 
articulate it and describe it) precisely by adopting a mimetic stance. 
 
2.2. Definitions of fantastic literature 
A degree of mimetic quality to the fantastic has been recognized by exclusivist critics since the 
earliest theorizations of the genre. Pierre-George Castex, for instance, identifies the peculiar 
quality of the genre in a complication of the dialectics between “mystère” and “vie réelle”: 
 
Le fantastique, en effet, ne se confond pas avec l’affabulation conventionnelle des 
récits mythologiques ou des féeries, qui implique un dépaysement de l’esprit. Il se 
caractérise au contraire par une intrusion brutale du mystère dans le cadre de la vie 
réelle; … «Il était une fois,» écrivait Perrault; Hoffmann, lui, ne nous plonge pas dans 
un passé indéterminé; il décrit les hallucinations cruellement présentes à la conscience 
affolée, et dont le relief insolite de détache d’une manière saisissante sur un fond de 
réalité familière.54 
 
Roger Caillois stresses the sheer impact that this “intrusion”55 has on the system of rational 
thought that props up the foundations of conventional reality: a rip in the fabric of “légalité 
quotidienne,”56 the fantastic is therefore equivalent to “un scandale, une déchirure, une 
irruption insolite, presque insupportable dans le monde réel.”57 In framing the fantastic event 
as literally outside the rules (be those rules physical, logical, psychic), Caillois identifies its 
                                                
54 Castex, 8. 
55 Caillois, Au coeur du fantastique, 9. 
56 Ibid., 161. 
57 “De la féerie à la science-fiction,” 8. 
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distinctive quality in its relative position with respect to the real. The question of the fantastic 
as relative space is the foundational tenet of Tzvetan Todorov’s landmark Introduction à la 
littérature fantastique. While he fundamentally agrees with his predecessors by stressing the 
importance of the relationship between the mysterious event and the worldview encouraged by 
the story, he grounds his theory of the fantastic on the “hésitation” produced in the character 
and the reader alike when faced with an inexplicable event, projected against a background of 
regular, familiar reality: 
 
In a world which is indeed our world, the one we know, a world without devils, 
sylphides, or vampires, there occurs an event which cannot be explained by the laws 
of this same familiar world. The person who experiences the event must opt for one 
of two possible solutions: either he is the victim of an illusion of the senses, of a 
product of the imagination -- and the laws of the world then remain what they are; or 
else the event has indeed taken place, it is an integral part of reality -- but then this 
reality is controlled by laws unknown to us.58  
 
The hesitation brought about by this inexplicable event, in the face of which the subject is torn 
between a natural and a supernatural explanation, is the fleeting space of the fantastic. Once 
this choice is made, the fantastic itself dissolves. In Todorov’s view, this space does not outline 
“an autonomous genre,” but is instead located “on the frontier of two genres, the marvelous 
and the uncanny [étrange].”59 In a marvelous text, the supernatural is a seamless feature of the 
world depicted, such as it is in fairy-tales, fantasy fiction, epic sagas and other narratives in 
which the supernatural is not, or does not have to be, “justified.”60 For instance, the Cinderella 
                                                
58 Todorov, 25. 
59 Ibid., 41. 
60 Ibid., 54. 
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tale does not dwell on the inherent strangeness of talking mice, but rather focuses the reader’s 
attention towards an edifying parable of injustice and retribution (to advance but one 
interpretation). On the contrary, étrange designates fiction where an apparently supernatural 
event is ultimately revealed to be natural, thus dissolving the ambiguity in favor of a 
reaffirmation of the laws of nature. One such story would be “The Murders in the Rue Morgue” 
(1841) by Edgar Allan Poe, a typical locked-room mystery where no rational explanation seems 
possible. In the story, Madame L’Espanaye and her daughter, two wealthy women leading a 
retired life, are found brutally murdered in a room of their fourth-floor Paris apartment. 
Everything points to a supernatural perpetrator: the door is locked from the inside and windows 
are nailed shut; the two bodies bear signs of an inhumanly violent force; witnesses have heard 
the voices of a Frenchman and of someone else speaking an unidentifiable language. In the 
end, C. Auguste Dupin, a Sherlock Holmes prototype, uses logic and critical thinking (Poe 
included this story among his “tales of ratiocination”61) to uncover the truth: of all things, it 
was an escaped orangutan who climbed to the fourth floor, opened the (only seemingly) shut 
                                                
61 Letter to James Lowell Russell, July 2, 1844 (The Letters of Edgar Allan Poe, ed. John Ward Ostrom, 
New York: Gordian Press, 1966, vol. I, 258). 
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window and killed the two women; the sounds it made were not recognized by any witness 
because they were indeed inhuman.62 
Todorov’s framing of the fantastic through the key notion of hesitation is certainly his 
lasting contribution to the critical debate. Suffice it to say that subsequent criticism has mostly 
adhered to his criteria or amended them in various ways, without ever proposing radically 
alternative solutions. Still, his system is problematic for several reasons. Its extreme clarity and 
totalizing aspirations, in good part due to an unwavering structuralist approach, ultimately 
reveal themselves to be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, Introduction à la littérature 
fantastique made accessible (and in many ways inaugurated) the critical debate about a whole 
literary universe that had been thus far relegated to a specialized niche; on the other, its 
ideological approach at times forced the raw material of its analysis into a Procrustean bed, 
making it even more evident that the elusive nature of the fantastic needs to be worked with 
rather than against. 
                                                
62 This story is generally recognized as having inaugurated the modern detective genre. There is an 
interesting relationship between detective and fantastic fiction, not only because, as noted by Todorov, 
both genres play on a protracted ambiguity (although the detective story, with its rational resolution, 
belongs to the étrange, Todorov, 49-51), but also because of the pivotal role that the revealing detail 
plays in both. An interesting case in point is represented by William Hope Hodgson’s 1913 collection 
of short stories featuring occult detective Thomas Carnacki (Carnacki, the Ghost-Finder); each of these 
stories sets up a mysterious case that is eventually revealed by Carnacki to be ascribable, depending on 
the single case, either to human machinations or to genuinely supernatural causes. In his study on the 
contiguity and contamination between detective fiction and spiritualism, Srdjan Smajić remarks that, 
“[w]hile the rationalist protocols of nineteenth-century detective fiction ostensibly preclude non-
rational forms of knowledge and, even more so, supernatural occurrences, the genre consistently 
displays signs of affinity with clairvoyance and telepathy, intuitionism and spiritualism” (Srdjan 
Smajić, Ghost-seers, Detectives, and Spiritualists: Theories of Vision in Victorian Literature and 
Science, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 6). 
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As already mentioned, Todorov’s fantastic is by definition a temporary state, or a liminal 
area between two stable elements.63 Taking this view at face value leads to considering the 
fantastic an excessively volatile state and creates typological paradoxes such as texts entirely 
declined according to the fantastic ambiguity and then finally resolved through the means of 
the étrange. Todorov is aware of such borderline cases, so much so that he conjures up the 
median category of the “fantastic-uncanny.”64 For instance, in the story “Il pugno chiuso” by 
Arrigo Boito, an apparently inexplicable phenomenon is resolved in the end by what seems to 
be an affirmation of reality through hard evidence. Levy, an avaricious money-lender, dreams 
about a highly valuable red florin and wakes up with the feeling of the coin in his clenched fist. 
He is ecstatic at first, but soon realizes he is unable to control his hand: no devil or surgeon65 
can get his fist to open and release its treasure. He commits suicide in the presence of a beggar 
named Paw, who in turn picks up what he thinks is the florin in the dark and becomes subjected 
to the same curse. As Paw finally dies surrounded by greedy onlookers, the very last line of the 
story zooms in on his now open fist and reveals that the red florin is not there. The greater part 
of the story flirts with the supernatural in such systematic ways that to classify it comfortably 
into the wide stream of realistic literature (perhaps by invoking a psychic disorder such as idée 
fixe or monomania as a plausible cause for the characters’ ailment) does not do justice to the 
text. While the resolution of “The Murders in the Rue Morgue,” however unusual, responds to 
an internal coherence of the text, meaning it is probable according to the text’s logic, a similarly 
                                                
63 To be exact, Todorov describes the étrange as a genre that is only delimited on one side (its border 
with the fantastic), while “on the other, it dissolves into the general field of literature” (Todorov, 46). 
64 Ibid., 44 and following. 
65 Arrigo Boito, “Il pugno chiuso,” in Poesie e racconti (Milano: Mondadori, 1981), 254. [“[Q]ualche 
diavolo o qualche chirurgo”] 
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‘natural’ explanation in Boito (which is given not through the positive affirmation of clues and 
counter-facts, but simply through the absence of evidence for the supernatural explanation) 
pretends to clarify, but in fact does not. We are reminded of M. R. James’s instructions for the 
creation of successful ghost stories: “It is not amiss sometimes to leave a loophole for a natural 
explanation; but, I would say, let the loophole be so narrow as not to be quite practicable.”66 
What I am driving at is that the mere presence of the “loophole” should not override the fact 
that it is impracticable. Therefore, as we try to define the specificity of fantastic literature in a 
more elastic way, it seems more productive to heed Francesco Orlando’s suggestion, which 
points us to “la tematizzazione del dubbio, non importa quanto protratta e come risolta.”67 A 
further clarification is in order as regards the kind of doubt that the fantastic provokes. Elizabeth 
Bennet’s doubt about the true nature of Mr. Darcy, however thematized, does not make Pride 
and Prejudice a fantastic novel. What is called into question in a fantastic text are the means 
and strategies through which we know the world and the extent to which these means can be 
trusted, i.e. the value of “every powerful explanatory paradigm”68 such as that of scientific 
materialism. 
                                                
66 M. R. James, “Appendix: M. R. James on Ghost Stories,” in Collected Ghost Stories, ed. Darryl Jones 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 407.  
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“statuti” of supernatural literature. He refrains from including post-Enlightenment supernatural 
literature in the capacious category of the marvelous (the result of a “pigra, antistorica assimilazione 
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In the same vein as Orlando’s corrective to Todorov, both Ferdinando Amigoni and 
Lucio Lugnani suggest a subtraction of focus from the notion of choice, which is so central for 
the dénouement of Todorovian fantastic. Amigoni takes Todorov to task regarding what he 
perceives to be a blatant imbalance between the two terms of the choice imposed by a fantastic 
text. Namely, while choosing a natural explanation (the étrange) allows for a confirmation of 
a complex Weltanschauung, with its deep values and beliefs, embracing the supernatural 
explanation (marvelous) implies a complete rebuttal of it. The “vertigine epistemologica”69 
staged by the fantastic narration is unlikely to be relieved by a simple rational decision (i.e. 
faced with the apparition of a ghost, the character decides to believe in the existence of 
otherworldly creatures). This in turn is mirrored by Lucio Lugnani's proposal to substitute the 
notion of hésitation with that of impasse. In his view, the temporary opposition between 
natural/rational and supernatural/irrational is not a faithful description for the state of radical 
doubt into which the characters are cast: faced with an event that clashes spectacularly with 
their entire system of knowledge and values, they are left in a state of deadlock. The luxury of 
a choice could not be further away: this cognitive short-circuit does not resemble “l’esitazione 
di chi è a un bivio, ma lo smarrimento di chi è finito in un vicolo cieco e non può tornare sui 
propri passi.”70 
 
3. On fantastic and realism 
3.1. Fantastic as perversion 
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The mimetic-veridical aspirations of the fantastic that we have touched upon in previous 
sections deserve to be explored in more depth. In particular, it might be productive for our 
purposes to turn our attention to the complex relationship between fantastic and realistic fiction 
– a critical point that should never be overlooked.71 We have to keep in mind that the term 
“realism” suffers a similar fate of referential ambiguity as “fantastic,” inasmuch as it can be 
considered both a literary genre and a narrative mode. When I speak of “realistic” in this study, 
I refer to an approach (or mode) that casts literature as a truthful reflection of reality (with all 
the problematic and contextually-bound connotations that such terms bear), theoretically 
unmediated by feeling and opinion and interested in ordinary aspects of human life. Naturally, 
iterations of the mode can take very different paths, as demonstrated, for instance, by the 
differences between English realism, French naturalism and Italian verismo. 
Lucio Lugnani uses the notion of “reality paradigm” to articulate the difference between 
realistic and fantastic narrative. In short, the reality paradigm can be understood as the 
intersection between the episteme (scientific knowledge) and axiology (the value system 
through which we arrange and evaluate the world around us) of a certain society, necessarily 
considered with respect to a specific time and place.72 In realistic literature, the reality paradigm 
functions as a set of coordinates and assumptions to which the text implicitly refers (through 
the objects and methods of representation) and against which it can be read. A realistic text, in 
a way, aims to mirror the reality paradigm to which it refers. Moreover, narrative techniques 
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work in unison to enhance what Roland Barthes calls “the reality effect”73: events are usually 
narrated in the third person for the sake of objectivity and the authorial voice often disappears 
in the fabric of the text. Fantastic literature, on the contrary, is concerned with deviations from 
(transgressions of) the reality paradigm; in this case, the supposed naturalness of that system 
of knowledge and values suddenly becomes open to question. In this sense, a fantastic tale can 
be considered “una serie di enunciati semanticamente pertinenti e coerenti, compatibili con un 
paradigma di realtà su cui il testo o meglio l’idea globale di testo è costruita, … interrotta 
dall’emergenza di un enunciato impertinente, logicamente incoerente e contraddittorio.”74 The 
deployment of certain narrative techniques and rhetorical strategies can also be read in dialogue 
with the conventions of realism: in a typical fantastic story, third-person narration gives way 
to the partiality of knowledge and vision implicit in first-person narration; the trustworthiness 
of what we read is openly disavowed by the narrative voice; the artificiality of literature and 
the opacity of the text are purposely highlighted; meta-literary references are abundant. 
It is also worth noting that the fantastic favors novellas and short stories over the form of 
the novel, generally associated with realism as a genre. The reasons for this phenomenon 
deserve more systematic study, but for now we can advance a structural hypothesis. The 
‘transparency’ effect pursued by literary realism is mostly achieved through a process of 
accumulation. Detailed descriptions of the environment contribute to build a world that is 
seamlessly coherent in itself and in its relationship to the extra-textual dimension. This very 
process of gradual building is part and parcel with the genre. On the other hand, the fantastic 
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is interested in moments of cognitive short-circuit, not unlike epiphanies (although, 
paradoxically, such epiphanies refrain from showing what James Joyce called the “whatness”75 
of things and tend to further mystify, rather than reveal); it sets the background against which 
such moments unfold, but it is this dynamic process of unveiling (and its consequences for the 
psyche of the characters) that is at the heart of the entire narrative edifice. Intuitively, short 
narrative seems structurally more suited to represent such lightning-bolt moments. 
Having said all this, it is important to correct the commonplace according to which 
“fantastic” is merely antithetical to “realistic.” I am thinking for instance of Rosemary 
Jackson’s rather simplistic view of “fantastic tales […] as an opposite version of realistic 
narrative,”76 reminiscent of the Todorovian maxim discussed above. The relationship between 
the two terms is complex and fraught in ways that a mere oppositional model does not exhaust; 
conversely, fantastic narrative could be visualized as a crooked branch growing out of the large 
trunk of realism. We might also take the metaphor a little further. If we consider the destructive 
or corrosive action that fantastic doubt has on the stability of the materialistic-positivistic 
worldview, we can imagine the crooked branch as a sick appendix with the potential to affect 
the health and solidity of the entire plant down to the roots. It is rather a process of perversion 
than reversal. Therefore, it should not surprise us that the fantastic subsumes many features of 
realistic narratives (a typical fantastic story will usually disguise itself as a realistic one) only 
to better set up its coup de théâtre. This sustained strategy of preparation for an event that, 
instead of explaining and disclosing, provides further confusion (the opposite of agnitio, the 
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final part of a narrative or dramatic text where identities are revealed and narrative knots are 
untied) is a common organizational trait of fantastic narratives. 
“The Venus of Ille” (1837) by Prosper Mérimée, set in the Catalonian countryside, opens 
with a slice-of-life description of the preparations for a wedding between the son of a well-to-
do antiquarian and the daughter of a wealthy family. Colorful observations on the antiquarian’s 
family’s house, mores and character traits all establish a solid ground of realistic illusion. 
However, the bourgeois idyll comes to an abrupt end when the groom is found dead in the 
marital bed the morning after the wedding. The story insinuates the strong suspicion that a 
beautiful but evil-looking statue of Venus, recently unearthed in the antiquarian’s garden, has 
come to life at night and killed the groom in a fit of jealousy (before the wedding, he had 
slipped the ring on the statue’s finger during a ball game). This suspicion is fueled by the 
suppositions of the protagonist-narrator, but it is never confirmed. In fact, the latter part of the 
story shows a progressive decline in referential credibility. Hearsay, superstitions, groundless 
deductions complement the dubious testimony of the one witness to the crime, the bride, who 
claims to have seen the statue kill her husband; her trustworthiness is further undermined by 
the magistrate who indirectly reports her words, framing them as the ravings of a madwoman. 
A wedding turns into a funeral, the beginning of a new life makes way for death, the celebration 
of a union begets tragedy and disintegration. It is not unusual for a fantastic story to pervert the 
Bildungsroman model, chronicling the subject’s slow and inexorable detachment from reality 
and society, describing dissolution rather than evolution.77 
 
                                                




3.2. A photograph of the impossible 
In H. P. Lovecraft’s short story “Pickman’s Model” (1927), a narrator named Thurber relates 
to his friend Eliot how he came to associate with Richard Upton Pickman, a disgraced painter 
who has since mysteriously disappeared. Thurber, who is gathering data for “a monograph on 
weird art,”78 is a great admirer of Pickman’s “genius”79 and at first does not agree with the 
Boston Art Club’s decision to expel him on account of the scandalous and unnerving nature of 
his art; he sees in Pickman a profound knowledge of nature and an insight into “the actual 
anatomy of the terrible” and “the physiology of fear,”80 in a way that reminds him of Füssli, 
Doré or Goya. One night, Pickman brings his friend to the run-down North End part of Boston 
in order to show him a secret studio he has rented under a false name. In this place, especially 
in the cellar, he can truly “let himself go”81 and paint without restrictions. The “morbid art”82 
that Thurber sees there horrifies and fascinates him to an extreme degree. The pictures convey 
a “loathesomeness” and a “moral foetor”83 that the narrator finds difficult to describe: they 
show demon-like creatures resembling the human form, with vaguely canine features, intent 
on feeding on corpses. The background of these scenes is often an actual place in contemporary 
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Boston, including a subway tunnel. Still, the chief reason for Thurber’s horror has little to do 
with the subjects depicted: 
 
But don’t get the idea that it was all this hideous business of theme and setting which 
struck me faint. … It was not any mere artist’s interpretation that we saw; it was 
pandemonium itself, crystal clear in stark objectivity. That was it, by heaven! The man 
was not a fantaisiste or romanticist at all– he did not even try to give us the churning, 
prismatic ephemera of dreams, but coldly and sardonically reflected some stable, 
mechanistic, and well-established horror-world which he saw fully, brilliantly, 
squarely, and unfalteringly. God knows what that world can have been, or where he 
ever glimpsed the blasphemous shapes that loped and trotted and crawled through it; 
but whatever the baffling source of his images, one thing was plain. Pickman was in 
every sense – in conception and in execution – a thorough, painstaking, and almost 
scientific realist.84 
 
A “fantaisiste” or “romanticist” is an artist whose subject is the fleeting matter of dreams and 
whose style, we are given to understand, is the opposite of “cold” and “sardonic”: warm, 
enchanted, filtered through emotional participation. This style mirrors the fanciful nature of the 
experience or objects it describes. On the contrary, Pickman is an “almost scientific realist” 
because of the “minute exactitude”85 of his brush, the “sharp[ness]” of his outlines and the fact 
that he abstains from “the use of selectiveness or bizarrerie.”86 However, Pickman too, like the 
fantaisiste, paints the stuff of dreams or nightmares, “daemons,”87 “ghouls and witches”88; the 
point is that he depicts them with an attitude conventionally associated with the representation 
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of tangible, familiar, everyday objects. There is something blasphemous about this “almost 
scientific” approach to the dark underbelly of conventional reality (“It was the technique, Eliot 
– the cursed, the impious, the unnatural technique!”89); and we can advance the hypothesis that 
Pickman was expelled from the art circle not strictly because of his concerting with obscure 
evil forces, but because of the way he has dared to represent them. 
So far, we have established the fantastic impulse as the irreconcilable tension between a 
solid, familiar world informed by the primacy of scientific materialism, and a super- or 
unnatural element that cannot possibly be accommodated within that system. If we keep this 
in mind, the ending of the story seems to throw off part of its premise. While in the cellar, one 
big canvas from a collection of “half-finished monstrosities”90 strikes Thurman: it portrays a 
squatting, Goya-esque ghoul feeding on a barely recognizable human body, standing out 
against the brick wall of the same cellar. While contemplating the painting, the two hear a 
scuttling noise outside the cellar door. Blaming the rats that infest the building’s foundations, 
Pickman grabs a gun and goes to investigate the commotion, while Thurber’s attention is 
caught by a crumpled photograph tacked to a corner of the canvas, which he assumes to be a 
reference picture for the background. When a gunshot startles him, he inadvertently stuffs the 
piece of paper in his pocket. It is only the next morning that he pulls it out and examines it, to 
his utter horror:  
 
Well – that paper wasn’t a photograph of any background, after all. What it shewed 
was simply the monstrous being he was painting on that awful canvas. It was the 
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model he was using – and its background was merely the wall of the cellar studio in 
minute detail. But by God, Eliot, it was a photograph from life.91  
 
This last detail somehow resolves the ambiguity around the status of the ghoul. It suggests that 
one can only represent a nightmare with such clarity of vision and precision of outlines because 
he has physically seen it, therefore because it is not a nightmare. If ontological doubts about 
the nature of the monstrous vision are dispelled (therefore dissolving Todorovian ambiguity – 
which, as Chapter 3 will demonstrate, is not a particularly productive approach to twentieth-
century fantastic), its function is intact: it opens up the door of cosmic horror, the powerful 
feeling of primordial fear (linked to the experience of a dimension that lies outside or beyond 
human understanding) that humans are generally shielded from by virtue of their own 
ignorance.92 
A few elements stand out in this story. In typically fantastic guise, it is a story about 
representation more than anything else. It self-reflexively puts forth a theory of “weird” art, its 
scope, its claims, and its intended effect on the viewer/reader.93 Most of all, and this is what 
interests us here, it explores the contradiction inherent in a supernatural literature that purports 
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to tell the truth; and in doing so, it questions both the boundaries of nature and the very meaning 
of truth. As explained by Todorov, allegory is the enemy of the fantastic, as it allows to explain 
away those elements in the story that do not add up; fantastic narratives, on the contrary, aim 
to be taken at face value.94 A fantastic creature does not stand in for something else: it just is. 
Hence the typical attitude of the narrator, who is usually also a character and a witness in the 
story: s/he is well aware of how unbelievable his or her story sounds, and yet s/he cannot refrain 
from telling it, out of an obligation to truth. 
The photograph has to be read in the context of this effort: to offer a harder, colder kind 
of “realism” that will make us alert to the insufficiency and partiality of vision promoted by a 
fully secular naturalism (“there are more things…”). In the story, the difference between the 
paintings and the photograph is not at all a qualitative one. The latter is merely an enhancement 
in terms of ‘coldness,’ minuteness of detail, detachment of reproduction. In fact, an interest in 
photography is only the natural evolution of the fantastic’s “retorica documentaristica,” the 
frequent incorporation of manuscripts, diary entries, letters, in order to sustain the narration’s 
truth claims in the face of the impossibility of the facts recounted.95 Pickman’s photograph, in 
short, can help us visualize the inherent tension that lies at the heart of the fantastic mode – a 
maddeningly incomprehensible and unnatural presence standing out against a background of 
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solid reality (literally, the brick wall of the cellar): a “mystère en pleine lumière,”96 or a monster 
in a photograph. 
 
4. Narrative and rhetorical features of fantastic literature 
4.1. “La vicenda del narrare”97 
As already discussed, the fantastic mode interrogates the reliability of a fully naturalistic 
worldview and epistemology. This translates into a thematization of doubt concerning the 
binary oppositions undergirding this worldview, such as supernatural/natural, 
rational/irrational, possible/impossible, and so on. We have also defined the territory of the 
fantastic through the way in which it frames the supernatural – therefore pointing to the 
inadequacy of any identifying criteria based purely on thematic considerations. A fantastic text 
is not merely about the supernatural; rather, it tells the story of a subjectivity’s reaction to a 
certain object or event (generally of supernatural origin), and the chronicle of the struggle 
undertaken by that subjectivity to make sense of, and find words for, such an experience.98 This 
kind of approach is reminiscent of Henry James’s thoughts on how an effective fantastic story 
should be written, as explained in his foreword to “The Altar of the Dead” (1895):  
 
The safest arena for the play of moving accidents and mighty mutations and strange 
encounters, or whatever odd matters, is the field, as I may call it, rather of their second 
than of their first exhibition. By which, to avoid obscurity, I mean nothing more 
cryptic than I feel myself show them best by showing almost exclusively the way they 
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are felt, by recognizing as their main interest some impression strongly made by them 
and intensely received.99 
 
What remains to be established is whose reaction we are talking about. It is obvious that the 
hesitation described by Todorov cannot be attributed to the actual, external reader of a text, 
whose possible response – an extra-textual element that is bound to the many and disparate 
conditions surrounding the act of reading – does not hold much value for the purposes of mode 
definition. Instead, Carla Benedetti calls attention to the “istanza narrativa”100 and adds that, in 
a fantastic text, the subjective trace of the narrator (a personal “traccia” that is naturally implicit 
in every act of storytelling, not only literary) is markedly informed by “un rapporto conflittuale 
con l’oggetto del proprio racconto.”101 
In fact, we could consider the ‘telling’ to be the main event of a fantastic tale, rather than 
the story that is told: 
 
Raccontare ad altri ciò che è difficilmente credibile, ciò che al narratore stesso 
continua ad apparire incomprensibile e che sarebbe piuttosto indotto ad escludere dal 
campo del possibile, raccontare ciò che sfida le sue capacità conoscitive, che sfugge 
alla definizione e che mette a dura prova le stesse possibilità del discorso, è una 
vicenda altrettanto rilevante di quella vissuta dal personaggio del racconto.102 
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The fantastic, therefore, is both an “avventura conoscitiva”103 and, or mainly, an avventura 
espressiva. Carla Benedetti’s definition of the fantastic as tied to “l’instaurazione di un limite 
interno al discorso”104 has the advantage of substituting the supernatural with the unsayable, 
therefore accommodating instances in which the creatures or events depicted have more to do 
with a para-natural dimension (as will be the case for the three short stories analyzed in Chapter 
2); moreover, it reveals it to be a capacious category for the inclusion of more fluid, less 
codified twentieth-century fantastic. The next chapter will focus on discussing the broader 
philosophical implications of this expressive challenge through the notion of monstrosity; what 
concerns us in this section is to illuminate how these aspects translate into a number of 
distinctive narrative and rhetorical features. 
 
4.2. Unreliable narrators 
As one would expect, it is very common for fantastic stories to be organized around internal 
focalization (“the narrator says only what a given character knows”105) or to make use of 
autodiegetic narrators (i.e. the narrator is the main character of the story). According to 
Francesco Orlando, who studied the evolution of the literary supernatural from thirteen-century 
miracle plays to Kafka and Bulgakov, the Age of Reason necessarily changes the way in which 
supernatural tales can be told. He considers for instance the emergence of Gothic literature in 
late eighteenth-century England: in this case, due to questions of knowledge and perception 
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occupying center stage in philosophical and scientific debates of the time, narrative devices 
such as the main character’s ignorance around the real nature of the events s/he witnesses 
become an important way to refresh and update literary iterations of the supernatural. This 
formal innovation is inextricably linked to the core of the fantastic mode: “È infatti tale 
peculiarità che permette – per la prima volta nella storia letteraria – che sul soprannaturale 
medesimo ricada il dubbio.”106 
While an incompleteness of vision is usually intrinsic to first-person narration, in the case 
of fantastic literature this partiality is usually flaunted and underlined, not least through a 
narrator’s self-doubting statements about his/her own perception. In the incipit of “The Black 
Cat” (1843) by E. A. Poe, the narrator makes two moves at once that are apparently 
contradictory. He assures the reader that his mind is perfectly sound and that he has empirical 
evidence as to the facts that befell him, and yet he sympathizes with anyone who would refuse 
to believe his story: “For the most wild, yet most homely narrative which I am about to pen, I 
neither expect nor solicit belief. Mad indeed would I be to expect it, in a case where my very 
senses reject their own evidence. Yet, mad I am not – and very surely do I not dream.”107 In 
this and many other fantastic texts, the narrator anticipates, and justifies, a reaction of 
incredulity on the part of the listener/reader. Counterintuitively, addressing head-on the blatant 
improbability of one’s testimony can be seen as an attempt to strengthen a bond of credibility 
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between who tells and who receives the story, making it clear that the same set of reality-
granting principles is shared.  
In a textual economy where what is “vero” does not generally correspond to what is 
“verisimile”108 (i.e. things that appear to be improbable are sworn to be true by those who 
experienced them), the narrator may resort to specific tactics to corroborate his testimony and 
bolster his credibility. In E.T.A. Hoffmann’s The Sandman, the narrator reflects at length on 
how to begin telling the story of the unfortunate Nathaniel so as to put his readers in “the right 
frame of mind for the reception of things of no ordinary degree of marvellousness.”109 He then 
considers, and performs, a number of openings: 
 
“Once upon a time” – the loveliest opening for any story, but too sober! “In the little 
provincial town of S. there lived' – a bit better, at least going back to the beginning. 
Or, as it were, in medias res: “«Go to the devil!» cried the student Nathaniel, his 
eyes filled with rage and terror, as the barometer-dealer Giuseppe Coppola...” – I did 
in fact write that at a time at which it seemed to me I perceived something comical in 
the wild eyes of the student Nathaniel; his story is, however, in no way amusing. I 
could in the end find no form of expression whatever which reflected anything of the 
colours of my inner vision, so I decided not to begin at all.110 
 
What the narrator does instead is begin the story with a direct transcription of Nathaniel’s and 
Clara’s letters, so that the readers ‘hear’ from the characters’ voices something that would not 
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have been “significant, original, gripping”111 enough if rendered by any of the usual narrative 
tricks. 
In E. A. Poe’s “The Oval Portrait” (1842), the narrator explains the circumstances 
through which he came upon a manuscript, and then proceeds to transcribe the manuscript 
itself, without adding any further comment (without closing the frame). Emanuella Scarano 
interprets this failure to offer an interpretation as a sign of the hermeneutical impotence of both 
the narrator and the reader.112 In her view, it is precisely through an authenticating device (the 
manuscript) that the voice of the narrator in the first part is devalued, since the juxtaposition 
destroys any hierarchy of reliability.113 Moreover, the narrator describes himself as 
“desperately wounded” and on the brink of “delirium,”114 one more detail that causes us to 
doubt his testimony. 
Hoffmann’s and Poe’s texts, as well as the Lovecraft story that we have previously 
discussed, offer examples of the way in which fantastic texts authenticate themselves by 
including supposedly unfiltered reproductions of documents such as found or bequeathed 
manuscripts, letters, doctor’s notes, diary entries, passages from other books, and (later) 
                                                
111 Ibid., 100. 
112 Scarano, 381. In this case the eventual silence of the narrator in fact models and anticipates the 
supposed bewilderment of a reader faced with this story; this is made more explicit by the narrator 
depicting himself in the act of reading: “Long – long I read…”; “… I there read the vague and quaint 
words which follow” (Poe, “The Oval Portrait,” in The Works of the Late Edgar Allan Poe, vol. I, 366, 
368). A reader picking up “The Oval Portrait” will see a mise en abîme of him- or herself in the figure 
of the narrator perusing the “small volume.” The contamination of genres and styles (Gothic 
reminiscences in the first-person description of the abandoned castle, an ekphrasis of the portrait, the 
third-person narration of the painter’s story), as well as an ironic reference to “the fancy of Mrs. 
Radcliffe,” all contribute to heighten the hyper-literary quality and meta-literary awareness of the text. 
113 Scarano, 383. 
114 Poe, “The Oval Portrait,” 366. 
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photographs. It is as if the burden of interpretation was thrust entirely upon the narratee(s),115 
while the narrator only takes it upon himself to relay facts and transcribe documents in the most 
objective way possible, regardless of how incredible they seem in the context of a 
naturalistic/skeptical outlook. According to Scarano, this attitude is reminiscent of the 
relationship between a high degree of authentication and a low degree of interpretation that is 
found in historiography.116 One can identify here one of the aspects of modern horror cinema 
that have been influenced by the peculiar ways in which the fantastic frames the supernatural; 
in particular, a specific cinematic sub-genre, that of “faux documentary” or “mockumentary” 
horror, makes ample use of photographs and videotapes to capture horrific instances of the 
supernatural. The introduction of an objective class of evidence (not the characters’ words but 
images engraved on film) lends an air of indisputability to the otherwise unbelievable events 
that such images capture. In films such as The Blair Witch Project (1999) and Trollhunter 
(2010), the tape that has been recorded by the unfortunate protagonists is found in the place 
where they mysteriously disappeared; the audience uncovers their fate (and finally gets to know 
the truth) by watching that tape, which is nothing but the movie itself. 
In the economy of knowledge and verification established by the fantastic, the character 
of the doctor or scientist deserves a separate mention. A supposed agent of the re-affirmation 
of the light of scientific reason over the dark corners of supernatural mystery, this figure is 
paradigmatic of the contamination between literary and scientific discourses in the nineteenth 
                                                
115 The narratee is the entity to whom the narration is addressed, often a clearly identified figure in the 
story. The multilayered structure of many fantastic texts makes it wiser to privilege this notion over the 
trickier, and less specific, notion of the reader. 
116 Scarano, 360. The fragmentary nature of many fantastic narratives can be interpreted as the ultimate 
sign of truthfulness: all the narrator-witness is able to offer in good conscience is “una serie di dati 
sicuri ed autentici, ma non dominabili dal discorso” (365). 
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century; a contamination to which, as already discussed, the fantastic mode is especially 
receptive. It is also worth noting that, while in the first half of the nineteenth century the 
fantastic privileges the figure of the artist as protagonist (after Romantic interest in the artist 
figure, as codified for instance in the Künstlerroman genre – towards which the manuscript in 
“The Oval Portrait” gestures), medical figures abound in iterations of the genre from the second 
half of the century, either as narrators or as actants of other kinds. These figures are assumed 
to be respectful of empirical evidence, unclouded by personal judgment and adverse to 
groundless speculation. However, owing to the fantastic’s skepticism towards the self-
sufficiency of scientific thought and its pretense to encompass all aspects of human life, the 
figure of the scientist is itself shown as a progressively less authoritative source of knowledge: 
from the ethically ambiguous scientist-mesmerist of M. Valdemar, to the doctor who seems to 
be fascinated by superstitious beliefs of an orientalized Poland just as he sets out to dispel them 
in “Il pugno chiuso,”117 to the unsettlingly fetishistic anatomist in Camillo Boito’s “Un corpo” 
(1870), to the doctor in the first version of Guy de Maupassant’s “The Horla” (1886 – a figure 
that significantly disappears from the second, longer version of the story), who ends his report 
on a (psychotic?) patient declaring openness to the supernatural explanation. The logical end 
to this gradual loss of voce in capitolo is the figure of the doctor in Camillo Boito’s “Macchia 
grigia” (1877), who is nothing but a silent addressee of the narrator’s manuscript. As noted by 
Friedrich Wolfzettel, his silence testifies to the abdication of modern science and represents 
                                                
117 The same fascination comes through in the narrators of two of Mérimée’s fantastic tales, the already-
mentioned “Venus of Ille” and the much later “Lokis” (1869); although they are not scientists (one is 
an archeologist and the other is a philologist), they both find themselves in provincial or remote 
locations (the Catalonian countryside and the Lithuanian region of Samogitia) where mysterious 
occurrences and an atmosphere of terror and superstitions subtly affect their rational skepticism and 
scholarly detachment. 
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“l’impotenza della ragione di fronte al mondo fantasmatico evocato proprio per mettere in 
dubbio il carattere unilaterale dello scientismo positivista.”118 The waning credibility of 
intradiegetic representatives of science and reason is consistent with a general observation: 
fantastic texts do not admit authoritative conclusions of any kind and generally undermine 
themselves as coherent ideological wholes, affirming “il trionfo del parziale sul totale” through 
a narration that is itself “irrimediabilmente plurim[a] e «divis[a]».”119 
 
4.3. “The story won’t tell” 
The very act of telling is represented in countless fantastic stories, in ways that lead to the 
frequent presence not only of narrators who participate in the events recounted, but also of 
narratees of various kinds. Importantly, this act is usually given the shape of an aesthetically 
incomplete or intellectually unsatisfactory experience. The text presents itself as a necessarily 
incomplete account, where the conflicting relationship between the narrator and the material 
of their story is mirrored by the frustration of an unsatisfied audience, represented or implied.  
In Hoffmann’s “Automata” (1819), the story of a group of friends exchanging and 
debating stories about the supernatural, this frustration is embodied by an intradiegetic 
audience of eager listeners. After two stories have been shared, Theodore begins reading from 
a manuscript of his own, entitled “Automata,” an intricate tale involving an uncannily realistic 
                                                
118 Friedrich Wolfzettel, “Il medico scientista di fronte al fantastico,” in La tentazione del fantastico, 
27. The intersection between literary and scientific discourse in the context of nineteenth-century Italian 
fantastic, from which I drew most of my textual examples, is explored, among others, in Alberto Carli, 
Anatomie scapigliate: l’estetica della morte tra letteratura, arte e scienza, Novara: Interlinea, 2004 and 
Morena Corradi, Spettri d’Italia: scenari del fantastico nella pubblicistica postunitaria milanese, 
Ravenna: Longo, 2016. 
119 Angelo M. Mangini, Letteratura come anamorfosi, 264. 
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automaton known as the Talking Turk. When he interrupts his reading in medias res, other 
members of the party complain: 
 
“Well,” said Ottmar, when Theodore came to a sudden stop, “is that all? Where is the 
explanation? What became of Ferdinand, the beautiful singer, Professor X------, and 
the Russian officer?” “You know,” said Theodore, “that I told you at the beginning 
that I was only going to read you a fragment, and I consider that the story of the 
Talking Turk is only a fragment. I mean that the imagination of the reader, or listener, 
should merely receive one or two more or less powerful impulses, and then go on 
swinging, pendulum-like, of its own accord.”120 
 
Here the philosophical foundation of the fantastic as a narrative that mirrors the fragmentary 
nature of human knowledge becomes a declaration of poetics. Not only is it foolish to pretend 
to offer ‘the whole story’; it is also undesirable on the level of literary effect. A fantastic text, 
in sum, has an obligation to disappoint.121 Feeding as they do on information gaps and blank 
spaces, fantastic stories often function as training sessions in ambiguity and dramatize the 
discomfort that comes with declaring oneself at a loss. 
When Prosper Mérimée finished reading his short story “Lokis” to an audience including 
the Empress Eugénie at the Château de Saint-Cloud in 1869, he reportedly asked one member 
of the audience “Avez-vous compris, vous?”; when the person hesitated, the writer replied 
gleefully “Vous n’avez pas compris, c’est parfait!”122 To be sure, the story in question is all 
                                                
120 E. T. A. Hoffmann, “Automata,” in The Best Tales of Hoffmann, ed. E. F. Bleiler (New York: Dover, 
1967), 102. Emphasis in the original.  
121 “Pour séduire, l’œuvre fantastique se doit de décevoir” (Irène Bessière, Le récit fantastique: la 
poétique de l’incertain, Paris: Larousse, 1974, 35). 
122 Kirsten A. Fudeman, “Linguistic Science and Mystification in Prosper Mérimée's ‘Lokis’,” 
Nineteenth-Century French Studies 40, no. 1&2 (2011-2012): 112.  
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but straightforward in its construction and meaning. It opens with a frame narrative in which a 
learned comparative philologist (“the Professor”) prepares to tell a story entitled “Lokis” (from 
the Lithuanian word for “bear”) to two people, Adelaide and Théodore, whom we assume to 
be his pupils. The story, which he reads from some notes he took at the time of the events and 
rearranged in a “manuscript-book”,123 recounts a peculiar experience he had in Lithuania a few 
years before. After being offered to translate the Gospel of St. Matthew into Jmoudic, the 
language spoken in the Lithuanian district of Samogitia, the professor set off on a journey 
across the country to further his knowledge of the language and local customs. While there, he 
spent a few days at the residence of young Count Michel Szémioth, whose library contained 
invaluable material for his translation work. During his stay, he learned that the Count’s 
mother, a gaunt, disheveled woman, had gone mad with fear many years before: two days after 
her wedding, during a hunt, she had been carried off by a bear and rescued just in time, but her 
mental health was forever affected. Not even her baby, born nine months later, had restored 
her mental balance, and in fact pushed her into a “redoubled frenzy” which made her want to 
kill the little “beast”124 she had just given birth to. The professor observed strange ‘feral’ 
behavior on the part of the count; he noticed his hairy arms and unusual facial features and the 
terror he struck in domesticated animals. When Ioulka, a superficial, coquettish girl whom the 
Count loved passionately, finally agreed to marry the young man, the Professor was invited to 
celebrate the wedding. However, in a way that is reminiscent of Mérimée’s earlier “The Venus 
of Ille,” the wedding night ended in tragedy. The morning after, the bride was discovered 
                                                
123 Prosper Mérimée, “Lokis,” in Lokis, The Blue Chamber, A Chronicle of the Reign of Charles IX, 
and Other Stories, ed. George Saintsbury (New York: Bigelow, Brown & Co., 1905), 3.  
124 Ibid., 13. 
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horribly mauled on the marital bed, while the groom had disappeared. The professor 
remembered that, during the night, he had seen “a dark body of great bulk”125 leave the 
newlyweds’ apartments through the window. The story ends with a return to the narrative 
frame, as the professor makes a digression into the comparative etymology of the word “bear” 
and is soon cut short by a member of his little audience (“«I could quote you endless other 
instances…» But Adelaide observed that it was late, and we ought to go to bed.”126)  
Throughout the whole story, the possibility that the bear has raped the Countess and 
generated a half-man half-bear is repeatedly suggested, but never confirmed. The ending too is 
left open, as Count Michel’s tormented love for and jealousy towards Ioulka could have 
provided a plausible motive for the murder. At the beginning of his reading, the professor reads 
the title of his story and adds a “Lithuanian proverb as a motto: Miszka su Lokiu, / Abu du 
tokiu.”127 The proverb, whose approximate translation is “Michel with bear, one and the same,” 
remains untranslated and unexplained in the text. When the reading is over (a moment that the 
professor punctuates by announcing “[t]he end”128 and shutting the book, confirming the 
predilection of fantastic narratives for icastic images, as codified by Ceserani129), Théodore 
enquires about the meaning of the title “Lokis”, since no character in the story bears that name. 
The professor’s answer is not very enlightening: 
 
                                                
125 Ibid., 71. 
126 Ibid., 74. 
127 Ibid., 3. 
128 Ibid., 73. 
129 Ceserani, Il fantastico, 83. 
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“If you were thoroughly steeped in the law of transformation from the Sanskrit into 
Lithuanian, you would have recognised in lokis the Sanskrit arkcha, or rikscha. The 
Lithuanians call lokis that animal which the Greeks called αρκπος, the Latins ursus, 
and the Germans bär. Now you will understand my motto: «Miszka su Lokiu, Abu du 
tokiu.»”130 
 
The small audience is very clearly not “steeped” in Lithuanian morphology; moreover, the 
phrase “now you will understand” reads like a blatant non sequitur, because no additional 
information has been given towards the comprehension of the “motto” (which, again, is never 
followed by a translation). It seems that the story has come full circle from a mystery into 
another. Not to mention that “Sanskrit r‚kṣa is neither the etymon or a cognate of Lithuanian 
lokis,”131 which casts further doubts on the reliability of this explanation – and by extension on 
the reliability of everything we have read so far.  
The story is informed by coeval developments in the field of linguistic science, especially 
those related to comparative philology. This discipline, which pursued a rigorously scientific 
approach to the study of the relationship between modern languages and their Proto-Indo-
European ancestor, mirrored the concepts and terminology of contemporary evolutionary 
theories.132 “Lokis” seems to undermine the very idea of such a model of progressive 
development on two fronts, biological and linguistic. Of the notion of a diachronic progression 
from beast to human being, the story illuminates the darkest implications; not the process of 
development and improvement, but the creeping lingering of a bestial side congenital in human 
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nature. Moreover, this troubling core is left between the lines, substantially unarticulated.133 It 
is not by chance that the clarification is expected to come (and does not eventually) from an 
investigation into words and their origin/etymology; instead of illuminating what they refer to, 
they remain opaque, resistant to comprehension (“«Come, Théodore, do you understand what 
Lokis means? » «Not in the very least.»”134). 
Henry James’s fantastic novella The Turn of the Screw begins in medias res with the 
image of an enraptured audience: “The story had held us, round the fire, sufficiently breathless 
…”135 The main narrator belongs to a small circle of friends who tell each other “strange 
tale[s]”136 on Christmas Eve. Although we are not given too many details about the story in 
question, we are given the audience’s reaction to it, a feeling of thrilled suspension. One of the 
members of this circle, Douglas, claims he can do better: he is in possession of a manuscript 
written by and bequeathed to him by a governess (now dead), which contains a first-person 
account of events that are way too dreadful to be imagined. He delights in his audience’s 
curiosity and skillfully manipulates expectations through a blend of hyperbole and vagueness: 
 
“Nobody but me, till now, has ever heard. It’s quite too horrible.” This, naturally, was 
declared by several voices to give the thing the utmost price, and our friend, with quiet 
art, prepared his triumph by turning his eyes over the rest of us and going on: “It’s 
beyond everything. Nothing at all that I know touches it.” “For sheer terror?” I 
remember asking. He seemed to say it was not so simple as that; to be really at a loss 
how to qualify it. He passed his hand over his eyes, made a little wincing grimace. 
                                                
133 About 15 years later, Maupassant will elaborate on the terrifying consequences of evolutionism in 
his short story “Le Horla” (1886-1887), which will be examined in Chapter 2. 
134 Mérimée, “Lokis,” 73. 
135 Henry James, The Turn of the Screw, 21. 
136 Ibid. 
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“For dreadful – dreadfulness!” … “For general uncanny ugliness and horror and 
pain.”137 
 
The “little … auditory”’s reactions thematize readerly expectation: they are plunged “in a rage 
of curiosity” by the way Douglas “work[s them] up.”138 However, this quest for readerly 
satisfaction is destined to fail, as the story contained in the manuscript, an exercise in perfect 
narrative ambiguity, refuses to reveal itself either as a ghost story or as the case study of a 
mentally ill woman. In fact, a final explanation never comes, as Douglas has already 
anticipated: “The story won’t tell … not in any literal, vulgar way.”139 
Such perfect ambiguity is so engrained in the narrative construction that critics like 
Shoshana Felman read the novella as a commentary on the violence of a certain kind of 
univocal, ambiguity-suppressing reading: just like the governess, torn between an initial belief 
in the angelic goodness of her children-protegées and a growing doubt that they might be evil, 
ends up strangling little Miles in an attempt to possess a knowledge that escapes her, so reading 
for the “meaning” of the story stifles the life out of the text: “… the governess’s very 
satisfaction at the success ending of the reading process is compromised by the radical 
frustration of a tragic loss: the embrace of meaning turns out to be but the embrace of death; 
the grasp of the signified turns out to be the grasp but of a corpse.”140 Felman’s reading 
                                                
137 Ibid., 22. 
138 Ibid., 25. In an interesting analogy, The Turn of the Screw was itself published in 12 installments on 
Collier’s Weekly, therefore incorporating delay and expectation into the textual history itself. 
139 Ibid., 24. Emphasis in the original. 
140 Shoshana Felman, “Turning the Screw of Interpretation,” Yale French Studies, no. 55/56 (1977): 
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highlights the fact that the verb “to grasp” is present both in the first lines and in the last lines 
of the novel, confirming that the text’s alpha and omega is in fact the question of intellectual 
grasping, or capire (etymologically capio, to seize, to take), which is represented by Cicero 
with the image of a closed fist.141 It is tempting to read Arrigo Boito’s already mentioned short 
story “Il pugno chiuso” precisely through this lens; that story, too, sustains a similar ambiguity, 
and the final image of the released fist reads like the letting go of control over the meaning of 
the story. The people surrounding Paw’s body as he dies and opens his hand are another 
example of an eager audience searching in vain for meaning and closure. James’s novella, in 
conclusion, is about experiencing the fantastic impasse: rather than inviting to choose one 
interpretation over the other (none of which is especially encouraged by the text’s internal 
logic), it thematizes the challenge of staying with the ambiguity.  
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Chapter 2 
Monstrosity as function of apophatic discourse 
in nineteenth-century fantastic literature 
 
 
“Pour effrayant que soit un monstre, la tache de 
le décrire est toujours plus effrayante que lui.” 





1. Telling monsters 
Over the past few decades, the study of cultures through the monsters they engender142 has 
emerged as a rich field of enquiry, with a multidisciplinary approach spanning literary criticism, 
cultural studies, art history, religious studies and classics to media, gender and disability 
studies. Following the first attempts at formalization (such as J. J. Cohen’s landmark 1996 
collection Monster Theory), the landscape of “monster studies” has been enriched and shaped 
by miscellaneous collections of works by authors of many and diverse theoretical and scholarly 
backgrounds (perhaps the most logical format for a work on monstrosity)143 as well as 
                                                
142 Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, “Monster Culture (Seven Theses),” in Monster Theory: Reading Culture, ed. 
Jeffrey Jerome Cohen (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 3. 
143 See for instance Bettina Bildhauer and Robert Mills, eds., The Monstrous Middle Ages, Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2003; Asa Simon Mittman and Peter J. Dendle, eds., The Ashgate Research 
Companion to Monsters and the Monstrous, Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2012; Adam Golub and Heather 
Richardson Hayton, eds., Monsters in the Classroom: Essays on Teaching What Scares Us, Jefferson, 
NC: McFarland, 2017. 
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discipline-specific compendia.144 Other works have focused more specifically on the spiritual 
and philosophical implications of the monster trope from the Middle Ages to the contemporary 
world.145 
As a preliminary observation, these studies acknowledge the sheer pervasiveness of 
forms of monstrosity in every culture and tradition (the monster being as much a local as a 
transcultural product), as well as the continuing relevance of the notion in contemporary 
cultural representations. The longevity and incessant renewal of our monsters, be they giants, 
centaurs, ghosts, zombies, traces the history of a culture's fears, anxieties and desires; monsters 
are always a site of projection and fantasy. Depending on the specific cultural moment it 
inhabits, the monstrous creature is a sign for something other, marking cultural, racial, political, 
religious, sexual, economic, and geographic difference. Monsters are liminal figures, policing 
the boundaries between human and inhuman, familiar and unfamiliar, normal and abnormal146: 
themselves being obscene examples of hybridization and impurity, they are both champions 
and transgressors of epistemological distinctions.  
Owing to the very shape-shifting nature of monstrosity, every attempt to discuss the 
phenomenology of a typical monster is bound to end with a methodological impasse. In this 
respect, it is probably wise to heed Asa Simon Mittman’s suggestion: 
 
                                                
144 Such as Jeffrey Andrew Weinstock, The Ashgate Encyclopedia of Literary and Cinematic Monsters, 
Farnham: Ashgate, 2014. 
145 Timothy K. Beal, Religion and its Monsters, New York: Routledge, 2002; Richard Kearney, 
Strangers, Gods and Monsters, London: Routledge, 2003; David Williams, Deformed Discourse: The 
Function of the Monster in Mediaeval Thought and Literature, Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1996 
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…[T]he monstrous does not lie solely in its embodiment (though this is very 
important) nor its location (though this is, again, vital), nor in the process(es) through 
which it enacts its being, but also (indeed, perhaps primarily) in its impact. No study 
could hope to pin down the monstrous in terms of physicality, though this is its most 
obvious marker. That which is “monstrous” in one culture (dark skin according to 
some medieval Christian texts, light skin according to some medieval Muslim texts, 
and so on) does not translate to others’ Others. Certainly, hybridity is common, as are 
giantism and dwarfism, and other forms of excess or lack (too many arms, too few, 
though these can just as well be markers of divinity), as well as certain activities, like 
anthropophagia, but the common ought not be substituted for the constitutive. I could 
not hope to describe the physical, behavioral or geographic parameters of the 
monstrous, here or anywhere. By definition, the monster is outside of such definitions; 
it defies the human desire to subjugate through categorization. This is the source, in 
many ways, of their power. Instead, then, I would look to the impact(s) of the 
monstrous. … Above all, the monstrous is that which … calls into question our (their, 
anyone's) epistemological worldview, highlights its fragmentary and inadequate 
nature, and thereby asks us (often with fangs at our throats, with its fire upon our skin, 
even as we and our stand-ins and body doubles descend the gullet) to acknowledge 
the failures of our systems of categorization.147 
 
A representation of this failure – the moment when categories underlying (and upheld by) 
scientific rationalism show their insufficiency – is, as we have already shown, the heart of the 
fantastic mode. What kinds of creatures produce such an effect in fantastic texts? How do they 
help us further illuminate the features and concerns of the genre? What kind of “everyday 
legality” do they outline through their disruptive presence? 
I suggest that, in texts that are ascribable to the fantastic mode, monstrous creatures 
generally activate a network of references gravitating around two concepts: hybridity and 
ineffability. These two qualities are framed by the narrative as being intimately connected: they 
offer, in negativo, the image of an epistemological framework in which the natural world is 
neatly divided into taxonomical categories by an intellectual act of isolation and description. 
                                                
147 Asa Simon Mittman, “The Impact of Monsters and Monster Studies,” in The Ashgate Research 
Companion to Monsters and the Monstrous, ed. Asa Simon Mittman and Peter J. Dendle (Burlington, 
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A fantastic text shows that the encounter with monstrosity results in “the inability to «tell»,”148 
in both senses of the word: to distinguish one thing from all others through individuation and 
categorization; and to speak, to use language in order to frame it, place it, control it. 
In The Philosophy of Horror, or Paradoxes of the Heart, Noël Carroll attempts to define 
the horror genre by postulating two conditions. In order to be considered such, a horror story, 
novel or film needs to include a monster in its diegetic universe; also, the way the monster is 
presented has to elicit a mixed reaction of fear and disgust. These conditions help differentiate 
the genre from stories of terror (such as those centered around serial killers or otherwise 
mentally unstable individuals – “all too human” stories) and also from exquisitely Gothic texts 
such as The Mysteries of Udolpho.149 
In order to trace the monstrous roots of hybridity, Carroll turns to Mary Douglas’s 1966 
study Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo.150 In this classic 
book, the anthropologist analyzes the ways in which different societies determine what (or 
who) is considered impure and therefore deserving of being relegated to the margins of culture. 
She reaches the conclusion that impurity or uncleanliness is generally attributed to elements 
that are perceived as straddling cultural categorizations. She offers the example of the Lele 
people of Congo, who shun the flying squirrel on account of it not being classifiable either as 
a land animal or as a bird. From this follows an understanding of unnaturalness in terms of the 
                                                
148 With this formula, Jack Halberstam qualifies specifically the monsters of Gothic literature 
(Halberstam, 23). 
149 Noël Carroll, The Philosophy of Horror, or, Paradoxes of the Heart (New York: Routledge, 1990), 
15. 
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interstitial. It is but a short logical step to apply this notion to the phenomenology of the 
monstrous. Ghosts, zombies, the Frankenstein creature are both alive and dead; wolfmen 
straddle two distinct species of the animal kingdom, wolves and humans; mechanical dolls are 
neither fully sentient nor fully inanimate. Monsters are therefore to be intended as “category 
mistake[s]”151: they expose the limitations of any cultural scheme that seeks, and fails, to 
categorize them. Carroll delimits this notion (which is admittedly very broad) in a way that 
resonates with the epistemological preoccupations of fantastic literature: he saves the monster 
label for “any being not believed to exist according to contemporary science.”152 
Let us consider the description of the bas-relief of Cthulhu found by the narrator among the 
notes and files of his late uncle, Professor Angell, in H. P. Lovecraft’s “The Call of Cthulhu” 
(1928): 
 
It seemed to be a sort of monster, or symbol representing a monster, of a form which 
only a diseased fancy could conceive. If I say that my somewhat extravagant 
imagination yielded simultaneous pictures of an octopus, a dragon, and a human 
caricature, I shall not be unfaithful to the spirit of the thing. A pulpy, tentacled head 
surmounted a grotesque and scaly body with rudimentary wings; but it was the general 
outline of the whole which made it most shockingly frightful.153 
 
                                                
151 Carroll, 31. 
152 Ibid., 27. There is no monstrosity to be found, for instance, in the Grand Guignol, because it “requires 
sadists rather than monsters” (ibid., 16). In this study, I concentrate on monstrous embodiments rather 
than monstrous acts – morphological rather than moral monstrosity. The reason for this choice is 
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153 Lovecraft, “The Call of Cthulhu,” 169. Emphasis in the original. 
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The figure in the bas-relief is what Harvey Greenberg would call “a Linnean nightmare”: a set 
of disparate characteristics making up an ultimately unclassifiable being.154 Through the 
“freakish compilation” that is the monster’s body, “the too-precise laws of nature as set forth 
by science are gleefully violated.”155 What the narrator can do, in order to render the thing 
“faithful[ly]” into words, is hoping to catch its “spirit”: the physical appearance of the figurine 
is way beyond any attempt at precise, analytic description. 
Count Michel Szémioth in Merimée’s “Lokis” is, like all werewolves (or were-bears?), 
a creature that straddles species, and as such casts a disquieting shadow over the notion of man 
as a rational being, far removed from bestiality as he is from his primitive past. Not by chance, 
the hypothesis of Michel actually being a monster is never openly allowed into the discursive 
arena, but always kept looming in the background, implied, between the lines.156 As seen in 
Chapter 1, the (well-grounded) suspicion of Michel’s monstrosity finds its counterpoint in a 
language that becomes opaque and, instead of clarifying, adds to the confusion.  
In fact, and most importantly, the manifestation of monstrosity is concurrent with – both 
leads to and is generated by – linguistic disturbances. According to David Williams, in Western 
intellectual history monstrosity and language are inextricably linked by the same origin story, 
the myth of the tower of Babel. The destruction of the Tower and the fragmentation of one 
                                                
154 Quoted in Cohen, 6. In this passage, Greenberg describes the Alien monster from the noted sci-fi 
franchise, inaugurated by Ridley Scott’s eponymous 1979 movie: the creature “def[ies] every natural 
law of evolution; by turn bivalve, crustacean, reptilian, and humanoid. It seems capable of lying 
dormant within its egg indefinitely. It sheds its skin like a snake, its carapace like an arthropod. It 
deposits its young into other species like a wasp. … It responds according to Lamarckian and Darwinian 
principles.” 
155 Ibid. 
156 Benedetti, 312-315. 
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language into many sanction the contingency of man-made structures, just like the plural body 
of the monster defies any unified and absolute knowledge of nature and the real. From this 
point of view, “the monster is, animally, a variety of Babel”157: a linguistically-inflected 
conceptualization of the limits of human understanding. 
With the simultaneity of its multiple nature, monstrosity defies syntactical order; it 
sabotages tenses with its conflation of past and present (primitive instinct and modern 
rationality, dead body and living spirit); itself a sign with no verifiable counterpart, it insinuates 
in the gap between the sign and its referent to show the precariousness, or the insufficiency, of 
such a binary system. A “confused[…]” and “paradoxical[…]” combination of “meanings”, 
the monster “«…lässt sich nicht lesen» – it does not permit itself to be read.”158 This could be 
a reason why the creature assembled by Frankenstein has no name; its body is a jumble of 
identities, of mind and matter, of death and life, in a cacophony that cannot be reconciled into 
a single chord, an identifying marker that will allow his creator and other characters to “tell” it 
somehow. At the same time, it is language that imposes upon the creature a marker of extraneity 
and non-belonging, as the lack of a name deprives the creature of a lineage and of the most 
                                                
157 Michel Serres, Disorder and Order, quoted in Williams, “Monsters, Then and Now,” 245. 
158 Edgar Allan Poe, “The Man of the Crowd,” in The Works of the Late Edgar Allan Poe, vol. II, 398.  
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essential nucleus of social structure, according to a model in which language represents the 
province of man par excellence (an assumption that the fantastic is invested in challenging).159 
In conclusion, the monster of fantastic literature is often represented as a hybrid, 
indescribable creature, whose presence activates the beating heart of the literary mode: “an 
experience of limits.”160 Armed with these preliminary considerations, and with the intention 
                                                
159 The case of the word “mostro” in the Italian cultural context is illustrative of a similar phenomenon 
of exclusion by way of discourse. The word has become common currency (and hackneyed journalistic 
lingo) since the 1980s, owing to the practice of designating with this epithet the perpetrator(s) of the 
infamous streak of double homicides that plagued the Tuscan countryside (“il mostro di Firenze”). In 
this case, the mostro became a receptacle for cultural anxieties around sexuality, the transforming 
relationship between the countryside and the city, the Americanization of Italian society. This process 
is strikingly reminiscent of the way in which traditional monstrous (fictional) topoi become sites of 
complex investment: one may think of how the vampire theme took on sinister undertones relating to 
the AIDS contagion in Francis Ford Coppola’s 1992 Dracula (Cohen, 5). In fact, the epithet “mostro” 
serves the purpose of a discursive expulsion of the perpetrator from human society. No human being 
can be capable of such acts: they cannot but be the product of an unnatural force. The notion of 
categorical interstitiality is still very much relevant. Part of the interest in the monsterization of the 
Florence serial killer is precisely how this label helped to project them into a narrativized or mythical 
space, straddling the boundary between reality and imagination. It is telling that the perpetrators (and 
the instigators) of the Tuscan killings have never been fully ascertained, while the impact of the acts 
themselves were quite visible: materially, in the form of a long trail of bodies, and culturally, through 
the lasting trauma suffered by Italian culture and society upon recognizing the presence of such an 
internal, uncanny threat. Proof of the discursive resistance to the notion of serial killing in Italy (and 
the perception of such a notion as exclusively American) is the fact that the most immediate Italian 
translation of “serial killer” (“pluriomicida”) still fails to capture the methodical, deliberate nature of 
the phenomenon (Ellen Victoria Nerenberg, Murder Made in Italy: Homicide, Media, and 
Contemporary Italian Culture, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012, in particular Chapter 1). 
160 Todorov, 93. At this point, we should also specify that, while we have preliminarily described the 
kind of monstrosity that the fantastic is interested in staging, “…a monster is not by nature fantastic. It 
becomes truly so only if it manifests itself outside all systems and all doctrines. Animated with a 
perverse autonomy, it must assert itself in its total freedom. Nothing or no one ought to be able to 
explain it away, or to integrate it into a theology or cosmogony” (Lévy, 56; emphasis in the original). 
This does not apply, for instance, in the case of the systematization offered by Festus in his epitome of 
Flaccus entitled De Verborum Significatione, where the etymology of “monster” is explained precisely 
through the role that such a creature evidently fulfills in the great scheme of creation: “monstrum quod 
monstrat futurum et monet voluntatem deorum” (quoted in Evanghélia Stead, Le Monstre, le singe, et 
le fœtus: tératogonie et décadence dans l'Europe fin-de-siècle, Genève: Droz, 2004, 15). Moreover, as 
demonstrated by some of the texts I analyze in Chapter 1, obviously not every fantastic text needs a 
monster in order to be considered such, nor do I mean to imply this. The present study considers how 
the monstrous theme intersects with the fantastic mode, in order to demonstrate how reading the latter 
through the former allows one to tease out with special clarity some foundational aspects of the mode, 
such as its apophatic quality (cf. the next section). 
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of bringing them into much sharper focus, we can now move on to an exploration of the nexus 
between monstrosity and language through the notion of apophasis.  
 
2. Fantastic fiction as apophatic discourse and the function of monstrosity  
Fantastic texts typically abound in instances of a specific rhetorical device known by the many 
names of paralipsis, preterition and apophasis. This device describes a situation in which a 
speaker says s/he will not, cannot or should not talk about something that s/he subsequently 
proceeds to talk about, or that is brought up precisely through this denial. It allows one to 
approach a topic by the back door, as it were, without tackling it directly.161 
The typical fantastic narrator is overwhelmed by the enormity of what s/he witnessed. 
Not only can their intellect not fully come to terms with what their senses perceive; their means 
of articulating both the events and their reaction to them are revealed as completely inadequate. 
There is no way on earth the narrator of Fitz-James O’Brien’s “What Was It?” (1859) could 
possibly express his dismay upon verifying the presence of an invisible creature in his room 
(“I cannot even attempt to give any definition of my sensations the instant after I turned on the 
gas…”162); in Lovecraft’s “Pickman’s Model,” which we have analyzed previously, Thurber 
recognizes the sheer impossibility of describing the artist’s perverse pictures (“There’s no use 
in my trying to tell you what [the paintings] were like, because the awful, the blasphemous 
                                                
161 This is probably what Stefano Lazzarin is thinking of as he reflects on preferred rhetorical devices 
in fantastic and horror texts: “quella figura della narrazione d’orrore – non so se qualcuno l’abbia 
repertoriata e battezzata con un nome preciso – che consiste nel riflettere sull’indicibile e l’inconcepibile 
nel momento stesso in cui lo si mette in scena” (Stefano Lazzarin, “Il volto velato. Iperbole e reticenza 
in Howard Phillips Lovecraft e nel racconto fantastico e d’orrore otto-novecentesco,” Between IV, no. 
7 , 2014: 5). 
162 Fitz-James O’Brien, “What Was It?,” in Collected Stories by Fitz-James O’Brien, ed. Edward J. 
O’Brien (New York: A. & C. Boni, 1925), 200.  
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horror, and the unbelievable loathsomeness and moral foetor came from simple touches quite 
beyond the power of words to classify”163); the reader of E. A. Poe’s “Berenice” (1835) is 
informed that s/he is reading the product of an illicit act of writing, “a tale which should not be 
told.”164 And yet the story of Berenice is told, Pickman’s art is described in minute detail, and 
the consequences of the encounter with the invisible being are extensively addressed. The 
urgency behind the fantastic avventura espressiva is dictated precisely by the extraordinary 
nature of the experiential material it aims to describe; the apophatic claims on the part of the 
narrators are therefore negated by the very existence of the text in which they are made. What 
is the point of this performance of intellectual, logical, expressive limits, which the narrative 
itself frames as impassable and yet cannot refrain from trying to overcome?165 What is the 
relationship of the monster to this performative disavowal? 
Apophasis is a particularly loaded concept when referred to monstrosity. In order to 
explore this connection sensibly, it is important to define the origin, features and purpose of 
apophatic discourse, all of which become apparent if we look at the first instances of 
codification of this category in medieval Neoplatonic philosophy.166 While for Plato and 
                                                
163 Lovecraft, “Pickman’s Model,” 203. 
 
164 Edgar Allan Poe, “Berenice,” in The Works of Edgar Allan Poe, ed. Edmund Clarence Stedman and 
George Edward Woodberry (Chicago: Stone and Kimball, 1894-1895), vol. I, 159. 
165 This is an ancient narrative device exemplified, for instance, by the topos of ineffability in the 
Commedia. 
166 The following discussion of monstrosity as function of apophatic theological discourse owes much 
to David Williams’s research into the topic, as laid out in his 1996 book Deformed Discourse and his 
2012 article “Monsters, Then and Now.” In these works, the scholar traces a genealogy of the monstrous 
as function of what he terms “deformed discourse,” the aesthetic counterpoint to the philosophical and 
theological tradition of negation, as developed by Neoplatonic philosophy and Christian apophatic 
theology. In this context, monsters are symbols whose incoherence is revealing of the limits of 
representation and human knowledge, as will be clarified in the following pages. 
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Aristotle apophasis simply pertains to the logical act of negation,167 the notion has a 
foundational role in the theological system elaborated by Pseudo-Dionysius the Aeropagite 
around the 5th-6th century. Such a system participates in a tradition with Neoplatonic roots 
which was enormously influential throughout the Christian Middle Ages and left a significant 
mark on Western mysticism (and in turn on modern spiritualism via important figures such as 
Emanuel Swedenborg). In Dionysius’s formulation, knowledge is attained per viam negativam, 
or through apophatic statements (“apophasis” coming from ancient Greek ἀπόφηµι, “to say 
no”, “to deny”, or more literally “away from speech”168). God, the ultimate object of 
knowledge, can never be known by what He is, but only by what He is not. By transcending 
the limits of human understanding and logic (which rely excessively on positive assertions), 
man can experience the union of subject and object and know God as paradox, a knowledge 
that goes beyond affirmation and negation and that the monstrous figure symbolizes. 
Apophasis is opposed to cataphasis (κατάϕηµι, “to say yes”, “to affirm”), which is the 
first degree of knowledge in Pseudo-Dionysius’s system: it identifies the kind of knowledge 
that is attained through the senses and proceeds through rational demonstration, trying to 
determine what something or someone is. The cataphatic method is associated with the 
scientific and logical mindset, which, in order to offer positive (affirmative) definitions, 
differentiates and classifies the objects of its analysis. This process, as Roland Barthes observes 
apropos of the plates of the Encyclopédie, carries with it a certain fragmentation of reality: “to 
appropriate is to fragment the world, to divide it into finite objects subject to man in proportion 
                                                
167 William Franke, “Preface,” in On What Cannot Be Said: Apophatic Discourses in Philosophy, 
Religion, Literature, and the Arts, ed. William Franke, vol. I, Classical Formulations (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame, 2007), 1.  
168 Ibid., 2. 
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to their very discontinuity; for we cannot separate without finally naming and classifying …”169 
Pursuing the idea of an exhaustive knowledge of the world by naming, defining and classifying 
hides, according to Dionysius, a fundamental fiction. First, it attains an imperfect (partial, 
fragmented) knowledge of the object, because defining a rose as red, for instance, limits its 
being to that characteristic and ignores all others. Also, it acts as a veil concealing the 
fundamental limits of human intellection – which are, in Dionysius’s theological discourse, 
marked by the supreme mystery of God towards which human intellect strives but that it can 
never fully encompass. We have to keep in mind that, “[w]hile Denys’ science is theology and 
his subject is always God, the epistemology he describes is applicable in general to the way the 
human mind works in relation to all objects of knowledge”170: whatever the nature of what is 
being investigated, its wholeness will never be penetrated through mere cataphasis. Proceeding 
per viam negativam by saying what something is not allows to reach a fuller truth, because it 
grants “liberation from the limitations of predication” and frees the mind from the cage of 
“logico-linguistic assertions.”171 
In this system, the figure of the monster plays an essential role. Pseudo-Dionysius 
formulated a complex theory of representation and signs built on a foundation of semiotic 
pessimism (i.e. the sign never exhausts the essence of its referent).172 In such a system, the 
monster quite literally embodies the limitations of rationalistic and logical thinking for being a 
                                                
169 Roland Barthes, “The Plates of the Encyclopedia,” in New Critical Essays (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1980), 27.  
 
170 Williams, Deformed Discourse, 32. 
 
171 Ibid., 33. 
 
172 Ibid., 26. 
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sign with no verifiable referent, an unnatural signifier that points towards what is outside or 
beyond nature – therefore a shortcut to transcend the limitations of logical and linguistic 
thinking. In Dionysius’s words, “A manifestation through dissimilar shapes is more correctly 
to be applied to the invisible ... I doubt that anyone would refuse to acknowledge that 
incongruities are more suitable for lifting our minds up to the domain of the spiritual than 
similarities are.”173 In the apophatic system, the monster is an aesthetic rendition of paradox, 
alluding to the supreme paradox that underlies all things. 
St. Thomas and other medieval Christian thinkers subsumed Dionysius’s system in some 
cases, and re-elaborated it in others to adapt it to their Aristotelian roots.174 Negative theology 
gives epistemological privilege to devices like the metaphor and the paradoxical sign and aims 
to reach – through a sort of self-destruction or transcendence of language – supreme silence in 
contemplation of the divine mystery (mystery has its root in µυειν, “to close one’s eyes” or “to 
close one’s lips”, and is etymologically and conceptually associated with the mystical175). On 
the contrary, the scholastic tradition is essentially cataphatic or affirmative and proceeds 
through syllogism and analogy; it relies upon reason and the logical nature of language and 
eschews the anti-intellectualism that is potentially intrinsic in apophatic theology.176 For 
scholastic philosophy, the monster retains its disruptive potential, but this disruption is 
understood in different terms: it embodies the denial of the foundational law of non-
contradiction, the Aristotelian principle according to which in nature everything is equal to 
                                                
173 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, chapter 141A, quoted in ibid., 40. 
 
174 Ibid., 48 and following. 
 
175 Ibid., 38. 
 
176 Ibid., 54. 
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itself and dissimilar to anything else (A = A ≠ B). The “impossible form”177 of the monster 
challenges this binary thinking by uniting contraries within itself; its threat is logical as well as 
ontological. 
David Williams regards the copious monsters that pepper Christian medieval art and 
literature – haunting the walls of churches, stalking the margins of manuscripts – as a reminder 
of the via negativa excluded by Aristotelian logic, pointing to a rhetorical and ontological 
coincidentia oppositorum that was to be found only outside that system.178 The excess, 
miscegenation and chaos embodied by the monster is a sign and a warning, as the etymology 
reveals (monstrare, to show, and monere, to warn): coming from, and returning to, an ‘outside’ 
of language and logic, it prevents “the adequation of the real with intellect.”179 
To sum up, in a context of overreliance on reason, logic and structure, in turn manifested 
through a fundamental semiotic optimism, the monster stands for the revealing power of 
incongruity.180 Its antimimetic, antilogical quality short-circuits the relationship between 
language and reality and alludes to alternative ways of knowing (the monster itself shows – 
monstrare – instead of representing – repraesentare181 – the latter being a typically cataphatic 
mode of signification). What is revealed is therefore generally the contingency or non-necessity 
of the ways in which the human mind orders and understands the world, and in which it 
pretends to describe it. 
                                                






180 Ibid., 26. 
 
181 Ibid., 4. 
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I suggest that representations of monstrosity that abound in 19th- and 20th-century 
fantastic literature operate in analogous ways, pointing towards spaces that are not only 
inaccessible to human intellection but also, consequently, ineffable. The impossibility of 
description lamented by most fantastic narrators, both through paraliptic rhetorics and through 
the thematization of fractured, crippled and incomplete language, delineates a secular brand of 
apophatic discourse for the fantastic mode, one that “concentrate[s] on the unsayable and 
generate[s] discourse deliberately out of this experience.”182 This attitude towards language 
speaks of a deep mistrust of anthropocentric rationalism and of any notion of an ultimately 
intelligible world. However, one should keep in mind that, in Neoplatonic and scholastic 
theologies, the monster alludes to “a realm where ultimate truth resides but cannot be 
known,”183 a realm whose existence is as certain as its ultimate unintelligibility. On the 
contrary, in a context of philosophical naturalism and logical positivism (in which fantastic 
literature is steeped and to which it reacts), the incongruity cultivated by the literary mode and 
represented by its monstrous agents does not lean on the certainty of an unknowable 
transcendency: what is at stake in this case is the very idea of the limits of human knowledge 
as well as the definition of (and the attitude towards) mystery. In an 1883 article titled “Le 
Fantastique,” Guy de Maupassant laments the fact that with the so-called Age of Reason “we 
                                                
182 William Franke, ed. On What Cannot Be Said, vol. I, 4. 
 
183 Williams, “Monsters, Then and Now,” 246. 
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have rejected the idea of the mysterious, which is now simply what remains to be explored.”184 
In other words, a determination to illuminate areas that were until then considered outside the 
domain of scientific inquiry (phenomena traditionally attributed to supernatural causes) leads 
to an “apocalypse du mystérieux,”185 which is manifested in the limits of the gnoseological 
circle being pushed further and further into the unknown. The skepticism of the scientific mind 
denotes a certain cognitive horror vacui in its pursuit of plenitude, of cataphatic certainty; as 
Heidegger puts it, “science wishes to know nothing of the nothing.”186 A monster in a fantastic 
text is a guardian and catalyst of a super- or sub- or preternatural dimension infested by paradox 
and lack; it teases and attracts the taxonomical mind, demanding and at the same time refusing 
to be mapped; pushing the potential of language to its expressive extremes, only to let it crash 
against a wall of silence and meaninglessness. 
                                                
184 Guy de Maupassant, “The Fantastic” [article in Le Gaulois, October 7, 1883], in Guy de 
Maupassant’s Selected Works: A New Translation, Contexts, Criticism, ed. Robert Lethbridge (New 
York & London: W.W. Norton &Co., 2017), 284. In this article, Maupassant announces the imminent 
death of the fantastic, intended both in the metaphysical sense (as the “unknown”) and as a cluster of 
narrative genres (such as the epos, the fairytale and Hoffmann’s and Poe’s “troubling works”); this 
double demise being the consequence of “skepticism” overcoming “superstition” (284). As we 
discussed in Chapter 1, the case could be made for the very opposite: skepticism defines the modus 
operandi of the fantastic mode itself as it scrutinizes the foundations of scientism and what it perceives 
as a dogmatic refusal of the supernatural. In fact, the peculiar way in which the supernatural is told in 
the wake of the Age of Reason is precisely the essence of le fantastique. Maupassant’s article anticipates 
many of the theoretical points made by Todorov in Introduction à la littérature fantastique, including 
the notion of “hésitation”: “…[W]hen skepticism had finally overcome superstition, art became more 
subtle. The writer played with ambivalence, touching on the supernatural rather than being immersed 
in it. He created terrifying effects while still remaining within the realm of the plausible, leaving the 
reader hesitant and fearful. That reader, left unsure what to believe, lost his footing as in water where 
you can’t see the bottom, clinging on desperately to reality only to immediately fall back even deeper, 
once again struggling in a confusion as awful and as frightening as a nightmare” (285). 
 
185 Laurent Dubreuil, “Maupassant et la vision fantastique,” Labyrinthe 4 (1999): np, accessed 5 May 
2018, http://labyrinthe.revues.org/294 
 
186 Martin Heidegger, “What is Metaphysics?,” in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: 
HarperCollins, 1993), 96.  
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This Heideggerian “nothing” is relentlessly circled around, alluded to, glimpsed at in 
fantastic texts. With its antimimetical, antilogical quality, the monster hints at (monstrat) a 
signification void or a mystery that can be talked around, rather than about; a space that 
discourse itself pushes to the limits of signification.187 Such gaping holes in the fabric of 
discourse can be read productively against Fredric Jameson’s analysis of the “strategies” with 
which modern non-realistic fiction “reinvent[s] the sacred.”188 In his already-quoted essay on 
“Magical Narratives,” he traces the ways in which romance, which he considers a literary 
mode, survives in and past the increasing secularization manifested in bourgeois realism. While 
in the Romantic era the increasingly disappearing “magical function” is replaced by what he 
calls “new positivities”, such as psychology,  
 
at the end of the nineteenth century, … the search for secular equivalents of this kind 
seems to have reached a dead end, and to be replaced by the new and characteristic 
indirection of modernism, which, in what from Kafka to Cortázar is henceforth termed 
“the fantastic,” seeks to convey the sacred, not as a presence, but rather as a 
determinate, marked absence at the heart of the secular world.189 
 
                                                
187 Not by chance has fantastic literature been read through instances of overwhelming unspeakability 
such as the numinous or the sublime (as Carla Benedetti does in the aforementioned “L’enunciazione 
fantastica”). The Kantian notion of sublime denotes an experience of the limits of human perceptive 
and intellectual faculties when faced with the intuition of an unlimited and unmeasurable absolute; 
similarly, the fantastic represents the consequences of an encounter with something that cannot be 
assessed or conceptualized according to familiar schemes, and that for this reason stalks the boundaries 
of discourse (Benedetti, 302-303). Rudolf Otto’s theory of the numinous describes the essentially non-
rational and suprasensible experience of the divine, pointing to something that can only be experienced 
or described indirectly. For Otto, the monstrous in particular is a “fairly exact expression for the 
numinous in its aspects of mystery, awfulness, augustness and «energy»; nay, even the fascination is 
dimly felt in it” (Rudolph Otto, The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-Rational Factor in the 
Idea of the Divine and its Relation to the Rational, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1950, 28). 
188 Jameson, 145. 
189 Ibid. 
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While Jameson’s understanding of “fantastic” is somewhat different from the one I subscribe 
to in this study, the movement he describes ends up clarifying the essential continuity between 
an apophatic discourse of the sacred and an analogous one in a secularized context. 
I would like to analyze how this “determinate, marked absence” is thematized, and given 
paradoxically palpable shape, in a strain of teratological fantastic tales from the second half of 
the nineteenth century, paving the way for a less traditional notion of monstrosity in twentieth-
century fantastic and supernatural representations, built around embodiments outside 
established taxonomies or around a complication of the very notion of embodiment. I trace this 
vein in three texts of disparate renown and fortunes that are arguably linked by a clear 
affiliation: the above-mentioned “What Was It?” (1859), by Fitz-James O’Brien; the second 
version of “Le Horla” (1887) by Guy de Maupassant; and “The Damned Thing” (1893) by 
Ambrose Bierce. In the first text, an invisible creature’s body is the empty space around which 
scientific reason and descriptive language run aground; in the second, the limits of human 
understanding, articulation and self-fashioning take the “opaque[…],” “transparen[t]”190 shape 
of a mind-controlling entity coming from an undefined outside; in the third, the narrow 
spectrum of a man’s perception accounts for his violent destruction at the hands of an unseeable 
predator.  
 
3. “Stretching tightly round a vacant space”: “What Was It?” by Fitz-James O’Brien 
Fitz-James O’Brien (1826-1862) was an Irish expatriate to the United States who wrote poetry 
and a number of influential texts of fantastic and science fiction. In his best-known short story, 
                                                
190 Guy de Maupassant, “Le Horla,” in Guy de Maupassant's Selected Works: A New Translation, 
Contexts, Criticism, ed. Robert Lethbridge (New York & London: W.W. Norton &Co., 2017), 196. 
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“What Was It?,” a group of “plucky and philosophical”191 individuals (among which is the 
narrator Harry, a man of letters with a love for leisurely opium-smoking sessions) move into a 
run-down boarding house in New York City. The house has a reputation for being haunted; as 
soon as they are settled, the tenants (all avid readers of supernatural literature) begin to expect 
a classic ghost to manifest itself, but are eventually forced to accept that no such presence 
inhabits the building. One night, after a particularly brooding, opium-fueled conversation with 
his friend Dr. Hammond on matters of terror and “the proneness of the human mind for 
mysticism,”192 Harry retires to his bed only to be attacked, in the complete darkness, by a 
strong, wiry creature whom he eventually manages to overpower. Upon turning on the light, 
the man realizes he is holding down a physical, material, but completely invisible being. Over 
the course of two weeks, the tenants keep “the Thing” in restraints in Harry’s bedroom while 
they try to study its nature and determine what to do with it. They eventually resolve to give it 
chloroform in order to take a cast of it with plaster of Paris, which reveals the creature to be a 
“distorted, uncouth, and horrible”193 imitation of a human being. The captive eventually dies 
from starvation (it refuses any food offered to it) and the cast of its body is donated to the 
cabinet of curiosities of one Dr. X, eventually making its way into a “well-known museum”194 
in the city.  
The story relies on a rather original take on the hybrid-creature trope: with the 
transparency of a ghost and the materiality of an animal, the “Thing” seems to come from some 
                                                
191 O’Brien, “What Was It?,” 192. 
192 Ibid., 196. 
193 Ibid., 207. 
194 Ibid., 209. 
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interstitial territory between nature and super-nature. At the beginning of the story, ghosts are 
evoked only in hearsay and in the words of other witnesses, but they never actually make an 
appearance. Previous caretakers have abandoned the house for fear of strange supernatural 
phenomena: 
 
These people declared that they were troubled with unnatural noises. Doors were 
opened without any visible agency. The remnants of furniture scattered through the 
various rooms were, during the night, piled one upon the other by unknown hands. 
Invisible feet passed up and down the stairs in broad daylight, accompanied by the 
rustle of unseen silk dresses, and the gliding of viewless hands along the massive 
balusters.195 
 
The emphasis on sight recalls the notion of ghost as apparition, projection, hallucination or 
visible spirit, a matter whose details were widely discussed in psychic circles of the time (see 
Chapter 1). In all these cases, the spirit is an airy and evanescent presence, whose transparency 
is strictly related to its immaterial nature. The narrator and his fellow tenants are instead 
plagued by a different kind of haunting: the creature that attacks Harry can be touched, has a 
physical, weighty body; its “bony hands”196 can strangle a man, its teeth can bite his neck, its 
heart can throb as a result of physical strain. It is a material ghost: “It breathed. I felt its warm 
breath upon my cheek. It struggled fiercely. It had hands. They clutched me. Its skin was 
smooth, like my own. There it lay, pressed close up against me, solid as stone, – and yet utterly 
invisible!”197 This does not chime with the expectations of the house tenants, who are hungry 
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for a good old-fashioned ghost story. Upon learning of the shady reputation of their new abode, 
they begin to expect that occult presences will show up: “[w]e absolutely awaited their advent 
with eagerness.”198 A mere creaking noise establishes “an instant silence” among the guests, 
“and every one [is] prepared for an immediate clanking of chains and a spectral form.”199 The 
passage pokes fun at the conventions of Gothic novels (the traditional Medieval castle being 
replaced by a dilapidated boarding house on Twenty-Sixth Street) and at the supernatural craze 
of the time, especially evident in periodical magazines and popular publications (which were 
O’Brien’s main source of revenue). Fourteen years before the story was published, William 
Gilmore Simms had complained: “[t]he world has become monstrous matter-of-fact in latter 
days. We can no longer get a ghost story … The materialists have it all their own way.”200 
O’Brien’s peculiar choice of monster shows not only how, “in the mid- to late nineteenth 
century[,] ghosts and materialist science were mutually possessed, each haunted by the 
other,”201 but also how this reflected in the way ghost stories were being reimagined. 
In fact, with the typically fantastic penchant for intertextuality, the story makes it evident 
that turning for clues to previous examples of terror-inducing literature will not be of much 
help in figuring out the nature of the mysterious visitor. During their “gloomy”202 conversation, 
Harry and Hammond construct a proper bibliography of the supernatural, evoking certain 
chilling details in Brockden Brown’s 1798 Gothic novel Wieland and Edward Bulwer-Lytton’s 
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1842 novel Zanoni, as well as E.T.A. Hoffmann’s masterful literary style. The narrator himself 
is a modest supernatural expert (therefore especially qualified as “indagatore dell’incubo”203), 
having published, as O’Brien actually had, a ghost story in Harper’s Magazine.204 However, 
none of these references provide Harry and Hammond with useful hermeneutical tools: the 
“terrible Enigma”205 cannot be explained through this genealogy of terror.206  
The most coveted book among the tenants is The Night Side of Nature, a collection of 
ghost stories published in 1848 by popular English writer Catherine Crowe; a copy of the book 
has been acquired by one of the boarders and is regularly stolen to be read in hushed little 
groups around the house. In the Preface to her collection, Crowe calls attention to that side of 
nature (its “veiled department”) that is only “strangely and imperfectly”207 glimpsed at in our 
day-to-day lives. This region promises to hold important revelations for us, and yet “science, 
at least science in this country, has put it aside as beneath her notice, because new facts that do 
not fit into old theories are troublesome, and not to be countenanced.”208 Despite their expertise 
                                                
203 This is the famous nickname of Dylan Dog, the main character of the eponymous horror comics 
series created by Tiziano Sclavi in 1986. 
204 The story, whose title is mentioned in the text, is “The Pot of Tulips” (1855); it concludes with the 
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in all things occult, it is in the guise of classic scientists that Harry and Hammond approach the 
creature, which translates into their showing the same pattern of behavior that Catherine 
Crowe’s book denounces. Faced with a “new” phenomenon, they resort to “old” means of 
investigation: while the possibility of an affiliation of the Thing with “spirit-circles”209 is 
briefly considered, the creature’s appearance activates Harry’s “scientific pride”210 and 
Hammond’s inquisitive nature (“Let us reason a little, Harry”211 … “I don’t know what it is … 
but please the gods I will, with your assistance, thoroughly investigate it.”212) They demonstrate 
the existence of the creature for the benefit of the bystanders through a simple experiment 
utilizing mass and gravity (dropping the creature on the bed in order to make the boards creak 
and an indent in the mattress appear). However, the story suggests that their methods of inquiry 
barely scratch the surface of the Mystery. The entire extent of the men’s curiosity regards the 
outer shape of the creature; all their “wishes” are “satisf[ied]”213 once they make the invisible 
visible. Therefore, after the plaster cast has been made and an idea of the creature’s features 
has been obtained, what remains to be done is simply to get rid of it. Once the phenomenon 
has been forcefully dragged into the confines of scientific observation (the ultimate price being 
its death), no more can be learned from it that falls outside traditional channels of inquiry. The 
men’s knowledge of the creature remains superficial, epidermic – quite literally. No attempt is 
made to investigate its origin, and with it its nature: the fact that it comes from nowhere (it 
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“dropped, as it seemed, from the ceiling”214) is briefly mentioned and never seriously 
entertained.215 
The ultimate inadequacy of the characters’ literary references and scientific knowledge 
is mirrored by the repeated claims of impotence by narrator-Harry. The first paragraphs have 
already made clear that he anticipates reactions of “incredulity and scorn” upon releasing such 
a “strange narrative,”216 something he is by all means reluctant to do. And yet in the guise of a 
typical fantastic narrator, he overcomes his “diffidence” towards his own material in order to 
relate, “in as simple and straightforward a manner as I can compass, some facts that passed 
under my observation …”217 The narrative material does not easily lend itself to simple and 
direct reporting. Apophatic statements punctuate the tale, linking the exceptionality of the event 
with the inadequacy of the intellectual and expressive means of the narrator: “I cannot even 
attempt to give any definition of my sensations the instant after I turned on the gas”218; 
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215 In fact, the text even insinuates the suspicion that the creature was never there in the first place, 
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“Imagination in vain tries to compass the awful paradox”219; “the confusion and terror that took 
possession of the bystanders, when they saw all this, was beyond description.”220  
The verb “to compass,” in its double meaning of “encircle” and “comprehend,” points to 
the conceptual heart of the story. The creature is always only seen per viam negativam, through 
the objects that surround it or that its body affects: “Hammond stood holding the ends of the 
cord that bound the Invisible, twisted round his hand, while before him, self-supporting as it 
were, he beheld a rope laced and interlaced, and stretching tightly round a vacant space.”221 
Again, the presence of a body on Harry’s bed can be discerned by “[a] deep impression [that] 
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of both” (quoted in Rosemarie Garland Thompson, Extraordinary Bodies: Figuring Physical Disability 
in American Culture and Literature, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, 69; for a deeper 
analysis of the relevance of Barnum’s shows to O’Brien’s tale, see Joyce L. Huff, “The Domesticated 
Monster: Freakishness and Masculinity in Fitz-James O’Brien’s ‘What Was It?’,” Nineteenth-Century 
Gender Studies, no. 4.2, 2008, accessed 6 February 2018, 
http://www.ncgsjournal.com/issue42/huff.htm). In O’Brien’s story, this freak-show subtext works in 
two directions. First of all, since it evokes a context of ruthless for-profit spectacularization, it 
counteracts the narrator’s earnest-sounding promises of objectivity, as well as the credibility of his 
scientific attitude. At the same time, it exposes the post-Darwinian anxieties of species miscegenation 
and racial promiscuity that these shows leveraged and exorcized, evoking the notion of “category 
mistake” that we have already analyzed. 
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marked itself distinctly on the pillow, and on the bed itself.”222 The same goes for the plaster 
cast, which offers just a negative image of the creature. My point is that language, too, functions 
as the ropes and plaster cast, as Harry and Hammond attempt to define, circumscribe, 
taxonomize the creature: 
 
It was shaped like a man, – distorted, uncouth, and horrible, but still a man. It was 
small, not over four feet and some inches in height, and its limbs revealed a muscular 
development that was unparalleled. Its face surpassed in hideousness anything I had 
ever seen. Gustave Doré, or Callot, or Tony Johannot, never conceived anything so 
horrible. There is a face in one of the latter’s illustrations to “Un Voyage où il vous 
plaira,” which somewhat approaches the countenance of this creature, but does not 
equal it.223 
 
First of all, the image described by Harry is only a reproduction, an impression left in plaster 
by the ever-elusive Thing. Moreover, the entire description is implicitly played in the negative 
key: the creature is shaped like a man, but distorted; the muscles have an unparalleled strength 
(again, not that of a normal man); the face surpasses other known forms of hideousness; its 
horrific quality is unrivaled by artistic representations; the face in Johannot’s illustration, ugly 
as it is, still does not equal the creature’s. As in the case of the bibliography of terror already 
provided, previous aesthetic renditions of the horrible are called to the aid of a mind at a loss, 
although these visual references only approach the form that is being described. Harry’s 
repeated apophatic claims (fragments of a discourse that affirms its own impossibility) find an 
iconic expression in the image of an empty space encircled by restraints, which on the one hand 
make the features of that space visible, and seem to capture its outline fleetingly, while on the 
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other hand emphasize its irreducible emptiness. O’Brien’s story highlights how the literary 
fantastic recognizes the paradox of finding its sense around a lack in its discursive capabilities, 
and how it self-consciously brings this lack center stage through a phantasmagoria of 
teratological figures and the related performance of rhetorical limits. 
 
4. “The rule of mankind is over”: “Le Horla” by Guy de Maupassant 
Guy de Maupassant, who is mainly associated with realistic novels and short fiction, wrote a 
handful of fantastic short stories across the entire span of his brief but extraordinarily prolific 
career, from “The Flayed Hand” (“La main d’écorché”) in 1875 to “Who Can Know?” (“Qui 
sait?”) in 1890 – the latter considered a sort of coda to the pinnacle represented by “Le Horla” 
(1887).224 Perhaps as a testimony to the unsettling, ‘unplaceable’ quality of this fantastic tale, 
since its publication “Le Horla” has been often linked to, or more simply explained through, 
Maupassant’s biographical details. The writer had contracted syphilis in 1875, and over the 
course of the following fifteen years his physical and mental health slowly deteriorated. By the 
time stories of paranoia and hallucination like “The Apparition” (1884) and “Le Horla” were 
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being reprinted (in 1891 and 1892 respectively), he had been committed to an institution, where 
he died in 1893. At this time Maupassant’s declining health was public knowledge and reprints 
in journals were accompanied by texts speculating on his state and clinicalizing the tales as 
symptoms of his condition.225 However, not only did the writer’s hallucinatory episodes arise 
later than when he was writing “Le Horla”226; the biographical connection itself, justified or 
not, does little to illuminate a story whose breadth and relevance force us to consider it “à la 
fois personnel[le] et métaphysique.”227 In fact, throughout the whole story, it is never clear 
whether the narrator is simply mad and hallucinating, or whether he is being pushed to the edge 
of sanity by actual events of unprecedented cosmic significance – making for a purely 
Todorovian fantastic tale. 
In the story, narrated in the first person through dated journal entries, an unnamed man 
is haunted (or believes he is) by an invisible being. The story opens with an idyllic description 
of the countryside surrounding his childhood home; along the Seine, a peaceful trail of ships 
sails by, including a beautiful Brazilian three-master that the narrator salutes with joy. Only 
four days later, he begins to feel feverish and plagued by an inexplicable sense of impending 
doom; he also experiences terrifying episodes of sleep paralysis. Later he begins to suspect, 
and then is progressively certain, that a mysterious entity is drinking the water and the milk 
from his nightstand while he is asleep. Fearing for his mental state, he leaves the country and 
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decides to spend some time in Paris, where his “unsettled imagination”228 appears to be soon 
cured of its paranoia. There he witnesses (and is deeply affected by) an experiment in hypnosis 
performed by a doctor on Madame Sablé, the protagonist’s cousin, whose will becomes 
completely subjugated to that of the doctor until the latter frees her from his “spellbinding 
force.”229 Back in the country, the narrator has an encounter with the being in full daylight as 
he sees a rose being picked by an invisible hand and floating in the air; then again at night, 
when the pages of a book move as if somebody was reading them; and finally when he sees 
the “opaque transparency”230 of the thing’s body obstructing his own reflection in the mirror. 
The man realizes he is being mentally controlled by an “unknowable creature from a 
supernatural race,”231 “stronger than [man], his successor in this world,”232 who is enslaving 
his will and dictating his actions. When he comes across an issue of the Revue du Monde 
Scientifique reporting “an epidemic”233 of the syndrome he is experiencing among the 
population of São Paulo in Brazil, he remembers seeing the three-master a few months before. 
Has he inadvertently invited the being into his home with that salute? In a desperate attempt to 
get rid of the parasytical presence, he decides to lock it into a room and to burn the whole house 
to the ground, killing his servants in the process. However, he soon realizes that even fire 
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cannot affect the superior makeup of the Horla’s biology and finally resolves to kill himself, 
either as a pure act of deliverance or in order to take the Horla’s life with his own. 
The story is incredibly complex in the way it interweaves its themes, with the main 
plotline flowing off into many rivulets whose significance is not always immediately evident. 
However, many of its key questions seem to coalesce around the invisible body of the Horla: 
the persistence of mysterious forces outside the reach of the scientific mind; the inherent 
limitations of man; the epistemological overreliance on sight; and the impotence of language. 
Under many different angles, the creature reaffirms the premise of apophatic discourse: that 
there is a ‘beyond’ to human understanding and articulation. 
 
4.1. The mirror and the page 
Throughout the story, every encounter with the creature precipitates the unnamed narrator into 
a deeper pit of doubt and despair; ascribing the first episodes to hallucinations, he gradually 
convinces himself that he is in fact stalked and mentally possessed by an invisible being. All 
his remaining doubts are removed by an especially shocking encounter, documented in a 
frenzied diary entry describing the man’s plan to attract and physically harm the creature. The 
passage is worth reproducing in its entirety: 
  
August 19. I will kill him.234 I have seen him! Yesterday, I sat down at my table and 
pretended to be writing with great concentration. I knew very well that He would come 
and hover around me, quite close to me, so close that I might be able to touch Him, 
grab hold of Him. And then… then, I will have the strength of a desperate man: I will 
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use my hands, my knees, my chest, my head, my teeth to strangle Him, crush Him, 
bite Him, tear Him apart. 
And feeling every part of my body ready to pounce, I waited for Him. 
I had lit my two lamps and the eight candles on my mantelpiece, as if I might be able 
to see Him in the bright light. 
Opposite me was my bed, an old oak four-poster bed; to my right was the fireplace; 
to the left, I had carefully closed my door, after leaving it open for a long time, in 
order to draw Him in; behind me was a very tall wardrobe with a mirror that I used 
every day to shave and dress, where it was my habit to gaze at myself, from head to 
toe, every time I walked by it. 
And so, I pretended to be writing, in order to trick Him, for He was also spying on 
me; and suddenly, I felt, I was certain, that He was reading over my shoulder, that He 
was there, almost touching my ear. 
I sprang up, my fists clenched, and turned around so quickly that I nearly fell over. 
And then? ... It was as bright as day inside the room and yet I did not see my reflection 
in the mirror! … It was empty, bright, deep, full of light! But my reflection was not 
there… and I was standing right opposite it!  
I could see the clear glass from top to bottom. And I stared at it wild-eyed. I didn’t 
dare take a step forward; I didn’t dare make a move, and yet I could sense that He was 
there – He was there but He would escape my clutches once more, He whose invisible 
body had devoured my reflection. 
I was so very afraid! Then suddenly, I gradually began to see myself in a mist, deep 
inside the mirror, in a fog as if through a layer of water; and it seemed as if this water 
glided from side to side, slowly making my image clearer with every moment that 
passed. It was like the end of an eclipse. The thing that was hiding me did not appear 
to have any clearly defined shape, but a sort of opaque transparency that gradually 
grew more and more visible. 
I could finally see myself clearly, just as I did every day when I looked at myself in 
that mirror.  
I had seen Him! I could still feel the terror of that moment that made me continue to 
tremble.235 
 
Out of the rich network of references in this passage, I choose to dwell on two in particular: 
the theme of sight and that of the written word. Both of these aspects are pivotal to the reading 
of Maupassant’s text, but also identify typical features of the literary fantastic. I read both 
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themes in the light of what appears to be the story’s conceptual heart: man’s loss of discursive 
mastery over himself and the world, coupled with an interest in how that very loss is articulated.  
We could argue that the reason why the mirror episode is the point of highest “terror” in 
the tale is because Maupassant’s story, just like O’Brien’s, operates within the dominant 
paradigm of sight. The meaning of the fantastic’s fixation for optical instruments and distorted 
perspectives becomes clearer if we contextualize it in the light of nineteenth-century 
developments in physiological optics and technologies of vision, as well as Comtian, empiricist 
theories of perception. In this frame of reference, discourses about vision are “restructur[ed] 
… to foreground inference and cognition,”236 creating a preferential connection between what 
is visible and what is real. This comes forth with great evidence in O’Brien’s story, where the 
characters’ incredulity towards an unseeable (but touchable, hearable) creature points to a 
different degree of reliability between data provided by sight and those obtained through the 
other senses. When “[k]nowledge, comprehension, reason, are established through the power 
of the look,”237 the very notion of an invisible portion of reality undermines the primacy of the 
eye, sabotages the alignment of the senses and creates epistemological and metaphysical 
paradoxes.238 
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A specific interest in questions of vision is a commonly recognized trait of fantastic 
literature. In particular, according to Angelo M. Mangini, anamorphosis or distorted 
perspective can be considered the essence of the entire literary mode. In the noted painting 
“The Ambassadors” (1533) by Hans Holbein, a distorted elongated shape lies at the feet of two 
human figures. Only from a specific angle can one clearly see that the object is in fact a skull, 
a clear omen of death that goes unperceived by observers for as long as they look at the painting 
in a traditional, frontal way. In this painting, precisely the deployment of an artifice linked to 
contemporary advancements in optical science tricks our eyes into failing us. The provisional 
and uncertain nature of our sight-based apprehension of the real is frighteningly exposed. What 
is called into question, therefore, is the transparency of the eye as a window onto the world, 
since it is itself liable to distortions, just like any other optical instrument.239 The fact that the 
optical illusion yields the image of a skull is also significant. According to Mangini, 
anamorphic distortions both represented in and embodied by the literary fantastic ultimately 
sabotage the principium individuationis – i.e. “quelle distinzioni che … garantiscono lo 
sviluppo e l’integrità della coscienza: Io/Altro; reale/irreale; parte/tutto; vita/morte.” 240 In 
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particular, the latter opposition, pointing to the ultimate experience of dissolution-through-
indifferentiation, can be said to underpin the entire mode both structurally and thematically.241 
Even before the mirror episode, the story has shown the narrator’s complete reliance on 
his eyes as neutral conveyors of reality and guarantors of his mental stability (“This time, I am 
not mad. I saw it… I saw it… I saw it! I can no longer have any doubts. I saw it!”242). In the 
passage quoted above, in an instance of the mechanism we have seen at play in O’Brien’s – 
whereby new, unexplained phenomena are investigated through old, familiar means –, he goes 
as far as lighting “two lamps and … eight candles,” with the inherently paradoxical hope of 
seeing the unseeable better. In describing the set-up of his trap, the narrator accounts for a large 
mirror in front of which he is accustomed to dress “every day,” and in which “it was my habit 
to gaze at myself, from head to toe, every time I walked by it.” The repeated nature of the 
action speaks of the character’s need for constant reassurance regarding the permanence of his 
being and the tangible borders of his identity; an identity that is both constructed and reaffirmed 
through the image in the looking glass. When that image fails to show, the narrator feels 
literally “devoured” by the body of the Horla, becoming one with the light that now fills the 
entire rectangle of the mirror. As the terrifying moment comes to an end, the narrator is both 
grateful to be able to distinguish himself again (meaning both “discern” and “separate” his own 
image; note the further repetition, “as I do every day when I look at myself”), and forever 
changed by having experienced the precarious contingency of his being. The “I” depends on 
the “eye,” and the Horla makes this relationship evident as it sneaks into it to wedge it open. 
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Moreover, the above episode suggests, through an interesting and unusual detail, that 
there is more to the process of self-individuation than phenomenal evidence. As he plans to 
attract the creature, the narrator’s first thought is to sit down at the desk and pretend to be 
writing; soon thereafter, he feels the Horla being drawn to the writing, peeking over his 
shoulder as if wanting to partake of that signifying act that he is so jealously guarding.  
In order to understand this detail, it is necessary to consider how the relationship between 
the narrator and the Horla is framed throughout the story. As we learn from one of the later 
diary entries, the narrator finally realizes that the Horla is in fact a creature of blatant biological 
superiority; using language that is strongly redolent of Darwin’s evolutionary biology, the 
being is described, with a blend of fear and admiration, as the occupant of a higher step in the 
scala naturae that extends “from the oyster up to man.”243 By virtue of the “delicate” and 
“subtle”244 nature of his body, as well as the irresistible strength of his will, he is the new king 
of all creation, just like man has been until the Horla’s coming.245 The stakes of the human race 
being superseded at the top of the food chain are very clear:  
 
Ah! The vulture ate the dove; the wolf devoured the lamb; the lion killed the buffalo 
with its sharp horns; man killed the lion with his arrow, with his sword, with his 
gunpowder; but Le Horla will make of man what we have made of horses and cattle: 
will we belong to Him, become His servant and His food, solely by the power of His 
will. How wretched we are!246 
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The Horla literally makes man into an animal, insofar as the presence of a higher being in 
nature’s ladder contradicts human exceptionality and groups him with the rest of the inferior 
species.247 With this in mind, we can investigate the role that language plays in this dynamic. 
In the context of evolutionary linguistics, which developed in the second half of the nineteenth 
century through the works of scholars such as August Schleicher (1821-1868) and Max Müller 
(1823-1900), languages were both studied comparatively and with an eye to their development 
from an Indo-European Ur-language; often similar concepts and terminology were used to 
describe the evolution of languages and that of organic beings, especially after On the Origin 
of Species was published.248 In this context, “as the theory of evolution eroded the barrier 
between humans and animals, some linguists saw language as the essential criterion that 
continued to separate the two.”249 For instance, in his Lectures on the Science of Language 
(1861), Müller interrogates himself on the difference between “brute” and “man” and comes 
to the conclusion that “the one great barrier between the brute and man is Language. Man 
speaks, and no brute has ever uttered a word. Language is our Rubicon, and no brute will dare 
to cross it.”250 One wonders, then, if the narrator’s pretense of writing “with great 
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concentration,” ostensibly a performance to attract and deceive the creature, is not to be read 
more properly as an attempt to reclaim power, much like the show of force put up by a 
threatened animal in order to scare its opponent (in this regard, the fact that the narrator is only 
“pretending” acquires new meaning). How else, then, are we to interpret the iconic image of 
the Horla leaning over the narrator’s shoulder, if not as an attempt to cross this Rubicon? 
Hoping to learn useful information about the invisible being, the narrator borrows a 
fictional treatise written by one Dr. Hermann Herestauss, “Doctor of Philosophy and 
Theogony,” on “the instances of all the invisible beings who exist alongside man or who are 
dreamed by us”251; however, one night he catches the Horla itself calmly perusing the book: 
“… I saw, I saw – yes, I saw with my own eyes – another page rise and fall down onto the one 
before it, as if some hand had been leafing through it. My armchair was empty, at least it looked 
empty; but I realized that he was there: he was sitting in my chair and reading.”252 The imagined 
posture of the Horla mirrors the power of the action he is performing: he is, in every sense, 
occupying the place of man. 
In fact, throughout the whole story, the creature is associated with a disturbance in the 
narrator’s relationship to language. The short story is, like many fantastic tales, a chronicle of 
progressive decay and disintegration, and this is evidenced both by the protagonist’s declining 
mental health and by a coterminous loss of mastery over his words. Since the very beginning, 
before the creature even manifests itself, the narrator reports that every night he “tr[ies] to 
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read,” but he “do[esn’t] understand the words; [he] can barely make out the letters.”253 The 
jumble of letters on the white page somehow anticipates the blinding whiteness of the mirror 
where the narrator’s image fuses with that of the Horla; once again a collapse of meaning 
ensues from a lack of difference, “dall’ipotesi di una continuità e d’una contiguità inesplorate 
e orribili.”254 It is no wonder, then, that the narrator, overcome with what looks like delirium, 
baptizes the creature with an inexistent word that is in fact a portmanteau, the blend of two 
signifying units making a new word altogether, “Horla,” hors-là, the out-there: out of the reach 
of language, of comprehension, of the fumbling hands of the narrator; unrecorded in Dr. 
Herestauss’s learned book on invisible creatures; outside the confines of mapped phenomena 
and taxonomized species. 
And what better attempt to establish an orderly sequence of discrete, rationalized events 
than a dated diary? We have already noted the preference for first-person narration in fantastic 
texts as marker of an interest in questions of testimony, belief and partiality of vision; in this 
case, the collection of diary entries evidently betrays the protagonist’s attempt at establishing 
mastery upon his own story by dividing it up in manageable units. Unsurprisingly, entries 
become more and more frequent as the narrator’s plight worsens; after the rose-picking 
episode, the first encounter with the creature in full daylight, they become daily (until a final, 
mysterious twenty-day gap between the second last and the last entry, in which the narrator is 
writing from a hotel in Rouen, having destroyed his house in the fire the day before). If the 
make-believe writing in the mirror episode fails to establish control over the creature, so does 
the actual diary, of which the former is a mise en abîme. As the story progresses, the narrator’s 
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articulateness makes way for obsessive repetitions, anacolutha and ellipses (“He has come, 
the… the – what does He call Himself? – the… I feel as if He is shouting out His name to me 
and I cannot hear it… the… yes… He is shouting it… I am listening but I cannot... say it 
again… Le Horla… Now I’ve heard it… Le Horla… that is who He is… Le Horla has 
come!”255), until the very last words of the diary, followed by silence and death – which, in the 
case of our unnamed narrator, amount to the same thing. 
 
4.2. The void of the monstrous, the plenitude of monstrosity 
In the second diary entry, the narrator laments the first symptoms of a vague malaise that he is 
unable to define as either physical indisposition or mental distress (“I don’t feel well, or rather, 
I feel somewhat sad”256). Wondering how this mysterious state supplanted the bliss he felt only 
a few days before, he reflects on the tendency of the human mind to balk at the unknown: “How 
weak our minds are, and how quickly they panic and are led astray the minute one small, 
incomprehensible fact assails us! Instead of reaching a conclusion with the simple words: «I 
don’t understand because the reason escapes me», we immediately imagine terrifying mysteries 
and supernatural forces.”257 
This notion resonates with the article Maupassant had published in Le Gaulois four years 
before (already quoted in section 2 of this chapter). In the 1883 article, Maupassant declares, 
or rather mourns, the imminent death of fantastic literature on account of a general change in 
attitude towards mystery and the irrational; after centuries of fear and terror, he declares, our 
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mind has shed all vestiges of superstitious beliefs. (In an earlier article in the same newspaper, 
entitled “Mystery and Myth,” the writer speaks of a “liberation.”258) In his view, 
 
Only a few hundred people still cling to the idea of visiting souls, the influence of 
certain beings and things, lucid sleepwalking, and phony ghosts. It’s over. 
Our poor anxious minds, limited in their capacity to understand anything without an 
apparent reason, terrified by the endless spectacle of an incomprehensible world, have 
for centuries been subject to strange and childish beliefs with which to explain the 
unknown. Now, aware of how mistaken we were, we still seek to understand, without 
knowing for sure. But the first great step has been taken. We have rejected the idea of 
the mysterious, which is now simply what remains to be explored.259 
 
It is all the more interesting, then, that “Le Horla” pervasively contradicts this position, not 
only by breathing new life into the themes that the article describes as outdated remnants of 
another age (supernatural literature seems very far from its supposed demise); it also qualifies 
this “liberation” from the darkness of ignorance in a rather sinister light, in order to put forth a 
much less optimistic view of the trajectory and place of humankind in nature. 
With the onset of his malaise, the narrator decides to leave for Paris, in hopes that the 
company of people and the genius loci will dissipate the fog of his paranoia, hatched in the 
solitude of the countryside. During a dinner at his cousin’s house, he meets Dr. Parent, who is 
an expert in “nervous conditions”260 and devoted to the study of magnetic influences. When 
challenged about the “experiments with hypnotism and the influence of suggestion”261 that he 
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is extolling, the doctor situates such incredible advancements in the context of a linear 
progression of human knowledge throughout history. In the past, the intellect, still “in a 
rudimentary stage,”262 marveled at the impenetrable mysteries of the world in ways that 
engendered “the popular belief in the supernatural, legends of wandering spirits, fairies, 
gnomes, ghosts, I would even go so far as to say the legend of God …”263 However, he 
continues, over the past few years Mesmer, together with his disciples, has begun to dissipate 
irrational fears with the torch of his knowledge, which he has bestowed upon the world. By 
doing so, he has invented a different vocabulary for phenomena that were already very much 
familiar, but inexplicable and therefore frightening.264 As exemplified in Maupassant’s story 
“Fear” (1884), once the cholera, “the indescribable and ghastly Being who comes to us from 
the far East”265 (with Orientalization serving as a further suggestion of complete and 
threatening alienness), is reduced to a microbe by doctors, it loses its fearful power.  
The epistemological shift from an unknown, fear-inducing entity to a known, 
scientifically-classified element has been described by science historian Georges Canguilhem, 
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who sees in this passage a movement from the realm of the “monstrous” to that of 
“monstrosity.”266 In his 1962 essay “Monstrosity and the Monstrous,” Canguilhem establishes 
a functional difference between these two terms and traces the fluctuating relationship between 
them in the context of Western culture. According to his framework, monstrous refers to any 
kind of organic phenomenon that is perceived as abnormal and incomprehensible, and as such 
engenders a response of fear and fascination (it is “a category of the imagination”267 on account 
of its suggestive, evocative power). An example of this would be the dizzying variety of 
imaginary creatures in medieval bestiaries. Monstrosity, on the contrary, is associated with 
biological objects that can be studied and classified; for instance, the phenomenon of conjoined 
twins framed as embryological anomaly. While in classical antiquity a monster is considered 
an omen and sacrificed as a product of abhorrent hybridization, in the Middle Ages monstrous 
beings are at the center of debates on the origin of evil and its place in creation,268 as well as a 
symbol for the limitations of human intellect, as exemplified by our previous discussion of its 
role in apophatic theologies. Such discourses affirm the inaccessibility of absolute truth while 
recognizing man’s natural tendency to seek knowledge: the monster provides an aesthetic 
rendering of this paradox. 
Moving further in his diachronic survey, Canguilhem explains how, in medical treatises 
of the sixteenth and seventeenth century (Liceti, Paré, Malebranche, Eller), credit is given to 
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the idea, already expounded by Hippocrates, that imagination itself can create monstrosities; 
for instance, a woman beholding certain images during pregnancy can cause the shape of the 
child to be affected accordingly, through a process that sees “fiction fashio[ning] reality.”269 At 
this stage, fascination towards abnormalities is sometimes indistinguishable from scientific 
investigation; more than “a census of monstrosities,” medical discourse of the time is still 
essentially “a celebration of the monstrous.”270  
A significant methodological shift takes place in the first half of the nineteenth century, 
when teratology (from τέρᾰς, marvel, monster, and λόγος, discourse) is born as a proper 
scientific discipline, informed by a will to illuminate and classify, backed by comparative 
anatomy and embryology. This development has two important consequences. First, a blurring 
of perceived boundaries between monster and human. Thanks to epigenetic theories (the notion 
that an embryo develops gradually from indifferentiation to complex structures), it becomes 
easier to think of morphological monstrosity as an instance of arrested or otherwise thwarted 
development along a spectrum culminating with a fully-formed non-pathological living being. 
These ideas also pave the way for Darwin’s theory of evolution. In his study on the relationship 
between monsters and reason during the Enlightenment, Michael Hagner talks about the 
epistemic shift that came with late eighteenth-century epigenetic theories: “This was a crucial 
moment for the temporalization of humans, because human existence was no longer infinitely 
far away from deformation, disorder, hybrids, and transitory forms. Humans no longer began 
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their existence as perfect creations, but as vulnerable embryos and potential monsters.”271 If 
we look at late nineteenth-century monstrous narratives of the Gothic and fantastic tradition, 
we realize that the notion of situating monstrosity on a spectrum that includes the human is in 
fact a foundational motif. For instance, in Robert Louis Stevenson’s Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll 
and Mr. Hyde (1886), the same body literally slides in and out of monstrosity, in ways that are 
made possible, and regulated by, scientific advancements in the field of chemistry.272 
The second major consequence of this shift in approach is that, on the one hand, the 
monstrous suffers a general “reduction”273 to the “wise and dull”274 notion of monstrosity; on 
the other, fantastic (imaginative) investment in the monstrous does not disappear. It is hardly 
an accident that Canguilhem chooses such etymologically analogous, almost equivalent terms 
to describe the two approaches, so as to signal their inescapable contiguity. When Camille 
Dareste (1822-1899) founds teratogeny (τέρᾰς + γένεσις, creation of monsters) around the 
middle of the nineteenth century, which champions the possibility of modifying embryos in 
order to produce biological anomalies, he shows how a positivistic determination to parse 
reality (“the attempt of all possibilities” as “part of the code of experimentation”275) ends up 
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flirting with the same irrational fascination with the monstrous that the positivistic spirit sets 
out to banish.276 
With this in mind, we can read “Le Horla” as a meditation on the resistance of the 
monstrous, locus of fear, mystery and subjection, to monstrosity, locus of rational control and 
scientific classification. In some way, the notion of monstrosity implies the search for plenitude 
that cataphatic discourse embodies; it betrays a will to anthropomorphize the world.277 Instead, 
the figure of the Horla – a creature made of pure will, unburdened by the weight of a body, or 
at least endowed with an unseeable one – eludes and undermines precisely the anatomical 
discourse of monstrosity delineated by Canguilhem. This means that it is unknowable in 
cataphatic terms (evidence-based, positive knowledge), while negative statements seem to be 
the only ones available: the Horla has no body, it does not die as humans do,278 it is only seen 
as it erases someone else’s reflection, it is not from here (whatever the meaning of the adverb). 
In representing the resistance of the monstrous to the human quest for total knowledge, it is a 
symbol for its limits – for the Heideggerian nothing testifying to an unknowable outside. 
Moreover, Maupassant’s story makes evident the tight link between the monstrous theme and 
the fantastic literary mode. Being firmly placed as it is in the territory of the monstrous (i.e. of 
fear, fascination, disgust, all fundamentally related to its unknowability), the figure of the Horla 
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represents and activates precisely the kind of reaction that the fantastic is interested in 
exploring. 
In fact, the way the creature is described evokes a model of parasitical threat or 
interiorization of the monstrous that will become more and more important in twentieth-century 
fantastic. For instance, in both O’Brien’s and Maupassant’s text, the invisible entity attacks the 
narrator in his bedroom, the heart of his home, making a case for the creature as a mobile agent 
of an unheimlich geography.279 In “Le Horla,” the invasion and penetration of the intimate and 
the familiar goes as far as mind control, one of the ways in which the narrator is effectively 
pushed out of his Heim. This helps us interpret the detail of the servants’ death: not only does 
the man lose Freudian mastery in his own house, he even kills the physical testimonies of that 
power. In rounding out the notion of a parasitical presence inside the confines of the familiar, 
Maupassant also hearkens back to centuries-old vampire lore. The creature is openly qualified 
as a “vampire”280 feeding on the life of his victims in the scientific review that the narrator 
consults; upon reading the article, the man wonders whether his salute to the ship caused the 
creature to “jump[…] off the boat onto the riverbank,”281 thereby evoking the belief according 
to which a vampire can only cross the threshold of a house if invited by the owner. The 
ambiguous provenance of the creature contributes to its undefinable alienness: earlier in the 
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text, a cosmic origin is suggested (“One day, as they are traveling through space, one of them 
will land on Earth in order to conquer it …”282), while later in the text, its “race”283 is said to 
have been born in São Paulo, the capital of a far, threatening Brazil, plagued by medieval 
epidemics. With the Third Republic consolidating its colonial power precisely in these years 
(1870s-1880s), the story seems to depict an opposite movement to that of expansion and 
domination. The French territory is inoculated with an unknown virus – the pathogen being 
carried by the foreign ship through the ‘bloodstream,’ symbolized by the Seine, deep into the 
heart of the nation. In this sense, the mysterious body of the Horla can be said to lie at the 
crossroads of several interwoven discourses regarding France’s capacity to control the colonies, 
the recent birth of the discipline of tropical medicine and a creeping fear of the primitive.284 
 
5. “There are colors that we cannot see”: “The Damned Thing” by Ambrose Bierce 
 “The Damned Thing” (1893) is one of the best-known short stories by American author 
Ambrose Bierce (1842-circa 1914), Civil War soldier, journalist, satirist and author of “grim 
and savage”285 narratives of war, fantastic and horror. The story is divided into four brief 
sections and documents a coroner’s inquest into the circumstances of the death of Hugh 
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Morgan, whose mangled corpse lies on the table of the small cabin in the wilderness where the 
story takes place. In the presence of a silent jury, made up of Morgan’s fellow “farmers and 
woodsmen,”286 a coroner is reading a book to himself and waiting for the arrival of the one 
eyewitness to the crime, young writer William Harker, who shows up soon thereafter and 
proceeds to read a statement about Morgan’s death from a manuscript of his own. His words 
are quoted directly in the entire second section. One morning, while on a hunting trip, he and 
the victim heard a rustling of leaves coming from a bush, and while Harker dismissed the cause 
of the disturbance as a startled deer, Morgan seemed immediately alarmed. They pointed the 
shotgun towards the origin of the noise but did not spot any animal, until they witnessed a most 
strange phenomenon: the wild oats on the ground appeared to be flattened progressively in a 
straight line, as if by the action of a huge mass moving towards them. Cursing what he referred 
to as “[t]hat Damned Thing,” Morgan fired his rifle in the direction of these movements, before 
Harker was violently pushed to the ground by “some soft, heavy substance.”287 Getting up, he 
heard inhuman growling and saw Morgan struggling as if suffering a seizure, with parts of his 
body being periodically erased from view (“blotted out”288) by some unseen mass. When he 
finally reached him, Morgan was dead. 
This account does not convince either the coroner or the jury. In the third section, the 
former skeptically examines the devastation on the body (mainly evident in bludgeoning marks 
and in the skin having been torn to shreds) and asks the jury to step out and deliberate. In the 
                                                
286 Ambrose Bierce, “The Damned Thing,” in The Short Fiction of Ambrose Bierce. A Comprehensive 
Edition, ed. S. T. Joshi, Lawrence I. Berkove, and David E. Schultz (Knoxville: University of Tennessee 
Press, 2006), vol. II, 857.  
287 Ibid., 860. 
288 Ibid. 
		 	104	
meantime, Harker recognizes the book in the coroner’s hands as Morgan’s diary and asks to 
see it, but the officer hastily dismisses its relevance for the inquest and buries it in his pocket 
(justifying his decision with a fairly illogical excuse: “all the entries in it were made before the 
writer’s death”289). The jury rules that “the remains come to their death at the hands of a 
mountain lion, but some of us thinks, all the same, they had fits,”290 and the inquest is closed. 
The final section of the story is the direct transcription of a number of entries from Morgan’s 
diary, with a short introductory note by the narrator. He speculates, not without a touch of 
irony, that the diary must have been kept from evidence because “possibly the coroner thought 
it not worth while to confuse the jury.”291 The entries document Morgan’s previous encounters 
with the puzzling phenomenon; first, he observes his dog bark furiously towards a specific 
point and then chase after something into the brush; then he sees the stars over a ridge being 
gradually blotted out from left to right as if by the passage of something opaque. After hunting 
down the creature with no luck, finding only footsteps and traces, he speculates that, just like 
the ear cannot perceive sounds that are too high or too low, so the eye cannot see colors past 
                                                




either end of the solar spectrum. He concludes that the Damned Thing must be of one such 
color.292 
The story exhibits many of the stylistic staples of fantastic fiction that we have previously 
dwelled upon, with an even higher degree of self-awareness. The makeshift trial in which 
different voices clash actually reproduces the enunciative setup of a typical fantastic text, with 
a fictional audience (the jury), torn between several possible versions of the facts, acting as 
arbiter of how the events unfolded. Written texts (Harker’s manuscript, Morgan’s diary) act 
both as physical evidence in a judicial sense and as an instance of those documentary materials 
privileged by fantastic narration. There is also a token representative of medical science and 
legal authority, so selflessly devoted to objective truth that he conceals important evidence 
because it does not reconcile with his preferred, although patently unsatisfactory, explanation. 
In Chapter 1, I quoted M. R. James’s recipe for the perfect ghost story, which is also 
productively applied to a number of fantastic texts: “It is not amiss sometimes to leave a 
loophole for a natural explanation; but, I would say, let the loophole be so narrow as not to be 
quite practicable.” In this case, the coroner’s motivation for disregarding the diary is precisely 
his attempt to squeeze through that loophole: it is easier to think that Morgan may have been 
mauled by a mountain lion. By acting in such a manner, the official dramatizes the 
                                                
292 While Maupassant was likely not familiar with O’Brien’s tale, Bierce was probably influenced by 
both O’Brien and Maupassant (Jeffrey Andrew Weinstock, “Damned Thing, The,” in The Ashgate 
Encyclopedia of Literary and Cinematic Monsters, 122). In fact, Bierce was accused of plagiarizing 
“What Was It?” and defended himself thus in an 1894 issue of Prattle: “In O’Brien’s story a man is 
attacked by, and overcomes, a supernatural and impossible being, invisible because transparent; in mine 
a man is attacked and killed by a wild animal that cannot be seen because, although opaque, like other 
animals, it is of an invisible color” (Bierce, “The Damned Thing,” 864n). In other words, in “What Was 
It?” the creature is framed as having transparency as a quality, which puts the focus on the riddle posed 
by its biological makeup (as plainly stated in the title). Instead, what Bierce’s story especially 
foregrounds is the limited bandwidth of human senses; the Thing does have a color, only Morgan and 
Harker are not equipped to see it. 
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hermeneutical work performed by a Todovian character-cum-reader as s/he faces an 
inexplicable event and chooses the path of the étrange: the world as it was before the fantastic 
disturbance, with its seemingly solid paradigm of reality, must be restored at all costs.293 In the 
words of Harker, “[w]e so rely upon the orderly operation of familiar natural laws that any 
seeming suspension of them is noted as a menace to our safety, a warning of unthinkable 
calamity.”294 However, the less natural explanation (i.e. non-conforming to known natural 
laws) is the most probable according to the story’s internal logic, especially in the eyes of 
someone who is in possession of all the evidence. Such a clarification is provided by Morgan 
himself in the last section, which the narrator unequivocally titles “AN EXPLANATION FROM THE 
TOMB.”295 The solution to the enigma (provided we accept it) does not point to the supernatural 
proper, but to a territory that is tangential to the natural and the “familiar” (a key word in the 
story). 
This becomes clearer once we read the diary entry in question, in which Morgan explains 
the invisibility of the creature through a discussion of the limits of sensory perception: 
 
Oct. 7. – I have the solution of the mystery; it came to me last night – suddenly, as by 
revelation. How simple – how terribly simple!  
There are sounds that we cannot hear. At either end of the scale are notes that stir no 
chord of that imperfect instrument, the human ear. They are too high or too grave. I 
have observed a flock of blackbirds occupying an entire tree-top – the tops of several 
trees – and all in full song. Suddenly – in a moment – at absolutely the same instant – 
all spring into the air and fly away. How? They could not all see one another – whole 
tree-tops intervened. At no point could a leader have been visible to all. There must 
                                                
293 The jury chooses this path as well, having been deprived of the knowledge of a crucial piece of 
evidence. The farmers’ choice is therefore motivated by ignorance, not by willful neglect. 
294 Bierce, 860. 
295 Ibid., 862. 
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have been a signal of warning or command, high and shrill above the din, but by me 
unheard. …  
It is known to seamen that a school of whales basking or sporting on the surface of 
the ocean, miles apart, with the convexity of the earth between them, will sometimes 
dive at the same instant – all gone out of sight in a moment. The signal has been 
sounded – too grave for the ear of the sailor at the masthead and his comrades on the 
deck – who nevertheless feel its vibrations in the ship as the stones of a cathedral are 
stirred by the bass of the organ. 
As with sounds, so with colors. At each end of the solar spectrum the chemist can 
detect the presence of what are known as ‘actinic’ rays. They represent colors – 
integral colors in the composition of light – which we are unable to discern. The 
human eye is an imperfect instrument; its range is but a few octaves of the real 
‘chromatic scale.’ I am not mad; there are colors that we can not see.  
And, God help me! the Damned Thing is of such a color!296 
 
In another instance of contamination between a traditionally supernatural phenomenon (ghosts) 
and the rules of physical science, Morgan dives into the question with the instruments of 
deduction and observation in order to produce a logical hypothesis. His elucubrations land him 
in what Catherine Crowe had called “the night side of nature”: a preternatural dimension just 
outside, or beside, the scope of known natural phenomena, just like certain sounds and colors 
lie just outside the spectrum of our sensory capacities. This theory pushes further in the 
direction of Maupassant’s unnamed narrator’s attempts to explain away the impossible 
presence of the Horla through biological vocabulary. Terminological precision is also 
employed here (although the notion of ‘actinic’ rays as a separate optical category was later 
disproved297), grounding the scientific dignity of the explanation. Morgan’s theory even 
explains the misalignment of the senses provoked by a material ghost such as O’Brien’s (a 
presence that impresses upon all senses except sight) through the synesthetic analogy between 
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“notes” and “rays,” as well as by virtue of almost literal repetitions (compare “There are sounds 
that we cannot hear” and “…that imperfect instrument, the human ear” with “The human eye 
is an imperfect instrument … there are colors that we can not see.”) 
As evidenced in the nature of the creature and the explanation offered by Morgan, the 
story taps into contemporary discussions of the occult as suprasensational.298 Leaning on the 
research of German scientists Gustav Theodor Fechner and Ernst Heinrich Weber into 
psychophysics (the relationship between stimuli and perception), scientists and philosophers 
of spiritualist leanings, such as William James, entertained the possibility that the supernatural 
be simply what is natural, but not perceived by the senses. According to this view, the occult 
is tantamount to what does not cross the “threshold” (Fechner’s terminology) past which a 
sensation is triggered.299 Contemporary scientific advancements boosting the signal of human 
perception and widening existing knowledge of the physical world, such as the discovery of 
radio waves, telegraphy, and electromagnetism, are seen as a testament to the progressive 
sharpening of human faculties, allowing for an enlargement, possibly ad libitum, of the human 
province. In The Widow’s Mite and Other Psychic Phenomena (1904), American publisher and 
spiritualism enthusiast Isaac K. Funk (1839-1912) wonders whether the next stage in human 
evolution will come into being precisely through a cultivation of perceptive faculties:  
 
Is it hard to believe that these rudimentary faculties are growing for the next stage of 
evolutionary development, in harmony with the environment of our objective or 
subjective nature, or both; and that when developed they will make us citizens of the 
universe – both the inner and outer – as our present physical senses have made us 
                                                
298 As argued in Cruce Stark, “The Color of ‘the Damned Thing’: The Occult as the Suprasensational,” 
in The Haunted Dusk: American Supernatural Fiction, 1820-1920, ed. Howard Kerr, John W. Crowley, 
and Charles L. Crow (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1983): 211-227.  
299 Ibid., 203. 
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citizens of this planet? This is man’s history, a slow adjustment of himself to his 
environment.300 
 
Such views are reminiscent of “monstrosity” as codified by Canguilhem: strictly speaking, the 
notion that every biological phenomenon, even the most puzzling, can be accounted for with 
the instruments of science and reason; broadly intended, a conquering attitude towards 
phenomena that were previously considered mysterious, based on the assumption (denounced 
by Heidegger) that the phenomenal world contains merely objects or beings for the intellectual 
consideration of man.301 “This is man’s history”: this is how the history of man unfolds – but 
also, this history is man’s history. 
In “Le Horla,” this anthropocentric perspective is explicitly overturned. If any 
development or evolution or adjustment is in effect, it certainly does not concern the human; 
in fact, it happens to its detriment, at the hands of uncontrollable and unaccountable forces. On 
closer inspection, Morgan’s “revelation” is not really about the nature of the Damned Thing as 
it is about the inherent limitations of human perception and understanding. The discovery that 
human senses cover a certain bandwidth, while revealing, is not necessarily empowering. 
Insofar as similar realizations “extend our insight at the very moment our essential blindness – 
spatial, temporal, cognitive, sensory – is illumined,” they design an indifferent and unknowable 
universe in which “the more we see, the less we are.”302 
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In this economy of information withdrawn, inaccessible or incomplete (some of the pages 
in Morgan’s diary are torn and the first entry begins mid-sentence), the monster’s presence and 
features are only ever inferred, rather than known. Morgan’s hunting mission relies on a study 
of the evidence around or after the body of the creature. The dog is going in a semicircle and 
barking towards the center, therefore the monster must be standing there; stars are being erased 
from the sky progressively on the top of a hill, so something must be walking along the ridge303; 
in the morning, “fresh footprints”304 suggest that it has been stalking the area outside the house. 
The creature must have a big furry body like that of a bear or a yeti, as one can gather from 
Harker being thrown to the ground by a “soft, heavy substance.” Finally, the ultimate evidence 
of the monster’s passage lies on the table in the cabin, and it is the mangled body of Morgan 
himself. This piecing-together effort, this symbolic movement towards the unknowable 
creature – this archaeology of the monster – finds its expressive equivalent in a wealth of 
apophatic statements. At the first glimpse of the “unfamiliar and unaccountable 
phenomenon,”305 Harker is dumbstruck (both in the moment and later, in recollection): “I was 
about to speak further, when I observed the wild oats near the place of the disturbance moving 
                                                
303 “Looking at the stars last night as they rose above the crest of the ridge east of the house, I observed 
them successively disappear – from left to right” (Bierce, 862). It is certainly notable that, of all the 
things the creature could have obscured with its passage, it is indeed the stars in the night sky. This is 
reminiscent of the mirror episode in “Le Horla,” where the narrator’s reflection is “absorbed” by the 
interposing body of the creature. In “The Damned Thing,” both the stars and the body of Morgan are, 
in a calculated repetition, “blotted out,” suggesting in both cases the temporary annihilation (and at the 
same time the ultimate fragility) of any man-made orderly structure, such as the self (on a micro-level) 
and the constellations (on a macro level; “cosmos” coming from the Greek word for “orderly 
arrangement”). 
304 Ibid., 863. 
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in the most inexplicable way. I can hardly describe it”306; a particularly shocking sight, that of 
Morgan apparently fighting with air, calls for a special linguistic effort (“it was as if he had 
been partly blotted out - I can not otherwise express it”307); Harker’s fear upon hearing 
Morgan’s cries mingle with the Damned Thing’s “hoarse, savage sounds”308 is equally 
indescribable (“Inexpressibly terrified, I struggled to my feet…”309). The keynote to this chorus 
of unspeakability is provided by the title: if the Horla is roughly placed in a taxonomical 
network and baptized through a neologism (although one that describes its position rather than 
its nature), Bierce’s story ultimately documents the abdication of biological enquiry and 




6. “I find evidences of its presence”: fantastic apophasis and monstrous reconstruction 
 “[T]he apparently causeless movement of the herbage, and the slow, undeviating approach of 
the line of disturbance were distinctly disquieting”310: in the absence of the familiar and 
habitual connection between grass being pressed down and the sight of a physical body treading 
on it, Harker’s mind immediately reaches for a reassuring epistemological principle, that of 
cause and effect. The fact that the consequential link between these two terms has become 
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unhinged accounts more than anything for the unnerving nature of his plight. In fact, a 
cataphatic model of knowledge relies heavily on a study of the nature of causes through their 
manifestations or effects. 
Going back to our earlier frame of reference, scholastic philosophy builds on Aristotle’s notion 
of four types of causes (as expounded in Physics II 3 and Metaphysics V 2) to establish the via 
causalitatis as “the basis of understanding”: despite stressing the unknowability of God through 
the ultimately limited means of human reason, scholastic thinkers are still very much drawn to 
the notion that an empirical study of creation (considering “beings and things as effects”) would 
allow for “an understanding of God as their cause.”311 On the contrary, Pseudo-Dionysius 
insists on the incompleteness of such a method; in his view, as synthesized by David Williams, 
“[j]ust as the complete nature of fire is not discovered through the analysis of a warm object, 
still less is the First Cause of all contained within the aggregate of His effects.”312 
In the three stories that we have discussed, characters are faced with a wealth of signs 
pointing to an ostensible nothing. The monstrous creature – “the effect for which no cause 
exists”313 – sabotages causality as ordering principle: all these monstrous encounters seem to 
yield is a constellation of orphan effects. In all three cases, the creature is only known, however 
imperfectly or intuitively, through a process of reconstruction or recomposition: in indirect 
ways, such as through a plaster cast, against one’s reflection in the mirror, against the starry 
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sky, and by the traces it leaves behind.314 We are reminded of Asa Simon Mittman’s warning, 
according to which “the monster is known through its effect, its impact.” There is no other way 
to go about this exploration: either for sheer impossibility of assessing the real nature of the 
monstrous (“What Was It?”) or for the intolerable stakes of an actual encounter (“The Horla,” 
“The Damned Thing”), the monstrous can only be glimpsed per viam negativam: as such, it 
sanctions the failure of cataphatic knowledge as sole instrument of negotiation of human 
existence within nature and the cosmos. 
This perspective, however, does not imply a discursive erasure of the human, but again 
a renegotiation of its position. It has been observed that, due to the fact that they ultimately 
expose the contingency of human structures, these fictional creatures epitomize “the most 
quintessential of late nineteenth-century paradoxes: that humanist endeavors culminate in – are 
crowned by – posthumanist revelations.”315 Unquestionably, these stories suggest that reality 
is not made in our own image; that some Thing, or Enigma, or “horrible force”316 exceeds the 
constraints of anthropomorphism and therefore invalidates it as a standard. However, precisely 
the fantastic nature of these tales – the fact that they are concerned with a subject’s response to 
having stumbled upon his or her cognitive, sensory, expressive limitations – preserves and 
guarantees a fundamental reliance on humanism as ultimate touchstone. One might even say 
that the fantastic needs to take an anthropocentric cosmological perspective as a given (just 
like it needs, as already demonstrated, a solid substratum of ‘realism’ through which its 
                                                
314 The work of “[m]onstrous interpretations”, according to Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, “must content itself 
with fragments (footprints, bones, talismans, teeth, shadows, obscured glimpses – signifiers of 
monstrous passing that stand in for the monstrous body itself” (Cohen, 6). 
315 Taylor, 417. 
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corrosive droplets can infiltrate), rather than a view informed by typically posthuman “flat – as 
opposed to hierarchical or anthropocentric – ontologies.”317 
This intuition is also corroborated by the shared narrative function of our three material 
ghosts: all are represented in the clear attempt to harm human beings (or, in “Le Horla”’s 
peculiar lexicon, to dethrone them). This happens to a variable degree in the stories; in fact, 
there is a progression in the dangerousness of the creatures. In O’Brien, the Enigma eventually 
succumbs at the hands of man, but still enters the picture in the act of trying to suffocate Harry; 
the unnamed narrator in Maupassant’s story becomes enslaved to the Horla and ends up 
committing suicide as a direct consequence of the encounter; in Bierce, the Damned Thing 
hunts and kills Hugh Morgan. The stories suggest that something about these creatures is 
fundamentally threatening to and incompatible with human existence (as shaped by the notion 
of a world at the complete disposal of human intellection). In the case of Maupassant and Bierce 
specifically, if on the one hand the threatening creature testifies to the ultimate impotence of 
its human opponents, on the other it paradoxically recognizes and sanctions their power 
precisely in the act of trying to overthrow it. There is, in other words, still a Rubicon to be 
crossed. 
From an archaeology of the monstrous derives a language that is necessarily broken and 
fragmented. If the monster can only be approached and glimpsed at (if not known) through its 
traces, by the same token language can only access it sideways, or metonymically. The diaries 
and chronicles document the shadows that are cast by the creature and through them they 
reconstruct its shape, but they can never describe it directly – on pain of being silenced, or 
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rather realizing that silence might be the only option. Paralipses, incomplete sentences, 
repetitions, hesitations are ways to stress the necessarily tangential nature of any such account; 
what the paradoxical need to describe the indescribable looks like. Language performs its own 
coming into being as strain and effort, always on the edge of an unspecified revelation that 
never comes.318 In these fantastic stories, literature and language are shown as flowing out of 
the encounter with non-human provinces and their denizens: language is an ill-fitting sheath 
for an uncrackable Enigma, but it is also – most importantly – generated by the encounter with 
it. 
  
                                                
318 According to Fredric Jameson, the fantastic represents “an object world forever suspended on the 
point of meaning, forever disposed to receive a revelation, whether of evil or of grace, that never takes 
place” (Jameson, 146). 
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Chapter 3 
Twentieth-century mutations of monstrosity: 
the fiction of H. P. Lovecraft and Tommaso Landolfi 
 
 
Shall I say the voice was deep; hollow; gelatinous; remote; unearthly; 
inhuman; disembodied? What shall I say? 
H. P. Lovecraft, “The Statement of Randolph Carter” 
 
La solita storia infine: chi così dice di non aver niente da dire è uno 
a mezza strada tra il silenzio e l’espressione, un infelice cui il 
silenzio gioverebbe, ma che non sa conquistarsi nemmeno il 
silenzio. 





1. A brief note on twentieth-century fantastic literature 
According to the periodization established by Tzvetan Todorov, the fantastic “appeared in a 
systematic way around the end of the eighteenth century with Cazotte; a century later, we find 
the last aesthetically satisfying examples of the genre in Maupassant’s tales.”319 He explains 
this decline by noting that, in the twentieth century, the distinction between real and imaginary, 
i.e. the foundation on which the fantastic creates the hesitation effect, becomes less relevant: 
“…today, we can no longer believe in an immutable, external reality, nor in a literature which 
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is merely the transcription of such a reality.”320 It is undeniable that the structural device of 
hesitation between a natural and a supernatural explanation becomes less and less frequent after 
the turn of the century (in a way, James’s 1898 “The Turn of the Screw” represents a brilliantly 
executed swansong for traditional fantastic/ghost stories). Still, in this study we have moved 
away from hesitation as defining trait and have preferred to approach the fantastic as the literary 
exploration of a reaction to the unknown and the unsayable; this prevents us from agreeing 
with Todorov on this issue. Such a framework also explains why later fantastic fiction is mostly 
at ease with relinquishing the supernatural.  
If the turn-of-the-century epistemological earthquake – associated, among other factors, 
with the emergence of psychoanalysis and the birth of modern physics – unquestionably 
destabilizes Positivistic certainties, it also seems that a number of writers engage with and 
elaborate its consequences precisely by recurring to the fantastic key. The appearance of 
psychoanalysis is, in Todorov’s view, the main reason why the fantastic has been essentially 
“made useless”321: 
 
There is no need to resort to the devil in order to speak of an excessive sexual desire, 
and none to resort to vampires in order to designate the attraction exerted by corpses: 
psychoanalysis […] deal[s] with these matters in undisguised terms. The themes of 
fantastic literature have become, literally, the very themes of the psychological 
investigations of the last fifty years.322 
In short, a writer who produces fantastic tales in the twentieth century speaks in an obsolete 
code that everyone has already cracked; or, the fantastic is tantamount to an aesthetic toolbox 
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whose instruments have become, by the late 1800s, blunt beyond repair. Still, this view chooses 
not to consider the ways in which twentieth-century fantastic – developing a meta-literary 
tendency that is already inherent in the mode – focuses its attention on the tools themselves by 
applying them to new, unusual tasks, and by finding creative impulse precisely in their 
acknowledged bluntness. Through these paths, the fantastic not only survives the turn of the 
century, but makes the most of what Jacques Finné has identified as the “usure thématique”323 
of its genre-specific imagery.324 This gives rise to self-reflexive texts in which, according to 
Stefano Lazzarin, “è possibile identificare tutti gli artifizi del fantastico ottocentesco, ma mutati 
di segno.”325 Such narratives are invested in the exploration of uncharted areas of the real and 
the self either through a re-functionalization of classic themes, tropes and devices, and/or 
through narrative material that is not consecrated by genre conventions or by cultural and 
                                                
323 Jacques Finné, La littérature fantastique: essai sur l’organisation surnaturelle (Bruxelles: Éditions 
de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1980), passim. 
324 This also applies to a number of nineteenth-century fantastic texts, which breathe new life into tropes 
of earlier Gothic novels. We have seen one such example in “What Was It?,” where the “clanking of 
chains” (193) is evoked precisely to be counterpointed by the typically fantastic device of the tangible 
ghost, and the haunted castle is replaced by a dilapidated boarding house in Chelsea. Moving towards 
the end of the century, a number of narratives appear that rely on fantastic and supernatural stock images 
for comic effect (developing a deep vein of disparaging humor that already underlies most fantastic 
literature, as noted in Ceserani, “Le radici storiche di un modo narrativo,” 36). In Oscar Wilde’s novella 
“The Canterville Ghost” (1887), a clanking of chains by the resident specter only prompts an offer of 
lubricant by the home owner. A few years later, George Méliès shoots the short silent film Le manoir 
du diable (The Haunted Castle, 1896), detailing a man’s encounter with the devil against the backdrop 
of a medieval castle. The film, technically the first horror ever produced, aims at inducing laughter at 
the clueless reaction of the poor protagonist. It includes a procession of stock figures from the Gothic, 
fantastic and also folk-tale repository (bats turning into vampires, ghosts with sheets over them, a 
beautiful woman transforming into an old hag, a skeleton, witches with brooms, mischievous sprites, 
crucifixes, all in the space of three minutes). 
325 “[N]on è questione di materiali, ma di funzioni” (Stefano Lazzarin, “Centuria. Le sorti del fantastico 
nel Novecento,” Studi Novecenteschi 24, no. 53, 1997: 143). 
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literary tradition.326 (As we will see, the latter operation usually entails dizzying teratological 
births.) If we are dealing with a death, then the corpse of traditional fantastic literature goes on 
to fertilize the landscape of its twentieth-century counterpart in ways that yield original and 
interesting results. 
Far from aiming at any sort of systematic review of twentieth-century fantastic, in this 
chapter I choose to focus my analysis on H. P. Lovecraft (1890-1937) and Tommaso Landolfi 
(1908-1979), two writers who, despite obvious differences, share a number of interesting 
traits.327 In their works, the deep interconnection between monstrosity and language, which I 
have already identified as a feature of traditional fantastic literature, is pushed even further, 
eventually achieving a process of monsterization of language itself, following distinctive 
modalities and aims. Lovecraft’s monstrosity is comorbid, as it were, with the representation 
of linguistic disturbances. This nexus manifests itself both through a hypertrophic narrative 
style and in the thematization of parasitical monstrosity within the word and the self. His fiction 
features an unheard-of pantheon of secular god-like creatures hailing from far-away planets, 
allowing for a personal interpretation of the fantastic mode through the genre of cosmic horror 
(or weird literature). Such a system feeds off contemporary discoveries in theoretical physics 
and physical cosmology and uses them to complicate acquired notions of the scientific mind 
                                                
326 Stefano Lazzarin creates a typology of Novecento fantastic literature that includes three categories, 
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as neutral observer of natural phenomena. Einstein’s notion of spacetime and the discovery 
that time itself is a relative concept deeply guides Lovecraft’s pursuit of “externality (whether 
of time or space or dimension).”328 This entails the creation of a literary universe in which 
mankind is seen as if from outer space, dwarfed and inserted into a broader context: “The 
humanocentric pose is impossible to me,” he writes in a letter, “for I cannot acquire the 
primitive myopia which magnifies the earth and ignores the background.”329 The pervasive, 
multifarious forms of monstrosity in his fiction are reminders of the “puerility”330 of any 
approach that regards the human-sized as a standard with any philosophical validity. From the 
cosmic scope of Lovecraft’s monstrosity, my analysis moves on to Tommaso Landolfi’s 
exploration of the linguistic scaffolding of the self. His fiction takes to the extreme the inherent 
skepticism of the fantastic towards “every powerful explanatory paradigm”331 in order to carve 
a literary discourse that undermines the very possibility of narrative. In his tales, every 
signifying act that strives for meaning and coherence is framed as intrinsically flawed, because 
it overlooks the deep fracture dividing words and things. In that fracture a number of monster-
words swarm undisturbed, waiting to encroach upon the mind in those moments when the 
arbitrariness of language is suddenly revealed. These entities, emerged from an “abisso 
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et al. (Sauk City: Akham House, 1965-1976), vol. I, 150. 
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dell’anima”332 or “fondo d[i] … follia,”333 have the alluring and destructive quality of the 
unheimlich, as defined by Sigmund Freud: both terrifyingly strange and eerily familiar, they 
have the power to disintegrate those boundaries between mind and matter, subject and object 
that hold up sanity and identity. The fantastic short-circuit and the related teratogenesis happen 
in language, making for an ouroboric, claustrophobic narrative. 
 
2. H. P. Lovecraft’s cosmic horror  
Howard Phillips Lovecraft (1890-1937) was born in Providence, Rhode Island, where he spent 
most of his life. Plagued by ill health and economic difficulties, he lived and died in poverty, 
publishing only a few of his works in contemporary pulp magazines and obtaining almost no 
recognition during his lifetime, except for a circle of friends and followers. Among them was 
August Derleth, who curated and published Lovecraft’s works after his death, sometimes 
forcing his own interpretation onto it as he added to what later became popular as the “Cthulhu 
mythos” (the god-like entities, places, languages and mythology that make up Lovecraft’s 
fictional universe). Through his fiction and his formal and informal critical reflections,334 
Lovecraft theorized and embodied more than any one writer the genre of weird literature or 
cosmic horror, which focuses on the relationship of man to the unknown in the context of a 
vast, indifferent and inscrutable universe. This relationship is explored through the conceptual 
resources offered by astronomy, geometry, and theoretical physics, as well as through a 
                                                
332 “Des mois,” in Opere, ed. Idolina Landolfi, vol. II, 1960-1971 (Milano: Rizzoli, 1992), 765. 
333 “Rien va,” in Opere, vol. II, 1960-1971, 308. 
334 I am referring to his landmark work of criticism “Supernatural Horror in Literature” as well as his 
monumental body of letters. 
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philosophical outlook that amounts to “a bizarre synthesis of ancient mechanistic philosophy, 
German pessimism, and the most rigorous positivist materialism.”335 In his stories, usually 
well-educated, rational protagonists stumble upon deliriously unnatural creatures and 
dimensions, engaging in an epistemological and expressive effort so titanic that it breaks the 
banks of reason and selfhood. 
The first thing one notices about Lovecraft’s modern bestiary is precisely its break with 
classical teratological creatures. According to S. T. Joshi, 
 
At the very outset of his career, Lovecraft appears to have determined that the 
monsters that had populated previous supernatural fiction – vampires, ghosts, 
werewolves, witches, and the like – were outmoded in his day. The advance of 
science, in his judgment, had rendered these entities so implausible that they were of 
little aesthetic value in literature.336 
 
Except for a small number of stories, Lovecraft’s monsters are generally nightmarish 
representations of slimy, post-Darwinian category mistakes, all (alien) flesh and no thought or 
spirit. In Cthulhu’s pseudo-mythology, the figure that sits at the pinnacle of the pantheon is 
Azatoth, “a blind and mindless creature at the center of chaos,”337 hinting towards the shattering 
of human conceptions of teleology and structure. Such creatures are rarely wicked or harmful 
in the sense we have attributed to the Horla or the Damned Thing; instead, they are tokens of 
the absolute indifference that describes the relationship of the cosmos to the human race. In the 
                                                
335 Lévy, 30. 
336 S. T. Joshi, “Lovecraft, Monsters in,” in The Ashgate Encyclopedia of Literary and Cinematic 
Monsters, 388.  
337 Ibid., 390. 
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history of the so-called Great Races or Ancient Ones who predate – and will follow – the 
existence of men, humans are accidents or, at the most, useful vessels for the furthering of alien 
species’ growth and development. 
These beings dwell in titanic spaces of unfathomable proportions, often in hidden and 
remote corners of the earth. Such settings – a radical update on haunted castles and country 
houses, which are all too human spaces – complicate the very notion of space and time in ways 
that are heavily influenced by contemporary discoveries in astro- and theoretical physics. In 
“The Call of Cthulhu” (1928), the narrator explains how he put together information gathered 
by himself and by his late grand-uncle, a professor of Semitic languages, in order to uncover 
the existence of a dark cult almost as old as earth, spanning from the New Orleans swamp 
dwellers to the Esquimaux. The cult worships the Great Old Ones, extraterrestrial creatures 
who came to earth at the beginning of time and now lie dormant in remote corners of the planet, 
waiting for the moment when they will claim it for themselves. In the written account of a now 
dead Norwegian seaman, whose ship was sailing across the South Pacific, the narrator reads 
about the crew’s terrifying experience of stumbling upon the underwater city of R’lyeh, 
temporarily emerged from the water after an earthquake. Its spaces look utterly incompatible 
with human existence and perception: the man’s necessarily vague description speaks of a 
geometry that is “abnormal, non-Euclidean,”338 of stone pillars of “unbelievable size” and 
“dizzying height,”339 and “crazily elusive angles of carven rock where a second glance shewed 
                                                
338 Lovecraft, “The Call of Cthulhu,” 193. See also the allusion to relativity: “In this phantasy of 
prismatic distortion it moved anomalously in a diagonal way, so that all the rules of matter and 
perspective seemed upset” (193-194). Interestingly, these dimensions are also explained through a 
reference to Futurist aesthetics (“[w]ithout knowing what futurism is like, Johansen [the seaman] 
achieved something very close to it when he spoke of the city…,” 192). 
339 Ibid., 192. 
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concavity after the first shewed convexity.”340 The inconceivable nature of the place anticipates 
the appearance of Cthulhu, recklessly liberated from a deep cave by the seamen themselves; 
the creature is also paradoxical in its being at once a mountain, a mass of slime, and a squid 
“with writhing feelers,”341 endowed with inherently contradictory features such as “flabby 
claws.”342 The city of R’lyeh and its horrific denizen are a metonymy of the general 
inhospitableness of the entire universe, when seen through the lens of Einstein’s discoveries.  
Trying to do justice to the vertiginous teratology of H. P. Lovecraft is an act that is 
doomed to failure, in the same way as his narrators try (and often die trying) to describe the 
unthinkable monstrosities they face. However, it is precisely by tackling the way in which the 
Providence writer performs and conceptualizes this difficulty that we can find a productive 
way into his sinister pantheon. If on the one hand monstrosity is at the core of Lovecraft’s 
fiction (“[t]here is not a tale where [monsters] do not intervene in some manner or other”343), 
the way it is explored, articulated and manifested is mainly in its interaction with language. 
This nexus develops along two parallel lines: through a trademark narrative style that proceeds 
by dizzying accumulation and cancerous overgrowth; and through the association of linguistic 
perversion, debasement or opacity with a process of monsterization of the human, which often 
coincides with the revelation of an already-monstrous element in the familiar fabric of the real 
and the self. 
 
                                                
340 Ibid., 193. 
341 Ibid., 195. 
342 Ibid., 194. 
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2.1. Language grows tentacles 
Lovecraft’s baroque, antiquated style was famously targeted by American critic Edmund 
Wilson a few years after the writer’s death. In a 1945 review on The New Yorker, Wilson asserts 
that “the real horror” in Lovecraft’s fiction is “the horror of bad taste and bad art,”344 justifying 
his appraisal with this observation, among others: 
 
One of Lovecraft’s worst faults is his incessant effort to work up the expectations of 
the reader by sprinkling his stories with such adjectives as “horrible,” “terrible,” 
“frightful,” “awesome,” “eerie,” “weird,” “forbidden,” “unhallowed,” “unholy,” 
“blasphemous,” “hellish” and “infernal.” Surely one of the primary rules for writing 
an effective tale of horror is never to use any of these words – especially if you are 
going, at the end, to produce an invisible whistling octopus.345 
 
Even considering what S. T. Joshi sees as Wilson’s strong “prejudice” against genre fiction, 
supposedly demonstrated by his suspicion of detective stories and fantasy,346 Wilson has a 
point. Narrators in Lovecraft’s tales are typically engaged in a struggle to describe what is, by 
their own admission, indescribable, and they respond to this conundrum through a paroxysmal 
overproduction of language: adjectives pile upon adjectives, synonyms chase after synonyms, 
in “tottering towers”347 that creak under the enormity of the meaning they are invested with. In 
other words, Lovecraft’s texts exhibit apophatic rhetoric to a much greater degree than we have 
                                                
344 Edmund Wilson, “Tales of the Marvellous and the Ridiculous,” in H. P. Lovecraft: Four Decades 
of Criticism, ed. S. T. Joshi (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1980), 47. 
345 Ibid., 48. Another notable commentary on Lovecraft’s style is offered by American writer Joyce 
Carol Oates, a great admirer of his work, who notes that “[i]n Lovecraft, … style and self-parody are 
indistinguishable” (Joyce Carol Oates, “The King of Weird,” np). 
346 Wilson, ibid., Joshi’s note. 
347 Roger Luckhurst, “H. P. Lovecraft and the Northern Gothic Tongue,” Oxford Dictionaries Blog, 
accessed 4 April 2018, https://blog.oxforddictionaries.com/2013/05/09/h-p-lovecraft/ 
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seen in earlier iterations of the fantastic.348 Statements of indescribability are so common 
throughout the stories and novels that they almost feel like knee-jerk reactions: “the effect was 
subtly menacing in a way I can never hope to depict,”349 says the narrator of At the Mountains 
of Madness (1936) upon contemplating the underground city; encountering an image of 
loathsome monstrosity, the narrator of “The Outsider” “cannot even hint what it was like”350; 
“no mere writing could convey”351 the quality of the cry heard by Luke Fenner in The Case of 
Charles Dexter Ward; “the Thing,” i.e. the gigantic, flabby body of Cthulhu, “cannot be 
described; there is no language for such abysms of shrieking and immemorial lunacy…”352; 
and so on. As we have come to expect, such declarations of descriptive impotence are 
contradicted by an unprecedented amount of data: an inordinate use of descriptors such as 
adjectives and adverbs; the mention or transcription of documents, letters, book passages; a 
wealth of precise dates and times of occurrences, specific details about characters and places, 
exhaustive background information. 
However, I suggest that, if we look at Lovecraft’s style in the light of the conceptual 
resources we have employed so far, its aesthetic rationale becomes evident. Lovecraft builds a 
language for the ineffable on excess rather than lack, according to a principle that is both 
                                                
348 This performance of discursive limits is picked up by Eugene Thacker, who echoes our earlier 
discussion as he frames supernatural horror (in particular Lovecraft’s) as a vessel for contemporary 
philosophical thinking: “What an earlier era would have described through the language of darkness 
mysticism or negative theology, our contemporary era thinks of in terms of supernatural horror” 
(Eugene Thacker, Horror of Philosophy, vol. I. In the Dust of This Planet, Winchester: Zero Books, 
2011, 2).  
349 Lovecraft, “At the Mountains of Madness,” 530. 
350 “The Outsider,” 13. 
351 “The Case of Charles Dexter Ward,” 248. 
352 “The Call of Cthulhu,” 194.  
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compensatory and emulative. On the one hand, it entails the acknowledgment of a hole in the 
fabric of discourse, to which the text reacts by amplifying (quantitatively rather than 
qualitatively) its signifying ‘volume.’ On the other, it represents a paradoxical way of 
recuperating some degree of mimesis, since it often molds itself to the gigantic creatures of 
countless appendages that it struggles to describe.  
In “The Dunwich Horror” (1929), Henry Armitage, a librarian at Miskatonic University 
(a fictional institution featured in many Lovecraft stories) fights an enormous, invisible 
creature wreaking havoc upon the imaginary town of Dunwich, Massachusetts. One night, 
Armitage and two colleagues enter the library to investigate a disturbance, only to discover that 
Wilbur Whateley (the invisible creature’s brother, a boy with undefinably odd features) has 
broken into the library in search of the Necronomicon, a forbidden book of occult lore that 
recurs in numerous Lovecraft texts and whose frightful content is always only alluded to. 
Whateley’s mission has failed and he has been fatally attacked by the resident watchdog. As 
he lays dying, the men are dumbfounded by the spectacle of his body: 
 
The thing itself, however, crowded out all other images at the time. It would be trite 
and not wholly accurate to say that no human pen could describe it, but one may 
properly say that it could not be vividly visualised by anyone whose ideas of aspect 
and contour are too closely bound up with the common life-forms of this planet and 
of the three known dimensions. It was partly human, beyond a doubt, with very man-
like hands and head, and the goatish, chinless face had the stamp of the Whateleys 
upon it. But the torso and lower parts of the body were teratologically fabulous, so 
that only generous clothing could ever have enabled it to walk on earth unchallenged 
or uneradicated. Above the waist it was semi-anthropomorphic; though its chest, 
where the dog’s rending paws still rested watchfully, had the leathery, reticulated hide 
of a crocodile or alligator. The back was piebald with yellow and black, and dimly 
suggested the squamous covering of certain snakes. Below the waist, though, it was 
the worst; for here all human resemblance left off and sheer phantasy began. The skin 
was thickly covered with coarse black fur, and from the abdomen a score of long 
greenish-grey tentacles with red sucking mouths protruded limply. Their arrangement 
was odd, and seemed to follow the symmetries of some cosmic geometry unknown to 
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earth or the solar system. On each of the hips, deep set in a kind of pinkish, ciliated 
orbit, was what seemed to be a rudimentary eye; whilst in lieu of a tail there depended 
a kind of trunk or feeler with purple annular markings, and with many evidences of 
being an undeveloped mouth or throat. The limbs, save for their black fur, roughly 
resembled the hind legs of prehistoric earth’s giant saurians; and terminated in ridgy-
veined pads that were neither hooves nor claws. When the thing breathed, its tail and 
tentacles rhythmically changed colour, as if from some circulatory cause normal to 
the non-human side of its ancestry. In the tentacles this was observable as a deepening 
of the greenish tinge, whilst in the tail it was manifest as a yellowish appearance which 
alternated with a sickly greyish-white in the spaces between the purple rings. Of 
genuine blood there was none; only the foetid greenish-yellow ichor which trickled 
along the painted floor beyond the radius of the stickiness, and left a curious 
discolouration behind it.353 
 
The description of Wilbur Whateley’s extravagant carcass shows the tension between the sheer 
accumulation of details, aiming at constructing an image that is as precise – as scientific – as 
possible, like the ekphrasis of an anatomical chart, and the ultimate inconceivability of the 
spectacle. Details are given according to the inherently fragmentary nature of cataphatic 
discourse, which breaks down its object into parts in order to apprehend it analytically.354 
Armitage’s gaze, through which we see the scene, lingers on each limb of the monstrous body 
and assesses it with precision – yet the general outline of the creature remains mysterious. 
Graham Harman refers to this dynamics as Lovecraft’s “literary cubism,”355 a technique 
through which an object is represented as a mass of perceivable features whose unifying 
principle remains elusive. This monstrous body, completely exposed in all its minute details 
and yet still impossible to picture, crystallizes the ineffable core of cosmic horror that is and 
                                                
353 “The Dunwich Horror,” 389-390. 
354 Cf. Chapter 2, section 2, where I mention Barthes’s discussion of the Encyclopédie as a cataloguing 
effort that can only proceed through fragmentation. 
355 Graham Harman, Weird Realism: Lovecraft and Philosophy (Winchester: Zero Books, 2012), 234. 
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remains unimaginable, despite the overload of sensory data and the sheer wealth of language 
matter employed to render it. 
The awareness exhibited by the narrator of “The Dunwich Horror” regarding the 
automatic nature of his paraliptic reflex (“[i]t would be trite and not wholly accurate to say that 
no human pen could describe it…”), and his calling into question the matter of visualization, 
suggest that there is one more aspect worth uncovering. If the declarations of indescribability 
by Lovecraftian narrators match those of typical fantastic ones, they are not substantially based 
– in contrast to the texts we have analyzed in Chapter 2 – on the visual inaccessibility of the 
Thing. In fact, apart from the actual example given by Wilson (the “invisible whistling 
octopus”), who refers to the creature described in the short story “The Dunwich Horror,” 
generally Lovecraftian monstrosity is either fully, obscenely visible or subjected to a 
progressive act of unveiling.356 The point is that this process of unveiling does not affirm, but 
rather undermine, the implicit association of seeing with knowing that emerges in the context 
of positivist science. Seeing more is not knowing more; the advancement of man’s status in 
nature through the enlargement of his sensory province (as anticipated by Isaac K. Funk in 
1904)357 is a mere illusion. The monster’s features, size, dimensions do not correspond to 
                                                
356 On careful analysis, “The Dunwich Horror” too responds to the principle of making the invisible 
visible: the gigantic, destructive entity is defeated by three savants through a combination of 
incantations and a potent powder sprayer, which reveals the features of the monster to the horror of all 
those present (and allow to locate it in order to destroy it). By the way, this story presents obvious 
similarities with the three texts discussed in Chapter 2, representing an ideal continuation of the 
material-ghost tradition. In “Supernatural Horror in Literature,” Lovecraft demonstrates to be well-
acquainted with those stories, praising “Le Horla” as a “tense narrative … without a peer in its particular 
department” despite its “indebtedness” (49) to O’Brien’s “What Was It?” and mentioning “The Damned 
Thing” as one of the most frequently anthologized works among Bierce’s “immortal tales” (66). While 
the spraying contraption is reminiscent of O’Brien’s plaster cast, the “bending and matting” (Lovecraft, 
“The Dunwich Horror,” 408) of the bushes caused by the enormous entity (and used to retrace its 
movements) recalls the wild oats being pressed down by the Damned Thing’s body. 
357 Cf. Chapter 2, section 5. 
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anything conceivable by the human mind, whose structures of thought simply cannot 
accommodate that evidence.358 Therefore, the nature of visual assessment is itself complicated, 
not to mention the possibility of faithful description. The gulf between things and words is 
deepened, not reduced, by the full exposure of such “unnamed and unnamable” dimensions.359  
If Lovecraft’s cosmic teratology seems to veer towards science fiction, the way it is used 
in his texts (and conceptualized in his critical writings) actually helps us take stock of the many 
shapes taken by the fantastic mode after its siglo de oro. In his celebrated 1927 essay titled 
“Supernatural Horror in Literature,” Lovecraft offers a small treatise on humanity’s “fear of 
the unknown”360 and a rich survey of the branch of literature it has spawned. This capacious 
category includes Gothic novelists such as Ann Radcliffe, Lovecraft’s “God of Fiction”361 and 
main inspiration Edgar Allan Poe, Maupassant and French symbolist Auguste Villiers de l’Isle-
Adam, as well as recent or contemporary Anglo-Saxon practitioners of the horror and ghost 
story such as Nathaniel Hawthorne, M. R. James, Algernon Blackwood, William Hope 
                                                
358 As in the case of the Cthulhu bas-relief we have already mentioned, a general assessment of the 
physiognomy of the creature represented can be made, but only a vague impression can be conveyed: 
“If I say that my somewhat extravagant imagination yielded simultaneous pictures of an octopus, a 
dragon, and a human caricature, I shall not be unfaithful to the spirit of the thing” (Lovecraft, “The Call 
of Cthulhu,” 169). 
359 “The Colour Out of Space,” 354. An analogous representational crux is posed by the appearance of 
Mr. Hyde in Robert Louis Stevenson’s 1886 Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. This is how Mr. 
Enfield attempts to provide an identikit of Mr. Hyde to Mr. Utterson: “[h]e is not easy to describe. There 
is something wrong with his appearance; something displeasing, something downright detestable. I 
never saw a man I so disliked, and yet I scarce know why. He must be deformed somewhere; he gives 
a strong feeling of deformity, although I couldn't specify the point. He’s an extraordinary-looking man, 
and yet I really can name nothing out of the way. No, sir; I can make no hand of it; I can't describe him. 
And it's not want of memory; for I declare I can see him this moment” (Robert Louis Stevenson, Strange 
Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987, 12). 
360 Lovecraft, “Supernatural Horror in Literature,” 12. 
361 Letter to Rheinhardt Kleiner, 2 February 1916, in Selected Letters, vol. I, 20. 
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Hodgson, and Lord Dunsany. Despite offering a prescriptive theory of the weird genre in terms 
of the emotional effect or “sensation” that it should provoke in the reader362– a consideration 
we have steered clear of in this study – Lovecraft’s essay conceptualizes weird literature as 
interested in “man’s shuddering reaction to the unknown” and pursuing “a malign and 
particular suspension or defeat of those fixed laws of Nature which are our only safeguard 
against the assaults of chaos and the daemons of unplumbed space.”363 This clearly resonates 
with what we have identified as the core of the fantastic mode.364  
Elsewhere he explains how a weird tale should aim for the gradual sabotage of a realistic 
framework (the “déchirure… dans le monde reel” described by Caillois365), specifying that “in 
every detail except the chosen marvel, the story should be accurately true to nature. The keynote 
should be that of scientific exposition – since that is the normal way of presenting a «fact» new 
to existence, and should not change as the story slides off from the possible to the 
                                                
362 “The one test of the really weird is simply this – whether or not there be excited in the reader a 
profound sense of dread, and of contact with unknown spheres and powers …” (Lovecraft, 
“Supernatural Horror in Literature,” 16). 
363 Ibid., 15.  
364 I insist on this point because it is not usual to see Lovecraft mentioned in critical studies of the 
fantastic mode, not even in inclusivist ones from the Anglo-American area such as Rosemary Jackson’s, 
where he is barely mentioned; this is partly due to the fact that, through his literary criticism and his 
letters, Lovecraft effectively establishes the genre coordinates against which he is usually, and certainly 
not erroneously, read. My feeling, however, is that cosmic horror can be read as a genre that taps into 
the fantastic mode in various ways and to different degrees, depending on the single work and on the 
single author.  
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impossible.”366 The fantastic quality of Lovecraft’s fiction is to be found in this misalignment. 
As already discussed, the language of scientific inquiry and classification is a cataphatic one; 
it belongs, by definition, to the sphere of the possible, the tangible, the verifiable, and it mirrors 
the knowledge that can be attained through logic and observation. Through this paradoxical 
imposition – having to describe mystery with the language of plenitude – Lovecraft creates for 
himself a stylistic cage, or what Benedetti defines “un limite interno al discorso”367; this allows 
him to emphasize the desperate inadequacy of human means through “the pathetic 
stubbornness”368 of his narrators. Lovecraft’s works pursue this tension programmatically and 
to its extreme consequences, taunting the scientific eye through an obscene display of the 
horrific; pushing the language of rationality up to the edge of the abyss and often past it; staging 
its explosion through the cancerous multiplication of qualifiers decried by Wilson; making it 
tentacular to reflect its “teratologically fabulous” subjects. 
 
 
2.2. Merciful ignorance and the taint of monstrosity 
We have seen how Lovecraft’s fiction develops a language for/of the monstrous; let us now 
round out our exploration by examining how the monstrous is thematized in its relationship 
                                                
366 Quoted in Lin Carter, A Look Behind the Cthulhu Mythos (New York: Ballantine Books, 1972), XV; 
emphasis in the original. This also describes Richard Upton Pickman’s painting technique, already 
discussed in Chapter 1: no matter its subject, even the most delirious, his brush retains the same 
scientificity of method; the clash between the detailed background of the cellar wall and the equally 
precise representation of the monster in front of it (the “marvel”) activates the fantastic short-circuit 
and calls attention to the issue of representation. 
367 Benedetti, 327. 
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with language. If we dig deeper into the mandatory professions of ineffability offered by 
Lovecraftian narrators and characters, especially in the context of their actions in the stories, 
we realize that something does not add up. Is it actually impossible to describe the monster, or 
is it better not to? In the opening comment of “Facts Concerning the Late Arthur Jermyn and 
His Family,” the story of a man who embarks on a genealogical search until he uncovers a 
terrifying secret about his own ancestry that pushes him to suicide, the narrator reflects that 
“[s]cience, already oppressive with its shocking revelations, will perhaps be the ultimate 
exterminator of our human species … for its reserve of unguessed horrors could never be borne 
by mortal brains if loosed upon the world.”369 Here, then, is the ending point of the cataphatic 
trajectory that we have seen exemplified in the obsessive description of Wilbur Whateley’s 
body: gaining an actual understanding of what lies behind the kernel of “inconceivable, 
indescribable, and unmentionable monstrosity”370 would have “shocking” and ultimately self-
destructive consequences. We witness an opposite movement to the one described in the first 
section: instead of stretching its expressive possibilities to monstrous extents in order to capture 
the unimaginable, the mind glimpses those “terrifying vistas”371 and retracts to a safer, if self-
deceiving, dimension. Therefore, we are allowed to ask ourselves whether such repeatedly 
flaunted ineffability, aside from an obvious indicator of the limited scope of human faculties, 
could in fact be a defense mechanism; in this case, mystery (in the etymological sense we have 
                                                
369 H. P. Lovecraft, “Facts Concerning the Late Arthur Jermyn and His Family,” in The Call of Cthulhu 
and Other Weird Stories, ed. S. T. Joshi (New York: Penguin Books, 1999), 14. 
370 “The Outsider,” 12. 
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already mentioned, i.e. “the closing of one’s eyes” or “the closing of one’s lips”) has a 
protective, conservative function. 
In the already-quoted incipit for “The Call of Cthulhu,” the narrator expresses somber 
relief at the fact that the limited power of human faculties shields mankind from realizations 
that would plunge it into madness or into a new dark age.372 By the same token, many 
Lovecraftian narrators, for whom this merciful veil of ignorance has been torn, end their 
testimony with the wish that their manuscript be destroyed or their story never be told again, 
in the guise of inverted prophets: “Let me pray that, if I do not survive this manuscript, my 
executors may put caution before audacity and see that it meets no other eye.”373 The stakes of 
this suppression of information is indeed very high: if certain things were exposed, “then man 
must be prepared to accept notions of the cosmos, and of his own place in the seething vortex 
of time, whose merest mention is paralyzing.”374 As the narrator of “Arthur Jermyn” warns in 
no uncertain terms, we could all end up like him: “[i]f we knew what we are, we should do as 
Sir Arthur Jermyn did; and Arthur Jermyn soaked himself in oil and set fire to his clothing 
…”375 
Words have the power to evoke monstrosity, or rather the corruptive power of monstrous 
revelations hatches within the word itself. In a short story by Ambrose Bierce titled “The 
Suitable Surroundings” (1889), Colston, a writer of ghost stories, reprimands his friend Marsh 
                                                
372 Ibid.  
373 Ibid., 196. Cf. also: “[i]t is for this latter reason that I urge, with all the force of my being, a final 
abandonment of all attempts at unearthing those fragments of unknown, primordial masonry which my 
expedition set out to investigate” (“The Shadow Out of Time,” 719).  
374 “The Shadow Out of Time,” 719. 
375 “Facts Concerning the Late Arthur Jermyn and His Family,” 6. 
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for enjoying his literary works in streetcars and other noisy, crowded environments that are not 
conducive to an immersive reading experience. He challenges Marsh to read one of his 
manuscripts in “the suitable surroundings” – “[i]n solitude – at night – by the light of a 
candle”376 – warning him that such an experience could downright kill him. Albeit incredulous, 
Marsh follows his friend’s instructions and is found dead the following day in a deserted house 
with Colston’s manuscript on him. One of the men who find the body reads part of the 
manuscript to himself and then burns it before it gets to the coroner. The story leaves several 
explanations open as to the motivations of Colston and the man who destroyed the evidence, 
but none of them are entirely satisfying because the contents of the manuscript remain 
inaccessible. As far as we know, reading killed Marsh: whatever death-bearing property the 
ghouls in the story had, it was transferred onto the page and imbued into the words, not unlike 
the volume of Aristotle’s Poetics in “Il nome della rosa.”377 The burning of the manuscript 
spares others from exposure to potentially destructive knowledge. Sometimes it is wiser to put 
out the beacon of knowledge and remain in salvific obscurity: “The aperture was black with a 
darkness almost material. That tenebrousness was indeed a positive quality; for it obscured 
such parts of the inner walls as ought to have been revealed…”378 
                                                
376 Ambrose Bierce, “The Suitable Surroundings,” in In the Midst of Life (London: Chatto & Windus, 
1964), 6.  
377 In “Supernatural Horror in Literature,” Lovecraft describes Bierce’s story as evoking “with singular 
subtlety yet apparent simplicity a piercing sense of the terror which may reside in the written word” 
(68). The following reference is to Umberto Eco’s 1980 novel, in which mysterious deaths in a medieval 
monastery are revealed to be caused by the poisoned pages of a manuscript. 
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Lovecraft’s fiction abounds with “pseudobiblia”379 such as “the dreaded Necronomicon 
of Abdul Alhazred, the fragmentary Book of Eibon, and the suppressed Unaussprechlichen 
Kulten of von Junzt”380: fictional treatises of forbidden lore that are usually evoked in 
conjunction with dark cults and practices. Their contents are mostly unknown and their 
objective materiality is almost irrelevant: what matters about them is that they are forbidden. 
Their raison d'être is not so much that of “giv[ing] a feeling of verisimilitude”381 to the stories, 
but rather that of being a function and symbol of the dangerous, destructive nature of a certain 
kind of knowledge. The words they contain are the host to a monstrous parasite that 
contaminates everything it touches. 
Oblivion, lunacy and disintegration seems to be the final destination for those “searchers 
after horror” or “epicure[s] in the terrible”382 who get to know too much – usually men 
motivated by curiosity and a fatal love of knowledge. The seamen who witness the 
“tenebrousness” dissipate and Cthulhu come out of the cave are either killed on the spot by the 
monster, on the ship by fits of raving laughter, or soon thereafter by the mere fact of having 
experienced such horror. As the narrator of “The Call” concludes, 
 
I have looked upon all that the universe has to hold of horror, and even the skies of 
spring and the flowers of summer must ever afterward be poison to me. But I do not 
                                                
379 Edward Lauterbach, “Some Notes on Cthulhuian Pseudobiblia,” in H. P. Lovecraft: Four Decades 
of Criticism, ed. S. T. Joshi (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1980), passim.  
380 Lovecraft, “The Dreams in the Witch House,” 655. 
381 Lauterbach, 97. 
382 H. P. Lovecraft, “The Picture in the House,” in The Dunwich Horror and Others, ed. S. T. Joshi 
(Sauk City: Arkham House, 1984), 116.  
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think my life will be long. As my uncle went, as poor Johansen went, so I shall go. I 
know too much …383 
 
Once the mind has been injected with the virus of horror (or truth, which in Lovecraft amounts 
to the same thing), the virus festers and spreads until one’s bodily integrity and soundness of 
mind disintegrate.  
In fact, in exposing the fragility of such constructs, Lovecraft shows that “reason carries 
in itself its own germs of corruption.”384 An inflection of this parasitical model informs a 
number of stories where horror reaches a second stage, as it were, following the encounter with 
the monstrous: the recognition of some form of monstrosity within oneself. A good number of 
Lovecraft stories recount “the progressive and ineluctable transformation of the monster-object 
into the monster-subject,”385 describing a trajectory of interiorization of the other. For all its 
pursuit of “outsideness,”386 rather than posing a menace from an undefined hors là, 
Lovecraftian monstrosity is dangerous because it is already firmly established, if in an 
                                                
383 “The Call of Cthulhu,” 196. 
384 Lévy, 74. 
385 Ibid. 
386 The word is used by Lovecraft himself in a short autobiographical note for an editor (quoted in S. T. 
Joshi, I Am Providence: The Life and Times of H. P. Lovecraft, New York: Hippocampus Press, 2010, 
694).  
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embryonic phase, on the inside of an imagined boundary of safety, shored up by mere ignorance 
(either painfully acknowledged or actively preserved).387 
In “The Outsider” (1926), an auto-diegetic narrator gets free of some sort of dungeon 
where he has apparently spent all his life and wanders out through a wood and into a castle, 
where a party is being held. He tries to join the merry brigade but suddenly the partygoers run 
and scream in fear. The ending is quite “mechanical” in its predictability, as Lovecraft himself 
remarked ten years later388: thinking he has spotted the creature in a doorway, he approaches it 
and sees a horrendous monstrosity (“a compound of all that is unclean”389), only to realize he 
is facing a mirror and he is touching his own “rotting outstretched paw.”390 Olmstead, the 
narrator of “The Shadow Over Innsmouth” (1931), is traveling through New England and ends 
up in Innsmouth, a decayed coastal town whose citizens exhibit odd physical features and a 
characteristically “shambling gait.”391 He begins to investigate the history of the shady place 
                                                
387 Even cosmic menaces from remote corners of the universe, such as Cthulhu himself, embody a threat 
that comes from below, not above: it is not by chance that Cthulhu is described as lying dormant in the 
underwater city of R’lyeh. The same can be said of well-known short story “The Colour Out of Space,” 
a true manifesto of “outsideness,” where a meteorite lands in the middle of Massachusetts and creates 
a portion of “blasted heath” (passim) that corrupts the soil and brings about unsettling mutations in the 
crops, as well as turning inhabitants into incoherent, babbling madmen. On closer inspection, the story 
recounts the event ex post facto; when the story takes place, supposedly in the 1920s, the meteorite has 
already fallen (1882). The protagonist, a surveyor who is in charge of building a reservoir in the area, 
can do nothing else but contemplate the consequences of this ever-expanding, seemingly unstoppable 
agent of corruption. 
388 Quoted in S. T. Joshi and David E. Schultz, An H. P. Lovecraft Encyclopedia (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 2001), 198. 
389 Lovecraft, “The Outsider,” 13. 
390 Ibid. 
391 “The Shadow over Innsmouth,” 598. Lovecraft’s interest for backwoods areas (such as the Catskills 
in “Beyond the Wall of Silence” and “The Lurking Fear”) as spaces where the genetic pool has been 
hideously stagnant, giving way to monstrous inbreeding and related physical and mental decay, has 
heavily influenced the entire cinematic genre of folk horror and especially the foundational works of 
American horror, such as The Texas Chainsaw Massacre (1974) and The Hills Have Eyes (1977).  
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until he learns from the resident drunkard that the locals are the offspring of human females 
and “half ichthyic and half batrachian”392 entities – which explains their bulging, unblinking 
eyes and fishy smell. These hybrid creatures are said to become gradually more repellent, until 
they unfailingly disappear from public view. Chased out of the city by a horde of loathsome 
inhabitants amid “a bestial babel of croaking, baying, and barking without the least suggestion 
of human speech,”393 Olmstead researches the history of Innsmouth until he finds unnerving 
links between the place and the history of his own family. The discovery of a monstrous great-
grandmother in his genealogical tree is crowned by the realization that he, too, has acquired 
“the Innsmouth look”394: erupting in a monstrous exclamation (“Iä-R’lyeh! Cthulhu fhtagn! Iä! 
Iä!”395), he decides to take to the sea and join his kin. The story traces the double movement 
that is typical of many Lovecraftian characters: Olmstead sets out to get to the bottom of the 
Innsmouth mystery, but ends up losing every vestige of humanity and becoming forever an 
inhabitant of the city’s inky waters. The alien language he speaks mimics that of the cult 
worshippers of Cthulhu396 and signals the terminal stage of monstrosity: after that, the story 
                                                
392 Ibid., 595. 
393 Ibid., 644. The paranoia of invasion also underlies Lovecraft’s racial and political stance; his racist 
views prompt him to write about the “Italo-Semitico-Mongoloid” masses corrupting the integrity of 
American culture in much the same terms as he describes swarms of sticky sea-monsters in his stories 
(quoted in Lévy, 61). 
394 Lovecraft, “The Shadow over Innsmouth,” 603. 
395 Ibid., 653. 
396 The story describes this language as “enigmatical sense-impacts uninscribable save as gibberish” 
(“The Call of Cthulhu,” 171); as for the genesis of the word Cthulhu, Lovecraft explains it thus in a 
letter to Duane W. Rimel: “…the word is supposed to represent a fumbling human attempt to catch the 
phonetics of an absolutely non-human word. The name of the hellish entity was invented by beings 
whose vocal organs were not like man’s, hence it has no relation to the human speech equipment” 
(Letter to Duane W. Rimel, 23 July 1934; Selected Letters, vol. V, 10-11). 
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cannot but come to an end, suggesting that the last trace of Olmstead’s humanity went into the 
drafting of this manuscript. 
A very similar treatment of language as a marker of monstrosity is at the basis of one of 
Lovecraft’s most accomplished stories. In “The Rats in the Walls” (1923), a well-to-do 
American businessman called Delapore moves into an ancient family castle in England (Exham 
Priory, an imposing construction dating back to Druidic times) after his son’s death following 
a World War I injury. Upon moving, the man, who has reacquired the old family spelling of de 
la Poer,397 is seen with the utmost suspicion by other villagers on account of old legends about 
dark practices carried out by his ancestors, the “cursed of God.”398 Despite extensive and 
beautifully executed restoration works, the walls seem to be teeming with rats. Following the 
scurrying noise, which seems to retreat “downward, far underneath this deepest of sub-
cellars,”399 de la Poer discovers that the basement opens up, through a hidden passage, into an 
immense underground vault. Together with a company of “assembled savants”400 (his friend 
captain Norrys, as well as archeologists and antiquarians), he penetrates the dark recesses of 
Exham Priory, where “horror pile[s] on horror”401 as they discover architectural remains from 
different eras and biological remains of both human and “semi-human”402 origin (all of whom 
                                                
397 This is likely an homage to Edgar Allan Poe, as noted among others by S. T. Joshi (Joshi and Schultz, 
223). In fact, “The Rats in the Walls” resonates with themes from Poe’s short story “The Fall of the 
House of Usher.” 
398 Lovecraft, “The Rats in the Walls,” 80. 
399 Ibid., 89. 
400 Ibid., 91. 
401 Ibid., 93. 
402 Ibid., 92. 
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are “invariably in postures of demoniac frenzy, either fighting off some menace or clutching 
some other forms with cannibal intent”403). It soon becomes clear that the de la Poers were 
followers of an ancient cannibalistic cult dating back to pre-Roman times, which the 
protagonist associates with the upsetting dreams he has been having while in the house (such 
as the image of ominous Trimalchio-like feasts “with a horror in a covered platter”404). In the 
hidden depths of the vault, where humans have been preying on humans since they were still 
half-monkeys, the narrator is overcome by the emergence of some sort of racial subconscious 
– the monstrous seed that corrupts his family blood: mirroring the descent into the depths of 
                                                
403 Ibid., 93. Apropos of this downward movement, Stefano Lazzarin has highlighted the 
correspondence between the rhetorical structure of Lovecraft’s texts and the physical architecture of the 
inhuman spaces in which characters move. Just like narrators constantly denounce the unsayable nature 
of the exceptional sights they contemplate, but always stumble upon something that is, paradoxically, 
more unsayable, more exceptional – so that no zenith or nadir of horror is ever reached -, in the same 
way, their adventure brings them deeper and deeper into “Piranesi[an]” spaces, where stairs lead to 
more stairs and cellars lead to more profound pits (“L’orrore è un crescendo tenebroso che sembra 
sempre sul punto di fermarsi per raggiunti limiti dell’umana facoltà di concepire, e non si ferma mai”; 
Lazzarin, “Il volto velato,” 8). This model, which can be summed up in the formula “infinito + x” (9), 
also describes a temporal descent, whereby an ancient past (both chronological and psychic) can be 
accessed through the same physical downward movement. In describing the position of his secret studio, 
unsurprisingly located in the basement of a dilapidated house, Pickman offers Thurber these hardly 
reassuring coordinates: “It isn’t so very far … as distance goes, but it’s centuries away as the soul goes.” 
In fact, we could visualize Lovecraft’s fictional universe as organized around a vertical axis, from the 
bowels of the earth to the depths of the cosmos, rather than responding to a flat, rhizomatic structure. 
The horizontal roaming described by contemporary modernist novels, whose ideal background is the 
city, has no prominent place in Lovecraft’s work (by the way, “The Rats in the Walls” was written 
between the date of publication of the first installment of James Joyce’s Ulysses, 1918, and the 
appearance of Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway, 1925), if not in the guise of the “ville double” theme: 
a split between the ordinary, diurnal side of the city and a dark, secret underbelly where unseen and 
unimaginable things lie dormant (Lévy, 46). As already mentioned, his stories are usually set in small 
towns or in the backwoods of New England, places where encounters with the unknown are easier and 
more frequent. This spatial configuration reflects the writer’s aesthetic priorities: “I could not write 
about ‘ordinary people’ because I am not in the least interested in them. … Man’s relations to man do 
not captivate my fancy. It is man’s relation to the cosmos – to the unknown – which alone arouses in 
me the spark of creative imagination” (Lovecraft, “The Defence Remains Open!,” 53). 
404 “The Rats in the Walls,” 91. 
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the earth, his language undergoes a striking involution from modern to archaic to Middle 
English, then Latin, Gaelic and finally incoherent beastly sounds: 
 
Curse you, Thornton, I’ll teach you to faint at what my family do!… ’Sblood, thou 
stinkard, I’ll learn ye how to gust… wolde ye swynke me thilke wys?… Magna Mater! 
Magna Mater!… Atys… Dia ad aghaidh ’s ad aodann… agus bas dunach ort! Dhonas 
’s dholas ort, agus leat-sa!… Ungl… ungl… rrrlh… chchch…405 
 
De la Poer is finally found in one of the deepest pits, crouching over the half-eaten body of 
captain Norrys. Here the reader will probably recall the repeated and slightly puzzling hints at 
Norrys’s plumpness scattered throughout de la Poer’s account, which otherwise does not linger 
on any other character’s physical traits. The taint of the narrator’s degenerate blood has been 
within him the whole time, only under the threshold of consciousness, just like the rats hiding 
in the walls; the repressed ‘genetic’ memory has emerged periodically in those descriptive 
slips, only to burst forth in the depths of the cellar. The ending actually preserves a classic 
degree of ambiguity: the protagonist is telling the story (to whom?) or writing the manuscript 
from a madhouse and still hears rats in the walls of his padded room, which leads one to believe 
he is mentally deranged; and yet, if Exham Priory has in fact been blown up (as he maintains), 
it is likely that some terrible secret did in fact fester in its foundations. 
 
3. The impossible literature of Tommaso Landolfi 
In a passage of his Pensieri (1845), Giacomo Leopardi recounts how one day in 1831 his friend 
Antonio Ranieri, walking through the streets of Florence, saw a group of people cry out in 
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terror over what they believed to be a ghost in the window of a palazzo, and that he ascertained 
was nothing more than “un grembiale nero … agitato dal vento.”406 He finds the fact all the 
more remarkable because, in his view, Italians are not a people to fall prey to such irrational 
beliefs. In fact, as a coda, he adds a jab at an imaginary foreigner who might smile at that scene: 
“[e] gli stranieri si tengano qui di sorridere, come fanno volentieri delle cose nostre; perché 
troppo è noto che nessuna delle tre grandi nazioni che, come dicono i giornali, marchent à la 
tête de la civilisation, crede agli spiriti meno dell’italiana.”407 As a matter of fact, while 
Leopardi is writing these words (in the 1830s), there is not the faintest trace on the Italian 
literary landscape of the fantastic terrors populating the pages of E.T.A. Hoffmann, Charles 
Nodier, Théophile Gautier, Ann Radcliffe, E. A. Poe and many others. The belatedness of the 
Italian brand of the fantastic is confirmed by the fact that the first proper attempts at the genre 
are courtesy of the Scapigliatura (Iginio Ugo Tarchetti’s collection Racconti fantastici is 
published in 1869). The reasons for such tardiness are probably to be found in a combination 
of factors, including a peculiarly rationalistic Romanticism associated with the political 
struggles for unification, the influence of Catholicism in the cultural discourse, the importance 
of the classical tradition, and an enduring notion of ‘sanity’ and rationalism as chiefly 
Mediterranean characteristics.408 
The last point is raised by Gianfranco Contini in the back cover of Italie Magique (1946), 
a collection of stories that has long been considered a landmark in the critical assessment of 
the Italian fantastic tradition: in his view, Italian and French surrealism are characterized by a 
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“lucidité du contrôle”409 that is opposed to the Gothic mists of Northern traditions; more 
specifically, the Italian variety stands out for its ample use of ironic detachment. Contini’s 
collection succeeded in shedding light on the state of non-realistic literature in Italy at the time 
(a second 1988 edition with an added Postfazione does nothing but suggest the possible 
addition of Soldati and Calvino) but influenced subsequent criticism in ways that have gone 
mostly undetected for decades: first, the collection was highly idiosyncratic and reflected 
Contini’s personal taste – therefore the canon that it contributed to shape was debatable; 
second, and most important, it was meant as a collection of Italian literature in the genre of 
“magico-surreale,” rather than fantastic.410 Another point about the Italian fantastic proper was 
made, more or less explicitly, by another influential anthology, Italo Calvino’s Racconti 
fantastici dell’Ottocento (1983). Calvino was also convinced of the peculiarly ‘intellectual’ 
quality of Italian fantastic literature in the twentieth century, while he did not think very highly 
of its nineteenth-century precursors. In the introduction, the writer famously explained the total 
exclusion of Italian writers as follows: “Ho lasciato da parte gli autori italiani perché non mi 
piaceva farli figurare solo per obbligo di presenza: il fantastico resta nella letteratura italiana 
dell’Ottocento un campo veramente «minore».”411 
Indeed, fantastic fiction by nineteenth-century authors such as Iginio Ugo Tarchetti and 
the Boito brothers is strongly indebted to the masters of American, German and French 
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410 Stefano Lazzarin et al., Il fantastico italiano: bilancio critico e bibliografia commentata (dal 1980 
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literature: however, the fact that the Scapigliatura borrows abundantly from non-Italian models 
should not be taken at face value. As demonstrated by Morena Corradi, in the decades 
following Italian unification, fantastic tropes and themes are absorbed by the cultural humus 
and come to inform and structure political, social and cultural discourses of the time.412 In the 
twentieth century, fantastic literature takes a very distinctive shape in Italy, through the many 
and diverse aesthetic directions pursued by writers such as Alberto Savinio, Primo Levi, Dino 
Buzzati, Antonio Tabucchi, Giorgio Manganelli. In these writers, the notion of a certain 
belatedness of the genre often translates into an extremely skillful and self-aware engagement 
with what Roger Caillois calls the “fantastique d’institution”413: “[i] temi e le metafore si fanno 
più idiosincratici. Il bestiario fantastico si arricchisce di esemplari inediti, l’elenco degli eventi 
impossibili di minimi, capziosi e disorientanti scompensi spaziotemporali.”414 
This is especially true in the case of Tommaso Landolfi (1908-1979), “vero e proprio 
Linneo degli animali inesistenti,”415 whose work features ultimate category mistakes, entities 
that straddle the boundary between language and beast, thing and thought. With Landolfi, the 
dynamic relationship we have been tracing between monstrosity and language is carried to the 
extreme. In his works, that which creates and summons monstrosity is the mere action of 
“ricerca o … sistemazione di parole”416: the signifying act is intrinsically teratogenic, because 
                                                
412 Morena Corradi, Spettri d’Italia, passim. 
413 Caillois, Au coeur du fantastique, 8. 
414 Amigoni, 39. 
415 Stefano Lazzarin, “Vipistrello, colombre, animale giglio: vampiri linguistici del Novecento italiano,” 
Italies [En ligne] 10 (2006): np, accessed 25 May 2018, http://journals.openedition.org/italies/634 
416 Tommaso Landolfi, Cancroregina, in Opere, ed. Idolina Landolfi, vol. I, 1937-1959,  (Milano: 
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any narrative that pretends to describe the world and the workings of the mind hides the fiction 
of its insurmountable arbitrariness. The gulf between the real (wherever it may be found) and 
the word, as well as between words and the subject who uses them, simply cannot be bridged. 
One may forget that it is there; but when a glitch in the signifying system occurs, one is 
occasionally exposed to the “terrifying vistas” that lie under, or beyond, language – to the 
unknown that activates precisely what we have been calling the fantastic reaction or 
experience. This experience, which is the chief concern of Landolfi’s fiction, works as a 
structural and thematic principle across his fantastic oeuvre.417 It makes for an irresistible 
“coazione metanarrativa,”418 whereby literature ultimately always talks about its coming into 
being; it determines the uncanny geography of his stories, where words slide seamlessly (and 
terrifyingly) from a familiar locus of habit and everyday use into a dimension that is external 
and alien to the subject, imposing upon the mind with clinging intensity; and finally, it 
translates into the thematization of monstrous language in the guise of unprecedented ‘monster-
words.’ These include animated, talking words who surprise the narrator when he least expects 
it; unheard-of signifiers making their respective signified suddenly scary; and the ultimately 
interstitial class of creatures, things that straddle the boundary between word, thought, and 
animal all at once – mind-matter hybrids that are far more dangerous than any ghost or vampire. 
                                                
417 In this section, I concentrate especially on Landolfi’s fantastic fiction, with occasional forays into 
works belonging to other genres. My approach does not specifically take into account the various stages 
of Landolfi’s fantastic, since I mostly analyze his work with respect to his attitude to language; this, as 
noted by Simone Castaldi, remains largely consistent throughout the years (Simone Castaldi, “Il 
linguaggio come funzione del fantastico nella narrativa di Tommaso Landolfi,” Forum Italicum 44, no. 
2, 2010: 359-360). 
418 Silvia Bellotto, Metamorfosi del fantastico: immaginazione e linguaggio nel racconto surreale 
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Tommaso Landolfi (1908-1979) was born in the small town of Pico, in central Italy. He 
studied in Prato and then in Florence, graduating in Russian language and literature and 
associating with the intellectuals and writers gravitating around the Giubbe Rosse cafè. Always 
fundamentally disinterested in political matters, he was incarcerated for one month in 1943 for 
“discorsi di chiara marca antifascista.”419 A man of solitary temperament, he spent long periods 
of time in his Pico mansion or feeding his gambling addiction in Sanremo and Venice (the 
gambler being one of the recurrent figures in his literary work). While the first part of his 
writing career was mostly devoted to fantastic fiction, going forward his production diversified 
into other genres (autobiographical writing, poetry, fairy-tale, drama, elzeviro), despite 
cultivating a fantastic strain up until the final works. 
Landolfi was never too keen on being considered a writer of fantastic stories:  
 
Su una rivista italiana, a nessun proposito, giudizio sommamente lusinghiero sulla mia 
«opera»; e tra l'altro vi son definito, con lodi da fare il viso rosso, «autore di racconti 
fantastici». Sommamente lusinghiero, cioè inteso come tale: come mi dispiace, al 
contrario, e come è anacronistico. Ma se avessi voluto essere uno scrittore di racconti 
fantastici... Che cosa invece ho voluto essere o sono? E chi lo sa: come sempre la mia 
comprensione è stata ed è soltanto negativa («Questo solo di noi...»).420 
                                                
419Cronologia, in Opere, vol. I, XLVIII. These “dichiarazioni” were hardly dictated by a vocation to 
impegno, but rather to the writer’s genetic aversion to every form of authoritarianism. Interestingly, in 
the autobiographical fiction LA BIERE DU PECHEUR (1953), the jail experience is welcomed with 
relief because it frees the narrator from “ogni pensiero e ogni possibilità d’azione” (LA BIERE DU 
PECHEUR, Opere, vol. I, 638). In 1944, Landolfi and his father were driven out of the family mansion 
by the Germans and were forced to go into hiding in the mountains. In LA BIERE DU PECHEUR, the 
narrator uses words that echo those used to describe the consequences of his past incarceration: “… 
soprattutto mi conveniva, quella vita, perché non comportava alcuna decisione e alcun impegno; 
almeno, era facile e persin giustificato credersi sotto il peso incrollabile d’una vasta fatalità, alla quale 
fosse, per così dire, affidato il compito di pensare per noi. In questo beato senso d’irresponsabilità e di 
abdicazione io trovavo il mio pane” (638). The title of this work is spelled in all capitals in order to 
establish an ambiguity between two alternative meanings (or a combination of them): La bière du 
pêcheur (The fisherman’s beer) or La bière du pécheur (The sinner’s coffin).  
420 Rien va, in Opere, ed. Idolina Landolfi, vol. II, 1960-1971 (Milano: Rizzoli, 1992), 269.  
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Ferdinando Amigoni ventures a guess as to what the ellipsis could stand for: “…se avessi 
voluto essere uno scrittore di racconti fantastici…ora sarei ricco e famoso tra pendolari e 
vacanzieri”421; but perhaps the context of Landolfi’s aesthetic approach can point us in a 
different direction. On the one hand, as demonstrated by this and other passages, the writer is 
deeply convinced of the anachronistic nature of fantastic narration in his own times. The great 
century of European fantastic literature has come to an end. From the onset of his career, 
Landolfi is a rather isolated figure in the Italian literary landscape, between the lyricism of 
Ermetismo and the fiction of writers such as Palazzeschi and Moravia (with the exception, 
perhaps, of Bontempelli’s realismo magico); after the war, Neorealism and the literature of 
impegno represent cultural proposals that are diametrically opposed to Landolfi’s conception 
of literature and the role of the writer. However, we should keep in mind that Landolfi’s literary 
trajectory does not simply register a loss of investment in the fantastic genre, but a general 
skepticism towards literature itself, as observed by Romano Luperini: “[l]’evoluzione dello 
scrittore è segnata … dalla progressiva disgregazione dello stesso strumento letterario.”422 In 
light of this, we can assume the ellipsis to imply something along the lines of “sarei nato nel 
secolo scorso,” or most likely, “…non avrei scritto affatto.” 
Still, if we take the liberty of ignoring Landolfi’s distaste for the fantastic label (not least 
because it is so blatantly contradicted by his writing practice), we realize that some of his 
metaliterary reflections are redolent of our previous discussion of fantastic as perversion of 
(and therefore dependent on) realism: 
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Sembra infatti che una deviazione parziale debba risultare, dal punto di vista 
rappresentativo, più mostruosa d’una totale, in quanto si tiene più prossima a una 
realtà corrente e verosimile senza attuare quel rovesciamento e quella proiezione in 
dimensioni del tutto fittizie e arbitrarie che inevitabilmente e unicamente 
impegnerebbero facoltà secondarie del lettore, spingendolo a una valutazione 
meramente intellettuale e convincendolo per questa via che si tratta di mero gioco.423 
 
In Landolfi’s fiction, these partial deviations are chiefly linguistic perversions, entrusted with 
the activation of the fantastic space.424 However, such literary explorations are never joyous or 
playful, even when they seem to give in to postmodern excess (“[non] si tratta di mero gioco”). 
They have a tragic, desperate character, ultimately owing to the fact that, more than anything, 
“Landolfi [è] terrorizzato dalla perdita del senso”425 and is not interested in its Dadaist 
deflagrations. We may also read the above passage as a theory of the monstrous, to be intended 
as deviation from, or corruption of, what is considered natural/habitual/human, rather than as 
complete alterity. This model, which we have seen developed in Lovecraft,426 also makes sense 
in the context of Landolfi’s monster-words – linguistic disturbances that stand out against the 
                                                
423 Landolfi, Rien va, 285. 
424 According to Simone Castaldi, Landolfi’s brand of the fantastic, “prescindendo da una 
individuazione di ordine strettamente tematico, scaturisce principalmente da questioni di ordine 
linguistico”; throughout the writer’s career, both in his fiction and in his autobiographical production, 
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apparently familiar background of everyday language, all of a sudden showing an incongruous, 
alien face. 
 
3.1. The frightening face of the familiar 
The notion of once-familiar psychic entities resurfacing in consciousness lies at the heart of the 
experience of the unheimlich, as argued by Sigmund Freud in a well-known 1919 paper.427 In 
this text, Freud ventures into the field of aesthetics in order to investigate the psychoanalytical 
etiology and the literary conditions necessary for the experiencing of uncanny feelings. He 
begins by dissecting the word heimlich, whose root denotes something familiar, belonging to 
the home (Heim), but also (by virtue of its intimate quality) something secret, concealed, kept 
from sight – so that its meaning ends up coinciding with its opposite, unheimlich i.e. unknown, 
unfamiliar. The ambiguous geography mapped by this etymological foray, together with a 
targeted reading of E.T.A. Hoffmann’s “Der Sandmann,” help Freud flesh out his conclusion: 
the uncanny arises not just when there is a conflict of interpretations (or mere intellectual 
uncertainty, as his predecessor Ernst Jentsch had speculated in his 1906 On the Psychology of 
the Uncanny), but when this conflict is established between, on the one hand, an ideational 
content that has been repressed (for instance the castration complex) or a primitive belief that 
has been surmounted (such as animism), and on the other a reality in which those elements 
have come to be regarded as unknown or impossible. This content has to be expelled from 
consciousness for the sake of the reality principle, but its Unheimlichkeit (its having-been-
familiar) grants it a peculiarly forceful quality. Freud lists a number of themes that are usually 
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associated with the effect, namely the Doppelgänger, the recurrence of the same (déjà vu), 
wishes or presentiments coming true, magic and witchcraft, death (dead bodies, ghosts and 
spirits), live burial, dismembered limbs (all of which are especially dear to fantastic writers).  
The category of the uncanny is a productive critical tool to illuminate the position that 
Landolfi’s monster-words occupy with respect to the subject. First of all, they hail from a 
dimension that sounds very much like the unconscious: “Donde vengono difatto queste strane 
parole su cui io non ho dominio, sorte d’un tratto e che mi son come estranee, se non dal fondo 
d’una mia follia?”428 Far from being pliable products of a speaker’s will, they impose upon him 
with an “insopportabile intensità psichica,”429 provoking both acute terror and obsessive 
fascination. They point to a path that, if followed, could lead to the mental and linguistic 
collapse of any (seemingly) cohesive, rational subjectivity. 
In the story “Il babbo di Kafka” (1942), the Freudian theme is dealt with rather explicitly. 
In the text, the Bohemian writer and a friend (the narrator) witness a horrifying scene: the 
resuscitation of Kafka’s father, by now long dead, in the form of a giant spider with Hermann 
Kafka’s head. The disgusting hybrid (“l’animale, o uomo,”430 “colla faccia rivolta all’insù, … 
un poco inclinata, nella posizione d’un rospo,”431), reminiscent of certain nightmarish paintings 
by Odilon Redon (and possibly an ironic literalization of Freud’s structural theory in its vertical 
arrangement of body/animal/Id vs mind/human/Super-Ego), advances slowly towards the men 
while staring reproachfully at his son. While the narrator screams and runs, Kafka, overcoming 
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430 Landolfi, “Il babbo di Kafka,” in La Spada, Opere I, 289. 
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the anguish he felt as a child when accused of unknown wrongdoing, chases the spider “nel 
grande salone buio,”432 but loses it in the meanders of his big, empty house. He searches for it 
in vain for days, fearing he will have to leave the house if that thing keeps haunting it (“«[m]a 
guarda,» si diceva «c’era a casa mia un simile animale e chi l’aveva mai visto! Chissà poi 
quanti altri ce ne sono dello stesso genere. Se non lo acchiappo non potrò più vivere qui»”433); 
when he finally finds it, he squashes it to death. By killing his father (i.e. the monstrous 
projections that have crystallized around him in his mind), Kafka reclaims control of his 
house/consciousness, although this process is signaled as always constitutively incomplete 
(“[c]on ciò Kafka credeva d’essersene liberato per sempre, anche se a duro prezzo. Ma quanti 
ragni, grossi o piccini, non alberga un vecchio maniero!”434). The killing is made possible by a 
final appearance of the elusive creature in full daylight, in a room “per la cui finestra il sole 
penetrava largamente”435: as the classic fantastic trope of the “vecchio maniero” becomes a 
straightforward representation of one’s ultimately unknowable psychic life, so the creature 
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haunting it exemplifies one of Freud’s definitions for the uncanny, which he borrows from 
Schelling: what “ought to have remained … secret and hidden but has come to light.”436 
In the story “Parole in agitazione” (1968), this coming to light translates into an actual 
act of regurgitation. One morning, while brushing his teeth, the narrator spits out in the sink, 
instead of toothpaste, a number of tiny, frenzied words (“[n]on so come spiegarmi: erano parole 
ma erano vive, e guizzavano di qua e di là nel lavandino…”437). The words address him to ask 
for a redistribution of their meanings based on their phonetic associations; for instance, 
Locupletale, meaning “attinente alla ricchezza,” claims its meaning should rather be “attinente 
a ruscello o in genere ad acqua che scorre … Perbacco, lo – cu – ple – ta – le: non ce l’hai 
l’orecchio?”438 Other words lay claim to different sounds that they think would be more 
appropriate to the object they signify, until the narrator, utterly confused by all the slipping and 
exchanging of meanings, decides to write down all the signifieds and to have words 
successively pick their preferred one in an orderly fashion. The little creatures, pacified, 
disappear, but the narrator finally has a frightening realization: he did not record the new 
pairings, has no “documento probante,” “[s]icché adesso, alle corte, lo sanno loro cosa 
                                                
436 Freud, 223. The story also exemplifies an exquisitely fantastic procedure – already inventoried by 
Todorov – that works both on the thematic and on the rhetorical level: “the transition from mind to 
matter” (Todorov, 114) through the literalization of speech. At the outset of the story, the narrator asks 
Kafka what he would do if, say, a gigantic spider with the head of a man walked into the room that very 
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lentamente sui cardini e si produsse punto per punto la scena da me immaginata” (289). The narrator 
has effectively conjured up the monstrous apparition with his words; he has created, and given 
disgustingly solid shape, to a nightmare. Moreover, with the appearance of the monster, “Il babbo di 
Kafka” stages the very act of literary creation, the coming into being of an entity made of words, yet so 
solid that it can be smashed with “un maglio da botte” into “una specie di midollo più o meno liquido” 
(291). 
437 Landolfi, “Parole in agitazione,” in Un paniere di chiocciole, Opere II, 855. 
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significano, non io. È terribile.”439 These words are not only uncanny because they are 
animated, but mostly because of the movement they describe, graphically represented by the 
regurgitation: from the inside to the outside of the narrator’s body, expelled and rejected but 
still coming back, demanding to be heard. No wonder the narrator, when the ordeal is over, 
still lives in fear of their return: “ma sempre in casa saranno restate, e un giorno o l’altro, 
vedrete, mi risalteranno addosso.”440 
Upon their appearance, words rebuke the narrator for being “un di quelli che ci tratta e 
bistratta,”441 presumably a writer; then the man himself alludes to the reckless use of words by 
“taluni romanzieri o giornalisti.”442 But the story is not a mere indictment of the degradation 
of language into lazy cliché. To be sure, the narrator of “Parole in agitazione” seems to have 
fallen prey to an acritical approach to language dictated by habit and its comfortable certainties: 
the suggestion being that he uses words like he brushes his teeth – without thinking. However, 
he stands accused not only of bistrattare, but also, more simply, of trattare [le parole]. The 
story suggests that the act of signification always already implies an improper use of language, 
because it pretends to ignore the underlying approximation and fiction regulating the 
relationship between words and things. That is to say, the redistribution of meanings effected 
by the narrator, far from rectifying mistakes or creating further chaos, only highlights the 
intrinsically arbitrary nature of the previous arrangement. 
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A similar communicative short-circuit is pursued in another tale entitled “La passeggiata” 
(1966), which opens with the following passage (and continues for two pages in the same vein): 
 
La mia moglie era agli scappini, il garzone scaprugginava, la fante preparava la 
bozzima… Sono un murcido, veh, son perfino un po’ gordo, ma una tal calma, mal 
rotta da quello zombare e dai radi cuiussi del giardiniere col terzomo, mi faceva quel 
giorno l’effetto di un malagma o di un dropace! Meglio uscire, pensai 
invertudiandomi, farò magari due passi fino alla fodina.443 
 
When the story was published, many readers and critics took it for a mere divertissement or an 
experiment in phonosymbolism. However, in the later “Conferenza 
personalfilologicodrammatica con implicazioni,” included in Le labrene (1974), Landolfi 
staged an imaginary discussion between himself and his critics (quoting actual reviews), 
revealing that all the words in the story could in fact be found in a Tommaseo-Bellini dictionary 
of Italian. Now, Landolfi’s intent in “La passeggiata” is not simply to play a trick on his readers 
(the pleasure of the literary game is certainly part of the issue, but not all there is to it). The 
short story is rather a meditation on the uncanny nature of language, entrusted to a selection of 
words that look and sound unknown on first impression, but are subsequently revealed to be 
firmly established in the Italian lexicon (if in its periphery).444 What creates disorientation is 
not the words themselves (the reading of the story), but the act of re-reading that takes place 
once we know those words are, or used to be, our words. Put into the context of Landolfi’s 
fiction, it seems possible that the desired outcome of the experiment be mostly to stress how 
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the difference between “scaprugginare” and “preparare le scanalature delle botti” is purely a 
difference in degree and not in kind. All words, regardless of their acquired familiarity through 
use, are endowed with an intrinsically alien character, which does not especially depend on the 
degree to which they are trattate and bistrattate.  
In a number of well-known stories, prosaic, everyday entities turn into something utterly 
monstrous purely by virtue of linguistic deviations. Like Medieval teratomorphic writing, 
where words not only point to their usual meaning, but also carry an excess of unrelated 
signification through the human and monstrous bodies that compose the illuminated letters,445 
so familiar objects are made strange by an ultimately uninterpretable further layer contained in 
their respective signifiers. Why are potatoes, in “La morte del re di Francia” (1937), suddenly 
referred to as canie? What is strange about them, if not the opaque, suggestive signifier that 
makes such a household staple inexplicably alien?446 What does our confusion with respect to 
these entities say about our epistemological habits? The narrator of “Le labrene” (1974) is 
obsessed by the eponymous little reptiles, commonly known as geckos; the fantastic quality of 
the tale, centered around the protagonist’s paranoia and his conflictual relationship with the 
material of his own story, originates mainly from the haunting and unusual word through which 
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“[…]la turpe bestia” is designated.447 In “Il dente di cera,” the third part of the story “Teatrino” 
(1939), a man is having dinner in a boarding house with the hostess, when the woman 
accidentally loses an artificial tooth. She explains that she makes her own prosthetic teeth out 
of “cera giassa,” a qualifier whose mysterious meaning provokes utter shock and bewilderment 
in the man: 
 
«Di cera?...» 
«Di cera giassa.» 
«Signora, ve ne prego, che scherzi son questi? … Voi volete profittare della mia 
debolezza!» 
«Perché? Che volete dire?» 
«Come che voglio dire! Ma s’è mai sentita una cera giassa! Che cosa intendete per 
cera giassa?» 
«È una cera, cera… cera giassa insomma.» 
«Signora smettetela, voi volete provocarmi. Sapete meglio di me che non esiste una 
cera giassa … Mi fate sudar freddo e mi mettete una smania, un formicolio nelle 
membra…»448 
The man’s alarmed reaction (culminating in physical violence) is dictated not by the quality of 
the object itself, but by the maddeningly elusive nature of the word used to describe it. Canie, 
                                                
447 “Le labrene,” in Le labrene, ed. Idolina Landolfi (Milano: Adelphi, 1994), 14. There is much to be 
said about this story as regards its fantastic qualities. In the taxonomy of Novecento fantastic delineated 
by Stefano Lazzarin (who identifies, as already mentioned, a hyper-, a meta- and neo-fantastic streak 
in twentieth-century iterations of the mode – all of which are perfectly represented in Landolfi), “Le 
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(a protagonist with an obsession that drives him mad, a case of suspended animation, a Poe-esque fear 
of live burial), but especially as concerns narrative devices. For instance, it features a textbook 
unreliable narrator whose only instruments for apprehending reality are his sensory and deductive 
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After coming into contact with a disgusting labrena and losing consciousness, the protagonist slowly 
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per unico tramite col mondo l’odorato e l’udito” (ibid.); then his face is covered (for better preservation) 
with a handkerchief soaked in vinegar, rendering his nose useless; finally, being placed in a coffin 
muffles the soundscape around him. All this information leads us to question – to say the least – his 
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labrene and a tooth made of cera giassa are not properly monstrous entities, but they seem to 
monsterize the signified they are attached to. A gecko itself is not monstrous if we call it gecko, 
but it might become so if we call it “labrena”; similarly, a fake tooth may be mildly disgusting, 
but its material reality is irrelevant when its name is sufficiently haunting to stick to a man’s 
brain fibers until he goes insane. 
The process of de-familiarization of language as a way into the mystery that underlies it 
is theorized in a famous passage of the autobiographical novel Des mois (1967), where Landolfi 
introduces the notion of “parole-viticci”: 
 
Ciascuno avrà fatto, volontariamente o per caso, l’esperimento che consiste nel 
rigirarsi dentro una parola fino a svotarla del tutto di significato; essa cioè sembra 
allora staccarsi, non solo dall’oggetto al quale va abitualmente legata, ma da ogni 
possibile oggetto od appiglio o sostegno, ed arricciolarsi, convolgersi nella mente, 
simile dapprima a quelle punte di frasche che il fuoco del camino torce avanti di 
bruciare, e da ultimo soltanto a se medesima. Parole-viticci, si potrebbero forse 
chiamare queste parole senza immaginabile rapporto colla realtà fenomenica. Ora: che 
cosa sono esse? Sono oggetti irriconoscibili o veramente parole autonome? E, nel 
secondo caso, donde vengono o cosa simboleggiano? E noi stessi che dobbiamo farne, 
in quale spazio, in quale abisso dell’anima lasciarle sciamare? Ancora una volta ci 
sentiamo superati da alcunché o da alcuno; né, sgomenti, troviamo nulla di meglio che 
frettolosamente ritrarci da quel mondo di ombre minacciose e riportare le parole al 
loro valore trito, provvisorio.449 
 
Every word, if seen from up close, threatens to lose its meaning – or better, to reveal its inherent 
meaninglessness. An extraordinary “monomania” or “nervous intensity of interest” is what 
dictates one of the pastimes of Egaeus in E. A. Poe’s “Berenice,” i.e. “to repeat monotonously 
some common word, until the sound, by dint of frequent repetition, ceased to convey any idea 
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whatever to the mind.”450 This literary antecedent evokes images that are far from comforting 
(where did that monomania lead Egaeus?), but the narrator of Des mois manages to snap out 
of a potentially lethal fixation by retreating to the reassuring world of habit and commonplace. 
 
3.2. “E allora perché non taci?” 
A worse fate befalls the unfortunate protagonist of sci-fi novel Cancroregina (1950), who is 
writing a chronicle-diary from a spaceship adrift around the moon. It is precisely through an 
effort of “ricerca o… sistemazione di parole” that the narrator unwittingly summons an 
unsettling entity, which he calls with the neologism porrovio. This entity appears completely 
unannounced in the text, like a sudden realization: 
 
Il porrovio! Che bestia è il porrovio? Mi duole dire che io stesso non lo so … Lui ha 
un’aria tra il tapiro e il porco o il babirussa, è quasi senza collo. Compare quando la 
notte corre come una lepre al sole, colle orecchie trapassate dalla luce; e quando 
dall’ombra mi spia e mi cova la follia, accovacciata come un gatto, o meglio come un 
escremento di vacca, cogli occhi gialli. 
Da molto tempo la mia vita è ossessionata dalla ricerca o dalla sistemazione di parole. 
Il porrovio si aggira grigio nelle tenebre, il porrovio viene, va, il porrovio è una massa 
che io non posso inghiottire.  
Il porrovio non è una bestia: è una parola.451 
 
The pinnacle of monstrous interstitiality has been reached: the porrovio is not only a Linnean 
nightmare, a mash-up of species; it is a word, a psychic phantasm and a material entity at all 
once. The same can be said about the vipistrello, or mental bat – another bestia-parola 
obsessing the narrator of Cancroregina. This unheard-of creature (“mostruosa” because of a 
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“deviazione parziale” rather than “totale”: a slight orthographic alteration) flaps around the 
inside of the cranium, but it can be expelled, and therefore materialized, through a powerful 
sneeze.452 Few things reinforce the notion of the permeability between mind and matter more 
than the image of a porous skull. 
The consequence of these apparitions can be compared to those described by Arthur 
Schopenhauer in the already-mentioned treatise on ghost-seeing: 
 
… with these perceptions, the boundary between subject and object, as being the first 
condition of all knowledge, becomes doubtful, indistinct, and indeed quite blurred. ‘Is 
that outside or inside me?’ is asked by everyone – as it was by Macbeth when a dagger 
floated before him – by everyone who is not deprived of caution and reflectiveness by 
a vision of such a nature.453 
In Landolfi’s fiction, the appearance of word-animals such as the porrovio accompany the 
disintegration of the principium inviduationis (“quelle distinzioni che … garantiscono lo 
sviluppo e l’integrità della coscienza: Io/Altro; reale/irreale; parte/tutto; vita/morte”454), and 
above all the distinction between subject and object, the necessary foundation of both 
knowledge and discourse. In the context of our interpretive grid, the porrovio is an enemy of 
cataphasis: logical affirmations about the real based on detached observation, entrusted to a 
transparent, objective language. It is not surprising, then, that as soon as the porrovio makes 
its way into the mind of the character, both his mental structure and its linguistic scaffolding 
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begin to putrefy455: the narrative loses coherence, words are deformed into deranged puns and 
the novel itself comes to an end, according to a model seen in “Le Horla.”456 
The point of these teratomorphic words is to show (monstrare), with their paradoxical 
body and their ambiguous status, that the pretense of dominating (domesticating?) discourse is 
laughably absurd. Even the mere idea of telling a story is blindly optimistic, as suggested by 
the exquisitely apophatic title of Landolfi’s 1966 collection, Racconti impossibili. One of the 
stories included therein, “Rotta e disfacimento dell’esercito,” opens with an exercise in the 
“mestieracci[o]”457 of writing stories: it describes some rather unexciting events in a country 
household during a classic dark-and-stormy night. Then the story ceases abruptly, giving way 
to a disenchanted reflection on the meaning of that exercise. Not only traditional stories such 
as these cannot, in good conscience, be written anymore (there is always a tinge of nostalgia in 
                                                
455 Stefano Lazzarin, “Parole-viticci: bestiario e onomastica di Tommaso Landolfi,” Studi novecenteschi 
34, no. 74 (2007): 317.  
456 There is an undeniable wealth of similarities between Cancroregina and Maupassant’s tale, starting 
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Landolfi’s attitude towards the great narrations of the past): indeed, as a general principle, 
“[o]ccorre avere una tal quale dose di follia per raccontare una storia, e forse il titolo di tutta 
intera la presente racconta doveva essere, meno ambiguamente, Racconto: impossibile.”458 
And yet, this story is being written, if in the negative key. The narrator catches the inherent 
contradiction of his position and anticipates the following objections:  
 
Basta o non basta dire «Io non ho niente da dire?» Ovvero: dire «Io non ho niente da 
dire» è dir qualcosa o è dir nulla? Per carità, non tiriamo ora fuori il metro logico, 
altrimenti la risposta è palmare, e come tale inservibile. Difatto a chi dica «Io non ho 
niente da dire» il volgare oppone: «E allora perché non taci?»459 
 
But – he replies to his imaginary critic – “quel sere [himself] sente il bisogno di dire”460: he 
can only live in and through language, even if all he can talk about is that he cannot talk about 
anything. In fully apophatic guise, Landolfi’s fantastic makes discourse out of its own limits, 
but, contrary to the ultimate trajectory inherent in an apophatic discourse of the sacred, never 
seems to be able to transcend itself. While Pseudo-Dionysian negative philosophy prescribes 
the ‘suicide’ or abdication of language as a condition for the “liberation from the limitations of 
predication,”461 in Landolfi’s tales words never truly go away: they stalk, they haunt, they 
scare, and cling to the mind like tendrils. The “abisso dell’anima” that is relentlessly hinted at 
and glimpsed through a phantasmagoria of monstrous and monsterized language ultimately 
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coincides with a silence – an unknowable hors là – that is always fatally out of reach. As in a 
tragic catch-22, language is both in the way of any process of unveiling and discovering, and 
the only instrument available to man to attempt such an operation, therefore leaving him 
eternally “a mezza strada tra il silenzio e l’espressione.”462 
  
                                                





In this study, I have attempted to define the ways in which a literary mode especially concerned 
with ways of saying defines the monster – the undefinable par excellence. I have retraced the 
philosophical and literary-historical pedigree of the genre/mode vis-à-vis its preferred 
rhetorical and narrative procedures, in order to highlight its interest in the limits of empirical 
knowledge and the conditions of representation. One might say that the first chapter shows a 
meta-critical example of the textual model described in chapter 2 apropos of the Thing or 
Enigma: through a reconstruction of theories of the fantastic and an analysis of its recurrent 
features, I have attempted to circle around the ghost of the fantastic – to close in on it – in order 
to arrive at a working definition. 
Throughout this study, I have preferred not to frame the fantastic in terms of the irrational 
side of Positivistic scientism; rather, I have found more use in the concepts of cataphasis and 
apophasis, because of a number of reasons. First of all, as I have shown in Chapter 1, the 
fantastic mode is still steeped in a context of scientific rationalism, whose language and means 
it adopts precisely in order to probe the limits of such a philosophical model. Analogously, 
apophatic discourse does not reject rational discourse (the discourse of logic and scientific 
classification that I have been referring to as “cataphatic”), but constantly dramatizes its pitfalls 
and its self-deceiving fictions of completeness. If apophatic theology points to an ultimate truth 
whose existence, however inaccessible to merely human means, is not disputed, fantastic 
apophasis describes a secular tendency to corrode overconfident representations of the world 
as made to measure for human cognition, but remains suspended, as explained by Jameson, 
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“on the point of meaning, forever disposed to receive a revelation, whether of evil or of grace, 
that never takes place.”463 Another reason why cataphasis and apophasis are particularly handy 
notions when dealing with fantastic literature is that they point to specific conceptions of 
language and representation; therefore, they are especially effective tools for approaching a 
literary mode that is inherently preoccupied with “quella vicenda che consiste nel fatto di 
raccontare.”464 The fantastic mode is intrinsically apophatic because it participates of a 
discourse that constantly states its own limits – or rather builds itself on those very limits, 
flaunting and thematizing them, in the texts I analyzed, through the figure of the monster. 
I have examined a strain of nineteenth-century texts featuring the innovative figure of the 
material ghost – a figure whose elusiveness (both to the senses and to rational speculation) 
allows for the introduction of an (in)visible hole at the center of narrative, the “limite interno 
al discorso”465 that is the hallmark of the mode. By provoking – and frustrating – the principle 
of horror vacui that characterizes a certain scientific mindset, and that informs the cataphatic 
impulse to total description, the monster ultimately functions “to critique the overconfident 
constructs of rational analysis.”466 
I have shown how the language-monstrosity nexus carries over to later iterations in ways 
that both bridge the gap between ‘classic’ and less traditional fantastic, and at the same time 
highlight the specificity of the paths chosen by the fantastic mode in the first half of the 
twentieth century. Such specificity consists in a heightened reflexivity over the means and 
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purposes of the mode and a frequent thematization of its procedures. In particular, in the works 
of H. P. Lovecraft and Tommaso Landolfi, the fantastic’s built-in curiosity towards 
manifestations of the ineffable, together with its predilection for uncanny transfigurations of 
the familiar, are distilled into the notion of monstrous language. In H. P. Lovecraft’s fiction, 
this principle is both stylistic and thematic. I have shown how Lovecraft’s hypertrophic style, 
in its glorious disregard for any principle of ‘good’ writing, tries both to compensate for the 
fundamental ineffability of the inhuman spectacles beheld by the characters and to recuperate 
some degree of mimesis by growing the tentacles and appendages that characterize the bodies 
of its monstrous subjects. Subsequently, I have demonstrated how, in Tommaso Landolfi’s 
works, the fantastic experience is chiefly located in the subject’s tormented relationship with 
words, in his awe and fear of their uncanny power, in his obsession for the “ricerca o … 
sistemazione di parole.”467 Animated words, regurgitated from a mysterious ‘inside,’ impose 
their presence on the narrator and demand to be listened to, calling attention on their intrinsic 
mystery; disquieting signifiers such as canie and giassa make the familiar strange purely by 
virtue of linguistic deviations; word-thought-animal mash-ups such as the porrovio and the 
vipistrello demolish the walls that should hermetically seal the mind from the world, the 
speaking subject and the spoken object; tendril-words impose upon the mind with the fixity of 
an obsessive thought, transforming the friendly face of language into a ghoulish grimace. 
Upon conjuring, ill-advisedly, one such parola-viticcio, Landolfi describes the 
consequence of this encounter by lamenting that “[a]ncora una volta ci sentiamo superati da 
alcunché o da alcuno…”468 The discourse of monstrosity that I have tried to explore in this 
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study is crucially articulated around this experience: one feels overcome, superseded 
(dethroned, in “Le Horla”’s lexicon), but does not know by whom or by what. Akin to the 
sublime or the numinous, the monstrous is always somewhere beyond one’s capacity to know, 
understand or explain: “[h]e knew that he was in presence, but knew not of what,”469 writes the 
governess to describe the demeanor of little Miles in the last pages of The Turn of the Screw. 
This also illuminates Lovecraft’s point about the passivity of his narrators, in a statement on 
the importance of dreams as models for his stories: “I believe that – because of the foundation 
of most weird concepts in dream-phenomena – the best weird tales are those in which the 
narrator or central figure remains (as in actual dreams) largely passive, & witnesses or 
experiences a stream of bizarre events which – as the case may be – flows past him, just touches 
him, or engulfs him utterly.”470 
The necessarily limited focus of this critical enterprise can illuminate (per viam 
negativam) ways in which this research approach could be applied and expanded. For instance, 
the texts I analyzed could be re-read with attention to the glaring absence (at least on the surface 
of the text) of any discourse on femininity. This aspect, which I acknowledge as a critical 
vacuum (a ghost?) in the present study, would probably yield interesting results when analyzed 
in the light of the fantastic’s tendency to de-center the subject and his mastery over the narrative 
– a subject that is always by definition male. In some of the texts I analyzed, features of 
femininity are attributed to monstrosity, as in the case of “Le Horla.” In the thousands of pages 
written by Lovecraft, for instance, very few women appear, and those who do generally 
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perform the function of vessels for, or promiscuous generators of, monstrous beings.471 The 
question of femininity in and through the fantastic has been broached by a good number of 
recent studies,472 and it might not be unwarranted to analyze the subject specifically through 
the lens of the fantastic’s apophatic rhetoric. 
In this project, I have intentionally left out a literary genre that especially complicates the 
notion of monstrosity as linguistic otherness: fantasy. As clarified in Chapter 1, drawing a 
distinction between fantastic and fantasy is all but an idle exercise. Knowing that the fantastic 
is especially interested in testing the movable border between real and imaginary, but has to 
postulate it in order to stage its disruption, helps us situate the figure of the monster as a 
function of this dialectic. Fantasy, however, structurally requires a complete suspension of 
                                                
471 Cf. Joyce Carol Oates’s observation: “…virtually no women appear in [his] work, for to Lovecraft, 
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disbelief, thereby changing the conditions under which it should be read. J. R. R. Tolkien’s 
fantasy fiction builds a world populated by various species of beings more or less far from the 
human form. What becomes of monstrosity when humanity is only one of the many shapes in 
which heroes come? Also, these beings speak culture-specific languages, codified and rendered 
in their original characters in detailed appendices to the main body of the text.473 This specific 
case is interesting because linguistic deviations are not especially framed as markers of 
inaccessible otherness, since they are already given in translation.  
Speaking of modal shiftings, there is perhaps a more fertile avenue in which this line of 
research could be channeled. The fantastic genre inaugurated a way of framing the 
supernatural, or more generally experiences that exceed human understanding and articulation, 
that has revealed itself to be extremely resilient in subsequent narratives of all sorts. In 
particular, the monster as function of a reflection on the boundary between real and imaginary, 
mind and matter, has influenced heavily the course of cinematic representations of the 
unknown, with an unsurprising frequency in the horror genre. In fact, the main vessel for 
monstrous narratives today, as already suggested by Noël Carroll in his already-cited The 
Philosophy of Horror: Or, Paradoxes of the Heart, is horror cinema. Carroll offers an 
interesting study of the literary pedigree of the cinematic supernatural (although this is not his 
main focus) as seen through the figure of the monster, opening up productive avenues for 
inquiry. Whereas he concentrates his attention on the features of disgust associated with the 
monstrous figure, it would be interesting to tease out the ways in which these monstrous 
presences are articulated with respect to language. For instance, I am thinking of an important 
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strain cultivated by horror cinema from its very beginning, where the monstrous creature is 
denoted through generic, O’Brienesque terms or simple pronouns: Tod Browning’s The 
Unknown (1927), Gordon Douglas’s Them! (1954), Robert Gordon’s It Came from Beneath 
the Sea (1955), John Carpenter’s The Thing (1982) and They Live (1988), It (the 1990 mini-
series directed by Tommy Lee Wallace and its 2017 enormously popular remake by Andy 
Muschietti), David Robert Mitchell’s “It Follows” (2015), and so on. In these films, the 
unnameability of the creature is directly related to its dangerousness; the monster in “The 
Thing,” for instance, cannot be pinned down to a name because it cannot be crystallized in a 
form – it is a shapeshifting entity that can morph into any of the characters, making it 
impossible to identify it and destroy it.  
If fantastic literature (together with its Gothic and sci-fi counterparts) constitutes a 
treasure trove of themes for genre cinema, one could also argue for a special suitability of its 
formal features to a visual translation. I have often commented on the visual paradigm 
underlying many fantastic stories, and on the fact that visual disturbances (such as those 
induced by the material ghost) are at the root of the fantastic experience.474 In this connection, 
we should also mention the inherent “figuratività” of the mode, as explained by Ceserani: “il 
modo fantastico ha cercato di attivare tutti i possibili procedimenti di figuratività e iconicità 
impliciti nella pratica narrativa …[attraverso] il ricorso a procedimenti di sottolineatura di 
elementi gestuali e visivi, di messa in posa e messa in scena.”475 Moreover, the partiality of 
vision cultivated by a fantastic text (chiefly through its use of first-person narration) finds an 
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interesting analogy in the use of point-of-view shots. The abundance of this device in horror 
cinematic language is easily understandable: first, it encourages identification with the main 
character, and secondly, it establishes a partial domain over the visual surroundings, which is 
essential for setting up the (gradual or sudden) revelation of the horrific that is the hallmark of 
the genre.476 This becomes especially evident in movies that present themselves as entirely shot 
through a hand-held camera, such as Daniel Myrick and Eduardo Sánchez’s The Blair Witch 
Project (1999) and Jaume Balagueró and Paco Plaza’s REC (2007). 
The nexus between monstrosity and language is thematized in many contemporary films 
and TV series of the horror/sci-fi genre, in such pervasive ways as to demand further analysis. 
In Denis Villeneuve’s Arrival (2016), an advanced alien civilization visits Planet Earth to teach 
mankind its ideogram-based language, which is soon revealed to be something of a monstrous 
entity itself: contracting every principle of sequentiality structuring human language and 
thought, it contains –and allows its speaker to experience – the past, the present and the future 
all at once. Monsters in the HBO show The Walking Dead (2010-present) are classic growling, 
inarticulate zombies, but allow for interesting reflections on linguistic questions. The show 
conceptualizes the issue of naming the monster (and what the need for such an operation 
reveals) through the fact that the various communities of survivors call the undead in different 
ways, such as “walkers,” “biters,” “munchers,” “eaters.” This element points to the cultural 
specificity of every act of ordering the world, as well as to the feeling of belonging created and 
sanctioned by these group-specific designations: the small communities of survivors come 
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together physically to escape the hordes of zombies roaming the planet, but especially come 
together in language by virtue of the distinct labels they put on those entities. I mention these 
texts (among a wealth of possible others) with no systematic intent – merely as examples of 
the ways in which the intricate tangle of language and monstrosity is revealed as constantly 
productive even in contemporary narratives of the supernatural. As for the present study, I hope 
to have been able to pull some productive threads out of this tangle within the context of the 
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